1 / 28

Demographic Trends in Russia: Long View of the Past and Short View of the Future

Demographic Trends in Russia: Long View of the Past and Short View of the Future. Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of Demography (IDEM) State University – Higher School of Economics (HSE) Moscow, Russia szakharov@hse.ru. “Russian Demographic Situation” Informal seminar

alvaro
Download Presentation

Demographic Trends in Russia: Long View of the Past and Short View of the Future

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Demographic Trends in Russia: Long View of the Past and Short View of the Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of Demography (IDEM) State University – Higher School of Economics (HSE) Moscow, Russia szakharov@hse.ru “Russian Demographic Situation” Informal seminar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace January 26, 2012Washington D.C.

  2. Completed Cohort and Period Total Fertility During the Demographic Transition in Russia (average number of births to a woman by age 50): birth cohorts 1841-1980, period 1897-2010 Source: Zakharov S.V. (2008). Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition. Demographic Research. Vol. 19, p.910 (http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol19/24/ ). (Updated for 2010 data)

  3. Period ASFR, Russia: 1979-2010, per 1000

  4. The Uncertainty of Forecast Scenarios: Whether considerable growth of fertility is possible? Optimism of Policy Makers, Pessimism of Theorists and Common Sense of People 4

  5. OPTIMISM OF POLICY MAKERS Policy makers and general public show unfounded optimism: the “fertility problem” seems easily manageableand therefore must be solved • At ordinary level, it is believed that the money (benefits) solves everything • The official ideology (including such an active player as the church) rely on the ideas of traditionalism and national patriotism • According to them, the new population policy adopted in 2007, no doubt, gives positive results • Professional skepticism is not taken into account

  6. Russian Specialists believe that the Change in Future Fertility is not that Uncertain PESSIMISM OF THEORISTS 6 The plausible value is 1.5-1.7 for foreseeable future (up to 2030) Completed cohort fertility tends to stabilize at this level Special adjusted period fertility measures controlling for age and parity stand for that Public opinion surveys about desired and expected number of children support this as well Russian and international experience tell us that family policy focusing on fertility stimulation mostly has tempo rather than quantum effects

  7. COMMON SENSE OF PEOPLE ‘How would Policy Measures-2007 affect your childbearing-related behavior?’, a question of the RusGGS-2007 • Would have as many children as planned but sooner then planned – 10% • Would have, perhaps, more children than planned – 8% • Will certainly have more children than planned – 1% • Measures will have no effect:respondents will not change their plans regarding the number and timing of births – 81%

  8. VISIBLE EFFECTS OF NEW POLICY MEASURES? Period Parity Progression Ratios: Russia, 1979-2010(Proportion of women moving from parity n to parity n+1 during the calendar year)

  9. COMMON SENSE OF PEOPLE Intentions of having the next child, respondents aged 25-35, %

  10. Actual and Projected CTFR According to Different Scenarios, Russia, 1930-1985 Birth Cohorts

  11. MORTALITY The Uncertainty of Forecast Scenarios: Mortality Decline is a Challenge and a Categorical Imperative 11

  12. Life Expectancy at Birth in G8 Countries, Males (left) and Females (right): 1960-2009 12

  13. Proportion of Men and Women of Age 20 expected to live through Age 60: Germany (Western and Eastern), 1960-2005, and Russia, 1960-2009, % 13

  14. Correlation between Life Expectancy (red curve) and Age-Standardized Mortality Rate from Alcohol Poisoning (blue curve): Russia, 1955-2006 (Е. Andreev) Russian “Chronic Disease” 14

  15. The difference in life expectancy at birth between men and women in selected countries, 2009, HFA

  16. Infant mortality rate in some countries, HFA

  17. Infant mortalityin Russia: ROSSTAT estimates and IDEM estimates adjusted for dead children with low birth weight

  18. For Specialists the Uncertainty of Future Mortality Change is High (1/2) 18 Reasons for Optimism: A sustained historical downward trend in infant and child mortality The fight with a dangerous alcohol consumption has started The “Health” national project has substantially increased public investment in health The program of hypertension control, apparently, has a positive effect Importation of medical technology actively continues

  19. Lessons of Neighbors Life Expectancy in Several Eastern European Countries: 1970-2007 19

  20. Contribution ofage groups and major classes of causes of death to change in life expectancy in Russia, 2005-2010, males

  21. Contribution ofage groups and major classes of causes of death to change in life expectancy in Russia, 2005-2010, females

  22. For Specialists the Uncertainty of Future Mortality Change is High (2/2) 22 Reasons for Pessimism: The long-run trend since mid-1960s is negative Significant fluctuations in mortality at middle (working) ages, which began during the anti-alcohol campaign in the mid of the1980s No signs of the second epidemiological transition (life expectancy in the elderly population is not increasing) System of free public health deteriorates. National programs and reforms in public health are chaotic, inconsistent, and often have the character of PR events. The system of expert evaluations of program effectiveness is absent.

  23. MIGRATION The Uncertainty of Forecast Scenarios: Immigration: Salvation or Trojan Horse? 23

  24. Net Migration in Russia: registered in 1970-2008 and adjusted after 2002 Census in 1989-2002, thousands (annual change of permanent population due to immigration) The Myth of the ‘Rough Stream’ 24

  25. Uncertainty of Immigration Future: Inconsistent State Policy, Nationalistic Sentiments of Public 25 Russian government policy focuses on bureaucratic measures to combat illegal immigration. The policy of integration and absorption is declarative in nature. Program to bring Russian-speaking and skilled expatriates/ «compatriots» back to Russia is an ineffective propaganda campaign. Socio-cultural distance between migrants and Russian citizens is growing because of the arrival of the titular ethnic groups from Central Asia Extremely low tolerance of the Russian population to migrants, bordering on chauvinism. Significant part of the political elite shares the ideas of conservative nationalism.

  26. Uncertainty of Immigration Future: a fast growth in numbers ofguest workersin response to an increasing demand 26 In Russia, the disproportion between the vast territory and a shrinking population is increasing Sustained growth of the Russian economy is hardly possible not only without structural upgrades, or radically higher returns on human capital, but without an increase in migration The number of migrant workers in the country is increasing rapidly. In 2005 it was 1% of the total employed, in 2010 - more than 10% Russian business lobby reinforces its interest in immigrants

  27. Projections of Net Migrants Needed to Avoid Population Decline (Replacement Level of Migration) in 2000-2050: Russia and Germany, thousands Source: Replacement Migration. United Nations. 2001. ST/ESA/SER.A/206 27

  28. Number of Registered Labor Migrants, millions Inescapable Reality The total number of labor migrants in Russia is 6-7 millions (estimates of the Independent Center of Migration Studies) 28

More Related