Defence Reserves Association 2012 Conference The ADF Reserves

1. Defence Reserves Association 2012 ConferenceThe ADF Reserves MAJGEN Paul Brereton HCRESD

2. Introduction • HCRESD apologises that he is unable to address the conference personally this year. He is en-route to the NATO NRFC in Copenhagen, where he will present to the NATO nations on how Australia educates, trains and exercises its Reservists. • HCRESD wishes to acknowledge the excellent support provided to CRESD over the last year by MAJGEN Barry and the DRA, particularly in connection with Plan SUAKIN and DHOAS.

3. Scope • The state of the ADF Reserves in 2012 • Operations • Strengths • Community perceptions • CRESD Strategic Plan and current initiatives • Reserve support • Reserve reform – Plan SUAKIN

4. THE STATE OF THE ADF RESERVES IN 2012

5. Operations • Current operational tempo continues to see the ADF Reserves delivering capability to current operations, expeditionary and domestic. • ANODE – Solomon Islands • ASTUTE - Timor • RESOLUTE – Border protection • CHOGM • Elsewhere

6. Strengths

7. Community perceptions • Newspoll research outcomes • Baseline awareness of Reserves is very high (Army 96%, ADF 91%, Air Force 73%, Naval 71%) • Overall support for reserves is very strong (92% support: 68% strongly, 24% somewhat, only 4% oppose) • 82% are aware, and 88% support, that employers are required by law to release employees for Reserve service • The “surge” or expansion base role was understood by 88%. • Most (90%) were aware of Reserve role in HADR domestically (90%) and expeditionary (77%), but less of regional stabops (57%), and non-combat (49%) and combat (37%) in MEAO. • Only 37% aware that most of ADF’s specialist medical expertise was provided by Reservists. • Implications • Need to communicate: • Expeditionary roles, especially in regional stability operations; and • Health role, especially specialists

8. CRESD Strategic Plan • Strategic Objective:Enhance the capacity of ADF Reserves to contribute to Defence capability. • Vision and Direction:The contribution of the Reserve component to ADF capability is increased, through enhanced availability for and experience of Defence Service, and improved retention, including through policies that support the availability of reservists for operational service and training, and collaborative relationships (with employers, industry, special interest groups and educational institutions) that support Reservists and Defence Service.

9. Current CRESD initiatives • Review of post operational welfare support for and reintegration of Reservists • DHOAS • Joint Reserve C&SC • Reviews of ESPS and Top-up Pay

10. Reserve support • Service Protection • MOUs • Police and emergency services in all jurisdictions • QANTAS is first private sector employer MOU • DRSPA • Further enhancements to Garde Review amendments cleared by all stakeholders • Now potentially Autumn 2013 sittings • ESP • Recent amendments to ensure scheme delivers value for money, particularly with respect to self-employed reservists

11. International engagement • NZ • DRSC / TFESC liaison • JRWG • Tasman Scheme • ASWPRRCF • 1-13 Nov 12, Auckland • ICESR • Examining possibility of Australia hosting conference with wider remit in 2013

12. Challenges & opportunities • In last decade, increased use of Reserves was driven by operational tempo, and was supported by “no-win no-loss” funding. • As Australia draws down from current deployments, we can anticipate reduced tempo, and tighter funding. • For next decade, we will have to support use of Reserves on other bases than tempo. These include: • Cost. Reserves are cost-effective means of generating and retaining capability. Previous DWP proposal to transfer high-end long lead-time capability to Reserves foundered due to perceived problem with maintaining skills and currency. This does not apply to low-end long lead-time capability, which may be a better fit. • Capability. Reserves, with their civilian skills, are well-suited to particular types of mission, and can free higher readiness and higher trained permanent forces for the missions for which their additional proficiency is required. • Culture. In a time when ADF is criticised for what are said to be aspects of its culture, Reserves serve as a cultural bridge between military and civilian society.

13. RESERVE REFORM –Plan SUAKIN

14. Reserve reform agenda • DWP, DBA and SRP establish two key reserve reform strategies: • Better integration of reserve and permanent components IOT more effectively utilise RC in generating capability. This means integration of effects, not necessarily of structures • Smarter use of RC, including rebalancing capability between PC and RC, IOT reduce costs. • PARLSEC directed reviews: • Develop force rotation model that institutionalises use of RC • Review conditions of service to optimise RC contribution to Total Force

15. Why? • Reform agenda and COE has different needs from that for which extant employment model was designed 60 years ago • Initial SRP RRS initiatives, focussed on savings through workforce restructure, had limited ability to deliver reform strategies. Focus on Reserve salary savings meant that these would be achieved through less, rather than smarter, use of RC. • Unique opportunity for deep reform presented by concurrence of • Service capability reviews (Plan Beersheba, also WONCR and 1TAF) • CRESD conditions of service review (Plan Suakin) • PSPG workforce initiatives (especially DEO) • Cultural reviews

16. We said we would deliver……. Executive Summary Section 1 Problem and evidence Employment models Rewardand CoS Predictive behaviour model Personnel cost model Change management & implementation Quick wins (SMART) Stand alone, SMART approach, implementable, low risk, high gain Section 2 COURSE OF ACTION SNAPSHOT* Evolutionary reform Leverage quick wins, deliver innovative reform Transformational reform Deep reform, organisational commitment and strategic courage COA 1 – Quick Wins COA 2 – Evolutionary Reform COA 3 – Transformational Reform DETAILED COURSES OF ACTION* Section 3 *Note - Courses of action may share compatible elements across them. 16

17. How…. • Develop a scenario • E.g. Remove the HRR • Provide superannuation • Combined output • Costed through life impact of scenario on force element or total force Enter into PBM Enter into PCM • Output from PBM • Transition rate • Retention rate • Resultant force structure • Input to PCM • HRR changes • Superannuation changes 17

18. Inputs – Hypotheses Ease of transition Optimised reward Employment continuum Workforce funding systems Culture barriers Opportunity for meaningful work Gender profile Workforce profile Partnership with industry Training delivery Cumbersome systems Two way employment contract Outputs – Courses of Action Service Spectrum Remuneration (inc benefits) Transfer processes Career management Employment Offer (Whole of workforce) ForceNet (e-Portal) Plan SUAKIN Supporting efforts Total Force Culture Flexible Funding Reserve Training 25 focus groups and workshops 50+ key informant interviews 200+ literature articles reviewed 10,400+ survey responses Predictive behaviour model Personnel cost model Plan SUAKIN was built on an evidence base Evidence base 18

19. In 12 month we have… • Consulted Widely (including with the DRA) • Collected a mountain of evidence • Designed a new employment model for Defence • Proposed an integrated framework for Reserve Reform • Moved Defence closer to operating as a Total Force • Commenced building a one-stop internet-based communication capability (ForceNet) for Reserves (and arguably the FT force) • Secured agreement at the highest levels of Defence committees (COSC and SCAC) • Secured the right level of resources to insure success: • $30m in funding to implement Plan SUAKIN and ForceNet • 16 FTE to help us do the work • Commence the long journey of implementation

20. Plan SUAKIN Outline • Employment arrangements and conditions of service for a Total Force optimally balanced between Regular and Reserve Components having regard to capability, cost and culture, that enables Defence to select the best balanced force for any mission

21. Six main LOOs • Service Spectrum of 7 SERCATs of full, part-time and casual service across Regular and Reserve Components, with increased mobility between them. • Each SERCAT attracts remuneration reflecting the capability and assurance it delivers. • Simplified transfer processes. • Improved career management and opportunities. • A Defence-wide employment offer. • ForceNet, an IT solution  providing “ information anytime, anywhere”.

22. 22

23. ForceNet 23

24. Three supporting LOOs • Total Force culture, remove cultural impediments to more flexible career patterns. • Greater assurance and certainty of funding for Reserve salaries. • Rationalise individual training for reservists.

25. Effects • A more flexible workforce to respond to changes in workforce, security environment and the economy, with economical personnel structures, increased ability to use Reservists to reduce hollowness and preserve capability, improved workforce planning, and access to a wider talent pool • Increased retention of trained personnel on ceasing Permanent service. • Improved career opportunities for womento serve throughout career and life stages. • Retention (at lower readiness but also lower cost) of some capabilities no longer sustainable in the Permanent component. • Minimal increase in cost of Reservist (from Service Allowance and SERCAT 5 Super), more than offset by economies from HRR. 25

26. Cultural challenges • Embedding a Total Force Culture will require determined effort to: • Institutionalise consideration of Reserve/integrated options in all operational planning • Change attitudes to less than permanent continuous full-time service, and in particular to “offering restricted service”

27. We concluded our presentation in 2011 by saying that we also needed to address a Total Force Culture… some of you may recall this slide

28. Culture and change management 30