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9/11, What We Know Now!

9/11, What We Know Now!. Significant new Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report demonstrates clear CIA culpability in allowing the attacks on 9/11 to take place. What is the new information!. The account of FBI Agent Ali Soufan

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9/11, What We Know Now!

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  1. 9/11, What We Know Now! Significant new Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report demonstrates clear CIA culpability in allowing the attacks on 9/11 to take place

  2. What is the new information! • The account of FBI Agent Ali Soufan • Tenet and Black’s White House emergency July 2001 meetings with Rice and Clarke, Rumsfeld and Ashcroft • Tom Wilshire’s e-mails to his CTC managers in July 2001 • The NSA August 28, 2001 release from NSA caveats to FBI HQ

  3. Key People Ali Soufan - lead FBI investigator on Cole bombing Steve Bongardt – FBI agent NY, Soufan’s assistant Dina Corsi, FBI IOS at FBI Bin Laden unit Margaret Gillespie FBI IOS at CIA Bin Laden unit Tom Wilshire - deputy chief of CIA Bin Laden Clark Shannon- CIA officer at Bin Laden unit

  4. The new information! The account of Ali Soufan, lead FBI investigators on the Cole bombing, describes three requests to the CIA for information on a meeting in Kuala Lumpur and on Tawfiq Bin Attash (Khallad).

  5. Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report indicates: Tenet and Black’s White House emergency meeting with Rice and Clarke, on July 10, 2001, and with Rumsfeld and Ashcroft on July 17, 2001 indicated that a huge al Qaeda attack was about to take place that would cause mass casualties in the US.

  6. Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report indicates: Tom Wilshire’s July 5, 13 and 23, 2001 e-mails to his CTC managers, indicated that Mihdhar and Hazmi would take part in the next big al Qaeda attack. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 298, Defense Evidence 939, Moussaoui Trial]

  7. Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report indicates that: August 28, 2001, the NSA release of NSA caveats was sent to the FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi, this is the same day she told FBI Agent Bongardt, he and his team would not be allowed to take part in the investigation of Mihdhar because of the NSA caveats. [Defense Evidence #449, Moussaoui Trial, DOJ/FBI IG report, Page 304]

  8. Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report indicates that: Tom Wilshire's knowledge that Mihdhar and Hazmi would take part in next al Qaeda attack with the NSA release sent to Dina Corsi on August 28, 2001 shows that the investigation of Mihdhar by FBI Agent Steve Bongardt was deliberately sabotaged.

  9. Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report indicates that: In addition, in spite of the knowledge that a huge al Qaeda attack was about to take place and that Mihdhar and Hazmi were going to take part in this attack, no one at the CIA gave this information to FBI Cole investigators, or raised an alarm over this information to prevent this attack.

  10. Analyzing the information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report Analysis of the DOJ/FBI IG report combined with the account of FBI Agent Ali Soufan, and evidence from Moussaoui trail shows that material information had been deliberately withheld from FBI criminal investigators on numerous occasions in at least 4 major wide ranging criminal conspiracies at the CIA.

  11. Analyzing the information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report The information that was with held was the information on the al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 5-8, 2000 attended by Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Tawfiq Bin Attash (Khallad).

  12. The al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur on January 5-8, 2000 This meeting was described in an NSA cable sent to CIA, FBI and FBI Director Louis Freeh in December 1999 as an important al Qaeda planning meeting; the attendees were all photographed by Malaysian intelligence at the request of the CIA

  13. The al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur on January 5-8, 2000 January 9, 2000 - Photographs of Khallad, Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi , Saleem al-Hazmi and other other al Qaeda terrorists were given to Cofer Black and George Tenet and other people at the CIA after this meeting.

  14. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI January 5, 2000, Tom Wilshire, deputy chief of the CIA Bin Laden unit blocked FBI Agent Doug Miller’s cable on Mihdhar from going to the [DOJ/FBI DOJ/FBI IG Report 240] January 5, 2000, CIA desk officer working for Wilshire sends a cable to the rest of the CIA stating that the information on Mihdhar had been sent to the FBI [DOJ/FBI DOJ/FBI IG Report 240]

  15. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI March 5, 2000 cable received at CIA HQ indicated that Hazmi has entered the US on January 15, 2000, Many people in the CIA and the CIA Bin Laden unit including Wilshire read this cable. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 248]

  16. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI November 2000 - FBI Agent Ali Soufan, FBI lead of Cole bombing investigation, sends request to the CIA Yemen station for any information the CIA has on Khallad Bin Attash and any al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur and is told CIA has no information [Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

  17. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI November 2000 - Soufan then sends the same request to the Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, and asks Freeh to forward this request to CIA Director Tenet, and is told the CIA has no information [Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66-67]

  18. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI April 2001 - Soufan sends same request for any information the CIA has on Khallad Bin Attash and any al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur directly to CIA headquarters in April 2001. Soufan is given no information. [Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

  19. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI June 11, 2001 - CIA and FBI HQ hold meeting in New York FBI field office meeting with Soufan’s people. Three photos are of Mihdhar and Hazmi are presented to Soufan’s Cole investigating team, at this meeting. [Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

  20. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI June 11, 2001 But FBI Agent Bongardt, Ali Soufan’s assistant is never told Hazmi is in US, that Mihdhar has a multi-entry visa for the US, that Khallad had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting, with Mihdhar and Hazmi connecting both to the planning of the Cole bombing. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Pages 69-70]

  21. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI July 5, 2001 Tom Wilshire indicates in email that people at Kuala Lumpur meeting are connected to the warnings of a huge al Qaeda attack. [DOJ/FBI IG Report 298]

  22. The CIA withheld information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI July 10, 2001 Tenet and Black call emergency meeting at White House with Rice and Clarke on imminent threat of huge al Qaeda attack that will cause mass US casualties, [Woodward, State of Denial, Pages 49-52]

  23. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI July 13, 2001- Tom Wilshire asks his CIA CTC managers for permission to transfer information on the Kuala Lumpur meeting to FBI [Moussaoui Trial, Defense Evidence Item 939, DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 298]

  24. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI July 17, 2001 Tenet and Black give Rumsfeld and Ashcroft same information given to Rice and Clarke, [Woodward, State of Denial, Pages 49-52]

  25. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI July 23, 2001, Wilshire in email to CTC managers asks why he has received no reply his request to transfer information to the FBI and indicates that Mihdhar will be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda attack. [Moussaoui Trial, Defense Evidence Item 939]

  26. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI August 22, 2001 FBI Agent Margaret Gillespie finds that both Mihdhar and Hazmi are inside of the US, and gives this information to FBI IOS Agent Dina Corsi and Tom Wishire. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 300]

  27. The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI August 22-30, 2001 In spite of Wilshire knowing Mihdhar and Hazmi are in US in order to take part in al Qaeda attack, he works with FBI IOS agent Dina Corsi to sabotage FBI Agent Steve Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar.

  28. Major criminal conspiracies at the CIA to hide the Kuala Lumpur information from the FBI 1 November 2000 - Soufan’s request to CIA Yemen station asking for all information the CIA has any meeting in Kuala Lumpur or on Khallad Bin Attash. He is told there is no information 2 November 2000 Soufan’s request to Director of the FBI, and is told the CIA has no such information

  29. Major criminal conspiracies at the CIA to hide the Kuala Lumpur information from the FBI 3 April 2001, Soufan’s sends this request directly o the CIA, he receives no reply 4 July-August 2001 CIA and FBI HQ sabotage the investigation of Mihdhar by the FBI Cole investigators

  30. November 2000 - Soufan’s request to CIA Yemen station November 2000 – In response to Soufan’s request for information to the CIA Yemen station, Soufan’s is told that the CIA has no information on any meeting in Kuala Lumpur or on Khallad [Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

  31. November 2000 - Soufan’s request to CIA Yemen station December 2000 – The passport photo of Khallad attached to Soufan’s request is shown to FBI/CIA joint source, Khallad identified as high level al Qaeda terrorist [Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

  32. November 2000 - Soufan’s request to CIA Yemen station December 2000 – The CIA Yemen station sends a request to the CIA Bin Laden unit requesting the photos of both Mihdhar and Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur. [NOTE: Yemen station was identified in DOJ/FBI IG report Page 270, as “CIA personnel overseas’, Page 269]

  33. November 2000 - Soufan’s request to CIA Yemen station January 2001 2000 – Khallad is positively identified in the photo from Kuala Lumpur. This identification connects Mihdhar and Hazmi. who were also at the this meeting directly to the planning of the Cole bombing. [DOJ/FBI IG report Page 270-271]

  34. November 2000 - Soufan’s request to CIA Yemen station January 200 - The CIA Bin Laden unit, the CIA Yemen station and the CIA handler for the FBI/CIA joint source are all aware of this identification of Khallad at Kuala Lumpur, yet this information is never given to Soufan or to the FBI Cole investigators, until late August.

  35. November 2000 Soufan’s request to Director of the FBI Louis Freeh November 2000 - In response to Soufan’s request to Director Louis Freeh, to be forwarded to CIA Director Tenet, Soufan is told that the CIA has no information on any meeting in Kuala Lumpur or on Khallad Bin Attash [Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66-67]

  36. November 2000 Soufan’s request to Director of the FBI Louis Freeh November 2000- But Freeh already knew about this meeting and even knows the CIA had information on this meeting since both the NSA and the CIA had given Freeh this very information in January 2000.

  37. November 2000 Soufan’s request to Director of the FBI Louis Freeh Late 1999, “the NSA analyzed communications ..activities…indicated that several members of an "operational cadre" were planning to travel to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in early January 2000… persons named Nawaf, Khalid and Salem were involved.” At the FBI, this information appeared in the daily threat update to the Director on January 4, 2000.” [DOJ IG Report page 239]

  38. November 2000 Soufan’s request to Director of the FBI Louis Freeh - The Counter terrorism center (at the CIA) had briefed the CIA leadership on the gathering in Kuala Lumpur and the information had been passed on ... to the Director Freeh and others at the FBI... [9/11 Commission report, Page 181]

  39. November 2000 Soufan’s request to Director of the FBI Louis Freeh The FBI Director Freeh withheld material information from an on going FBI criminal investigation and had criminally obstructed the FBI’s own investigation of the Cole bombing

  40. Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA April 2001 Soufan sends the same request he sent to the CIA Yemen station and Freeh directly to CIA headquarters. [Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66] Mid-May 2001, Just after the CIA receives Soufan’s request, Tom Wishire is moved over to be liaison to Michael Rolince, head of the ITOS unit at FBI. [Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

  41. Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA Mid-May 2001 Wilshire and Clark Shannon both obtain Soufan’s request, but do not give any information to Soufan. The fact they have this request is kept as one of the most closely guarded secrets at the CIA. [DOJ/FBI IG Report page 283, 284]

  42. Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA Mid-May 2001 Wilshire obtains three photographs of Mihdhar from the CIA and attempts to identify Khallad in these photos due to information that he remembered from an old cable. NOTE: He clearly had the passport photo of Khallad from Soufan’s request, if he had the Kuala Lumpur photo of Khallad he would have known Khallad was in a different photo from Mihdhar. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 284]

  43. Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA Late May 2001 – In spite of having Soufan’s request, no information is given to Soufan and Wilshire asks Shannon to get Corsi to set up a meeting with Soufan’s own people to find out what the Cole investigators know about the meeting at Kuala Lumpur. [Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

  44. Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA Late May 2001 - The CIA wanted to know if the FBI Cole investigators found out about the Kuala Lumpur meeting and could recognize people who had attended this meeting, Mihdhar and Hazmi. [Prior Knowledge of 9/11, Page 384-388]

  45. Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA June 11, 2001 Meeting between CIA, FBI HQ agents and FBI New York Cole investigators takes place in FBI New York field office. [Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

  46. Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA June 11, 2001 Corsi shows the three photographs of Mihdhar to Cole investigators that Wishire had obtained from the CIA, CIA Officer Clark Shannon asks Cole investigators if they recognize anyone in the photos taken at Kuala Lumpur, one photo only shows Mihdhar and Hazmi. [Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

  47. Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA June 11, 2001 – Corsi claims she is told that the CIA wanted to know if Fahad al-Quso had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting. [Account of Soufan New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 67]

  48. Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA June 11, 2001 Corsi and Shannon say that information on the people in the photos can not be shared due to the “wall”. After a heated exchange, Corsi reveals that one person is named Khalid al-Mihdhar and Clark Shannon states that this person had a Saudi passport. [Account of Soufan New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 67]

  49. Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA June 11, 2001 - Corsi promised to provide additional information on Mihdhar, but later claims she was prevented by the “wall”. [Account of Soufan New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 67]

  50. CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar July 23, 2001 Wilshire emails his CTC managers and says that he is sure Mihdhar will be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda attack. [Moussaoui Trial Defense Evidence 939] July 24, 2001 Margaret Gillespie finds Doug Miller’s cable that contains the CIA information on Mihdhar and also finds the cable that states that this information had been sent to the FBI FBI IG Report. [DOJ/FBI IG Page 299]

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