Lecture 14: Al-Qaeda, Part 1

1. Lecture 14: Al-Qaeda, Part 1 • History and Evolution of Al Qaeda

2. A Brief History of Al Qaeda • 1979: Soviets invade Afghanistan • Pakistan’s ISI trains & arms mujahideen resistance • Abdullah Azzam builds network of foreign fighters • 1989: Soviets pull out of Afghanistan • Azzam & bin Laden establish “al Qaeda” • Azzam killed in car bomb attack • Bin Laden moves to Sudan; supports al-Turabi • 1992: AQ operatives try to shoot down U.S. military planes at Aden airport, Yemen

3. A Brief History of Al Qaeda (cont.) • 1993: First attack against World Trade Center • Ramzi Yousef, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman • 1993: Somalia, “Black Hawk Down” • 1994: Oplan Bojinka Plot (Yousef) in Manilla • 1996: Sudan expels bin Laden, returns to Afghanistan • 1996: First al Qaeda “fatwa” • “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” 23 August 1996: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html

4. A Brief History of Al Qaeda (cont.) • 1996: Ayman al-Zawahiri (leader of EIJ) flees to Afghanistan (joins AQ in 1998) • 1998: Second al Qaeda “fatwa” • “World Islamic Front Declaration of Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders”http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html • 1998: Bombing of U.S. Embassies in Kenya & Tanzania • 1999: Millennium Plot, LAX (Ahmed Ressam) • 2000: Bombing of USS Cole

5. 9/11 and Beyond • 9/11 Commission Report – investigation details, bin Laden’s rationale, etc. • 2001: Richard Reid (show bomber) • 2003: U.S. invades Iraq • Abu Musab Zarqawi declares loyalty to bin Laden • 2005: AQ in Iraq bombs hotel in Amman, Jordan • June 2006: Zarqawi killed by air strike • 2006: Trans-Atlantic multi-plane plot • Similarities to Oplan Bojinka . . .

6. Modern Evolution • Shift of foreign fighter gravitation from Iraq to Afghanistan/Pakistan • Local and Regional Alliances • Placing local grievance in global framework • Both parties benefit but also run risks • Examples: AQIM, AQAP, Al-Shabaab • Towards multi-polarity

7. Al Qaida in the Maghreb (Algeria)formerly “Salafist Group for Preaching & Combat” Jihad Movement (Bangladesh) Jamiat-ul-Ulema (Pakistan) Jemaah Islamiyyah (Indonesia) Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Groupe Islamique Combettant Marrocaine (Morocco) Jama’at al-Fuqra (Kashmir) Al Qa`ida’s Committee in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen and Saudi Arabia) Groupe Tunisien Islamique (Tunisia) Islamic Movement of Turkistan al-Tawhid wal Jihad (or al-Qa`ida in Iraq) Abu Sayyaf Group (Malaysia, Philippines) Eastern Turkistan Liberation (China) Jaish-e-Muhammad (Kashmir) Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines) Lashkar-e-Taiba (Pakistan) Harkat al-Mujahideen (Kashmir) Al-Shabaab (Somalia) Global Al-Qaida Affiliates There are others . . .

8. Affiliate Relationships • Often connected by the assistance and training they received at AQ training camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan • Central connection is the Salafi-Jihadist ideology • AQ leaders hope these geographically scattered, disparate movements will one day coalesce into a single, unstoppable force • These affiliates give al-Qaida a much-needed perception of having a global presence and influence • Affiliates can gain some amount of legitimacy within the global salafi-jihad movement; can lead to new kinds of logistical support, recruits, etc.

9. From Affiliates to “Leaderless Jihad” • Core al Qaida matters less (especially after May 2011) • Home-grown Islamic radicals; may originally be from North Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia • Local converts to Islam mostly living in Europe, Africa and perhaps Latin America and North America • No direct connection with al Qa`ida (or any other identifiable terrorist group) • Motivated by a shared sense of enmity and grievance felt towards the United States and West • Relationship with al Qa`ida is more inspirational than actual, abetted by profound rage over the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq and the oppression of Muslims in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and elsewhere. • Neither directly members of a known, organized terrorist group nor necessarily even a very cohesive entity unto themselves.

10. Toronto plot, June 2006 • 12 men and 5 youths charged with planning a wave of attacks against Parliament Buildings, CBC Broadcasting Centre, CSIS offices; Attempted to acquire 3 tons of ammonium nitrate • Not a homogeneous group (Arab, Pakistani, Somali and Caribbean) • All were Canadian born or residents of good standing • “Led” by 22 year-old Fahim Ahmed and Zakaria Amara • No known direct ties to al Qa`ida central or affiliates • Inspired by al Qa`ida, and guided by 43-year-old Salafist cleric Qayyum Abdul Jamal, whose sermons at a local mosque, Al-Rahman Islamic Centre for Islamic Education, were “filled with hate” against Canada • Fahim Ahmed distributed jihadi videos after Friday prayers glorifying the 9/11 hijackers • Lots of Internet activity, chatting, use of the Internet for indoctrination, radicalization, research on targets, weapons • Infiltrated by Mubin Shaikh, an Indian-Canadian Muslim with solid Islamic background, who served as a police informant, disrupted plot

11. Recent Cases in the U.S. • May 2009 - plot by four prison parolees and Muslim converts to bomb two synagogues in New York City and Stewart Air National Guard base in Newburgh, NY (near West Point) • September 2009 - attempt by a Jordanian national who overstayed his visa to bomb a Dallas office building • September 2009 – plot by a Muslim convert to bomb a federal courthouse in Springfield, Illinois. • November 2009 - 13 people killed at Fort Hood by an Army psychiatrist • December 2009 - young Nigerian on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit attempts to detonate explosives hidden in his underwear • March 2010 - young Somali-American arrested in Yemen during a roundup of suspected al Qaeda members • March 2010 - “Jihad Jane” indicted • April 2010 – NY Times Square attempted bombing

12. Recent Cases in the U.S. Between September 11, 2001, and the end of 2009, 46 publicly reported cases of domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism occurred in the United States • Almost 1/3 of those cases occurred in 2009 • Most had limited skills or experience with weapons, criminal activity, violence, etc. • Ideological commitment was primary driver. - Brian Jenkins, “Would be Warriors” - Bruce Hoffman, “American Jihad”

13. Conclusion • Al-Qa`ida is a decentralized entity, not an organized force; It is made up of numerous affiliates groups, local independent cells, and motivated and resourceful individuals • Al Qa’ida has achieved one of their primary objectives: • Inspiring a global movement of individuals using violence against civilians in pursuit of a political objective • AQ’s efforts to inspire and mobilize new recruits in Western Countries, including the U.S., is one of the biggest security challenges facing US today The U.S. homeland is threatened by a global ideologically-fueled movement which can lead to attacks from foreigners or from U.S. citizens or residents inspired by the ideology This movement requires that we understand the ideology and why it resonates among communities and individuals, and then attack the sources of that ideological resonance

14. Questions?