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DoS attacks prevention

DoS attacks prevention. Avital Yachin Under supervision of Gal Badishi SoftLab – June 2006. What is DoS. server. client. attacker. What is DDoS. zombie. zombie. server. zombie. zombie. zombie. zombie. Possible solutions. Firewall (specific ports) ?

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DoS attacks prevention

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  1. DoS attacks prevention Avital Yachin Under supervision of Gal Badishi SoftLab – June 2006

  2. What is DoS server client attacker

  3. What is DDoS zombie zombie server zombie zombie zombie zombie

  4. Possible solutions • Firewall (specific ports) ? • Heuristic (identifying and blocking the attacker) ? • Clients Authentication ? • At what level ?

  5. Selected solution • Both sides authenticate the other side at the packet level. • Current implementation filters packets at the transport layer (UDP). • Can be generalized to the IP layer.

  6. IP Data IP Header UDP Data UDP Header UDP Data UDP Header IP Data IP Header How it works Outgoing Packets Key

  7. IP Data IP Header UDP Data UDP Header UDP Data UDP Header IP Data IP Header How it works Incoming Packets Key ? = Key

  8. User mode Kernel mode How it works Application TCP/IP Driver NDIS Driver Network Card NDIS Hook Driver Encapsulator

  9. Authentication Method • Hashing (SHA-1) of current time and a secret code. • Authentication token changes periodically (not for every packet  much cheaper). • Clocks synchronization. • Client’s secret code is known to server.

  10. Conclusions • There’s no simple solution to wire flood. • Packets can be filtered at lower levels thus preventing system resources abuse. • Solution is “cheaper” than IPSEC (but doesn’t handle encryption).

  11. Future Enhancements • Filtering packets at the IP layer (solution for TCP and others). • Auto time synchronization. • Full kernel mode implementation (performance / flexibility tradeoff).

  12. Demo

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