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Flemming Andreasen (fandreas@cisco)

SIP Extensions for Network-Asserted Caller Identity and Privacy within Trusted Networks <draft-ietf-sip-privacy-04.txt>. Flemming Andreasen (fandreas@cisco.com)

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Flemming Andreasen (fandreas@cisco)

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  1. SIP Extensions for Network-Asserted Caller Identity and Privacy within Trusted Networks<draft-ietf-sip-privacy-04.txt> Flemming Andreasen (fandreas@cisco.com) W. Marshall, K. K. Ramakrishnan, E. Miller, G. Russell, B. Beser, M. Mannette, K. Steinbrenner, D. Oran, F. Andreasen, J. Pickens, P. Lalwaney, J. Fellows, D. Evans, K. Kelly, M. Watson IETF - March 2002

  2. Draft Status • Lots of list discussion and off-line comments • Currently in WG Last Call

  3. Overview of Changes • Applicability Statement about appropriate use • Within administrative domain or cooperating domains • Draft is for network-asserted identity, not user-asserted • Anonymity header removed • Issue of IP address privacy still described, but no solution offered (general service invocation issue) • Extensions must be documented in an RFC and undergo designated expert review • Grammar fixes and 2543bis alignment • Various editorial changes

  4. Open Issue #1 • Proxy handling of a Remote-Party-ID received from untrusted entity (proxy or UA) • Option 1 • If verifiable, set “screen=yes” • If not verifiable, set “screen=no” • Option 2 • Always remove untrusted Remote-Party-ID • If identity can be determined, add new Remote-Party-ID with identity information • Option 1 more general than option 2 • Option 1 allows unsupported identity types to be passed while still supporting the general privacy handling functions • Option 2 assumes that an untrusted Remote-Party-ID is always useless. Option 1 lets the user decide • Recommendation: Option 1

  5. Open Issue #2 • Explicitly indicate the party type (rpi-pty-type) or infer from message • Option 1 • Explicit “calling” and “called” party types • Option 2 • Always infer from message, i.e. “calling” in request and “called” in response • Deprecate rpi-pty-type • Option 1 more general than option 2 • Allows “calling” and “called” in other messages than requests and response respectively (European requirement (?)) • Allows for other types of party information in the future (related extensibility issue) • Recommendation: Option 1

  6. Open Issue #3 • Types of Identity Information (rpi-id-type) • Option 1 • User, Subscriber, and Terminal • Option 2 • User only (inferred) • Deprecate rpi-id-type • Option 1 more general than option 2 • Allows different types of identity information to be conveyed which could be important for some network based services • Allows for other types of identity information in the future (related extensibility issue) • Recommendation: Option 1

  7. Open Issue #4 • Define “privacy” parameter as a general URI parameter or restrict to Remote-Party-ID • Option 1 • Let “privacy” parameter apply only to Remote-Party-ID. • Option 2 • Let “privacy” parameter be a general URI parameter • Option 2 more general than option 1 • Not clear why the UA couldn’t just make other URIs “private” to begin with • Significant draft change • More discussion needed

  8. Open Issue #5 • Extensibility of rpi-pty-type and rpi-id-type • Option 1 • Make them extensible • Require RFC and designated expert review • Option 2 • Do not make them extensible • Option 1 more general than option 2 • Enables use of existing privacy mechanism for new types of party and identity information in the future • Potential for abuse, however the required designated expert review can prevent this • Recommendation: Option 1

  9. Open Issue #6 • Names of rpi-pty-types • Currently “calling” and “called”, however somewhat misleading • Alternative suggestions welcome

  10. Open Issue #7 • Cryptographically random identifier in From header field • Leftover from 2543 • No longer required given From-tag uniqueness requirement • Recommendation: • Use “anonymous@localhost” instead

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