JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LAW: A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT

1. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LAW: A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT Damien Geradin, TILEC & Howrey LLP Nicolas Petit, ULg

2. Purpose of the presentation • Whydoesjudicialreviewmatter in EU competition cases? • Providesome quantitative and qualitative information on judicialreview in EU competition cases • Demistify the «success story » of judicialreviewunderArticle 102 TFEU

3. Outline • The functions of judicialreview • Importance of judicialreview in EU competitionlaw • Nature and standard of reviewapplied by the EU courts in competition cases • Quantitative assessment • Qualitative assessment of the GC’s setting of normative standards function

4. 1. The Functions of JudicialReview • The case for a functionalapproach • Typology of the functions of judicialreview • The Lawyer’s Standpoint => Safeguarding Universal Values • The Economist’s Standpoint => Promoting Welfare • Eradicate decisional errors • Establish normative standards • The Political Scientist’s Standpoint => Ensuring Accountability

5. 2. Importance of JudicialReview in EU Competition Law • Importance of judicialreview in competitionlaw • Competition lawisprone to errors • Competition enforcementinterfereswithfundamentalrights • Competition lawmay not beenforced in the public interest

6. 2. Importance of judicialreview in EU competitionlaw • Severalidyosincraciesexplainthatjudicialreviewreallymatters in EUcompetitionlaw • Inadequateenforcement structure • Insufficientchecks and balances • Influence of Commission decisionsat national level

7. 3. Nature and Scope of JudicialReview in EU Competition Law • Articles 263 and 261 TFEU • The institutional balance and the commission’sdiscretion (+ ossification risk?) • Full (law) v. Restrained (complexeconomicassessments) judicialreview

8. 3. Nature and Scope of JudicialReview in EU Competition Law • Permeable distinctions • Errors of law • Errors of fact • Review of « complexeconomicmatters » • Judge Forwood on the « nature » of complexeconomicassessments • The Tetra Laval standard … • … and the Woodpulpgood olddays

9. 4. Quantitative Assessment • Methodology • Testing the GC’s performance in relation to the protection of fundamentalrights (seepaper) • Testing the GC’s performance in eliminatingdecisionalerrors • Data isdifficult to interpretunder Article 101 and EUMR • Data istroublingunder Article 102 TFEU => GC neverannulled in full a Commission decision / all cases involve partial annulments on peripheral issues

10. 4. Quantitative Assessment • Hypothesis 1 – Commission Always Right? • Implausiblesuccess story as errors are part of human nature • Benchmarking • In other areas where standard ispossiblylower (EUMR), and negativedecisions are lessfrequent, rate of annulmentishigher • In other areas where standard isequal, rate of judgmenthigher • Applicantsstilllodge Article 102 TFEU proceedings (beliefthatdecisions are flawedisstrong)

11. 4. Quantitative Assessment • Hypothesis 2 – Judicialimmunitythroughformalisticnormative standards • Quantitative assessment • Proxy 1: Degree of reliance of old, forms-basedprecedents => mostcited cases are Hoffmann La Roche and Michelin II • Proxy 2: Presence of mainstream economic concepts in Article 102 TFEU Judgments • “Consumer welfare” is not even cited once

12. 5. A Qualitative Analysis of the “Setting of Normative Standards” Function of the GC • In other areas, the GC has been keen on defining, and refining normative standards (GSK and Airtours) • Under Article 102 TFEU, reliance on formalistic normative standards, whichfarepoorlywithmainstreameconomictheory • The case-law on abusive tying • The case-law on abusive rebates (Tomrav. Commission, T-155/06) • Generalizedrisk of type I errors + chillingeffect on attempts to modernise competitionregimesaccross the EU