SOF & Net-Centricity For DOD EA Conference

1. SOF & Net-CentricityFor DOD EA Conference Changing the Paradigms to Change the Future Lt Col Scott Rutherford C4 Chief Technology Officer Chief, C4 Strategy Division 18 Oct 2006

2. Number of Combatant Commands: 9

3. Number of Services: 5

4. Number of Combatant Commands with Service-Like Responsibilities/Authorization: 1

5. USSOCOM Vision “To be the premier team of special warriors, thoroughly prepared, properly equipped, and highly motivated: at the right place, at the right time, facing the right adversary, leading the Global War on Terrorism, accomplishing strategic objectives for the United States.“ SOF Truths • Humans are more important than hardware • Quality is better than quantity • SOF can not be mass produced • Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur …SOF Warriors engaged – right place & time

6. Realizations • USSOCOM Vision - right place, right time, right adversary • Accomplished by excellent Intelligence, logistics, and C2 • Ability to communicate & share information is the enabler • SOF Truths – Highly skilled warrior, limited in numbers • Ability to access C4I throughout mission profile • Across the strategic, operational, & tactical levels • In-garrison, en-route, or putting bullets on target • USSOCOM is at war – GWOT • C4I systems fully engaged • Need to continue to support and enhance • USSOCOM needs to move towards net-centric warfare • Without affecting current environment & capabilities …Supporting the current fight; preparing for the next

7. Domains of Operation • The Domains (and thus military battle spaces) • Land USSOCOM Area of Operations • Maritime USSOCOM Area of Operations • Air USSOCOM Area of Operations • Space USSOCOM access to systems • Cyber ? – Not yet defined and scoped • SOF must have the ability to conduct military operations across any domain, opposed or unopposed, to gain or deny freedom of action within a given battle space

8. Global Commons • Global Commons • Areas of the world not owned by any country and thus considered as shared areas • The Global Commons • Air • Sea • Space • Cyberspace • Freedom of Navigation • The ability to conduct operations to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate the global commons

9. Cyberspace • Joint Pub 1-02 • The notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computers networks • NMS to Secure Cyberspace (NMS SC) • Comprises data and communications systems that link the physical domains of air, land, sea, and space; • is created, maintained, and operated by public, private, and government stakeholders; • is subject to the electromagnetic spectrum and allows high rates of maneuver; • transcends commonly defined organizational and geographic borders; and • forms the foundation of a global information environment. • Wikipedia • That domain that exists “inside” and “on” computer networks

10. Realizations • DoD is “studying” the cyber domain and DoD’s role in that domain • SOF must have the ability to operate and/or access the domains to include the cyber domain • Development & cultivation of (IAW NMS SC) • Strategies • Warfighting arts • Operational expertise • Technical competence • The cyber domain is also a global common • Actions in the cyber domain can affect the physical and/or cyber domains • USSOCOM needs to move towards net-centric warfare Must define SOF’s part

11. SOF Cyber Domain Presence • Establish governance for establishing cyber presence • An entity (man or machine) exists in the cyber domain in one or more of the following ways • User as self • User w/r/t to assigned duties/skills • User as a member of a community of interest (COI) • User will “register” with the environment via above • Environment will grant appropriate accesses based on user existence conditions • Action execution threads via mapped business processes & user actions assigned • Selection of shared vocabulary • Scope of action via Digital Rules of Engagement (DRoE)

12. DRoE Cyber Domain Action

13. DRoE DRoE DRoE DRoE DRoE DRoE NO Cyber Domain Action

14. Stovepipe - Dependent Access only data in system Tightly integrated systems w/ dedicated networks Creative methods to move data from one system to another Networked - Independent Share data from different systems possible Tightly integrated systems Systems existing on common networks make moving data from one system to another possible Net-Centric - Interdependent Access data from any system if authorized Open architecture usable by all Capability We are here Time Electronic Environment Eras …When and how do we make the jump?

15. Current Electronic Environment • Numerous networks • Numerous classification enclaves • Different governance • Not federated • Were not built with current view of net-centricity • Built at the end of the stovepipe infrastructure era • Not able to easily share information • Legacy systems • No true DoD operational net • Based on your role and mission • SOF’s part – SOF Information Enterprise (SIE) …We are in the “networking era”

16. Net-Centricity An overarching concept that realizes and utilizes the behavior and effects of networking, applying the resultant effects of networking that arise from the combining of the physical and cyber environments and coupling this (resultant effects) withinformation superiority in such a manner that applications, services, systems (e.g. weapon systems, sensor systems, support systems, ISR systems), and users (e.g., decision makers, warfighters, support personnel), can work together in a way that planned and unplanned actionable elements (net-centric enabled elements) can work synergistically, creating a greater ability than the sum of its parts.

17. Enabling Net-Centric Warfare • To enable net-centric warfare a net-centric enabling environment must exist • Core attributes of a net-centric enabling environment • Able to communicate • Limited by policy not architecture • Can share/access data, information, knowledge • Limited by policy not architecture • Creates the environment to access/control • Applications • Services • Systems • Actionable elements (e.g., weapon systems, sensors) …Establish enabling environment!

18. Creating Net-Centric Enabled Capability • Three capability categories • Enabling Environment Capabilities - underlying IT foundation • User Core Capabilities - Capabilities that everyone wants / uses • User Focused Capabilities - Capabilities for a subset of users • Separation of enabling environment from user capabilities • IT “Professional” community responsible for enabling capabilities • Provide clear guidance and standards via concise individually approved documents – Applied Concept Document (ACD) • Document desired effect and how to assess • Significant change in any concept does not invalidate entire plan • Must synchronize requirements, budget, and acquisition efforts to scope requirements, validate, develop, resource, acquire, field, operate, and maintain SIE capabilities …Think capabilities

19. Effects Based Operations Effects-based operations are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war. Capabilities Effects • Four key ingredients for successful effects-based operations are: • Options • Agility • Coordination • Knowledge Mobilization …Focus on capabilities

20. Capability Requirements (Prioritized) Net-Centric Enabled Capability Requirements KM Enabling Requirements IT Enabling Requirements NCE Stds Net-Centric Enabled Capability Funding Capability Program Office Responsibility NW Program Office Responsibility Network …NCE Capabilities on the environment

21. Capability Requirements (Prioritized) Net-Centric Enabled Capability Requirements Net-Centric Enabling Gap Capability Program Office Responsibility • IT Infrastructure • KM “Infostructure” • Policy • Guidance • TTPs • Tools (e.g, meta tagging) Net-Centric Enabling Gap NW Program Office Responsibility Network …NCE Capabilities on the environment

22. Networked Environment NETWORK 1 NETWORK 2 NETWORK X NETWORK Y Disparate Networks Gap Disparate Networks Gap BW Gap Connectivity Gap Disparate Networks Gap BW Gap Connectivity Gap Disparate Networks Gap BW Gap Connectivity Gap Network Gap Mobile Fixed Fixed/Mobile

23. How to Proceed? • Create MLS networks? • Create MSL networks? • Create MILS networks? • Create thin-client solutions? • Create unique “stove-pipe” solutions? • Protected infrastructure? • Create enclaves? • Tunnels? …Need to think differently

24. The SIE Problem • No standardized capability-based approach to develop SIE enabled capabilities for SOF • Inability to dynamically communicate and share information from/to anywhere, across a spectrum of network environments operating at numerous security levels and/or user groups • No dedicated operational environment …Solution can’t affect current operations or capabilities

25. Document Color Codes Exists Under Development Planned SIE Core Governance Model

26. User Focused Capabilities User Core Capabilities SIE Reference Model SIE Governance and Strategy (Policy Management) Mission Areas (Capability Management) Investment Strategy (Portfolio Management) External Capability External User (Enterprise Management) Enabling Environment Capabilities External Core Service External Network Enabling Environment(s) Boundary

27. SIE Enabling Environment • The “IT Professionals” will define the environment, the policies, TTPs, and tools to empower the “info layer” “COI POCs” so they can empower their user community Fixed, Fixed/Mobile, Mobile, Embedded Enabling Environment SOA IT Domains “IT Professionals” Policy TTPs Tools Communities of Interest Users COI POC Policy, TTPs, Tools “Infrastructure Layer” HW/SW “Infostructure Layer” IA Layer …Decouple Info & Infra structures

28. Single-Electronic Environment • Approach - create a single-electronic environment via TRUST • Trusted user – “I am who I say I am and I’m ok” • Trusted user interfaces – “No insider threat from the device” • Trusted data – “Data protected & watched” • Trusted infrastructure – “systems protected & watched” • Trusted environment – “Info assured/mission assured” • Data will no longer reside in different classification domains • Will “rest,” travel, get processed, and used side by side with other levels of data • Based on privileges and location of trusted user and capabilities of user interface …A classification-stateless, trusted NW

29. Classification Level Classification-Stateless, Trusted Environment • Need to create a Classification-Stateless, Trusted Environment (CSTE) • An environment that has no classification state while at rest • Classification “bubbles” are created when data is processed/used • Allows any user access to the infrastructure • The foundation for info sharing • CSTE matures over time • IOC occurs at initial desired classification level • Transport layer dependent • FOC occurs at final desired classification level • Data object dependent • Test, pilot, operate TS None Classifications Available ? Time0 <- IOC -> FOC TimeX …The future is now

30. Resources Time0 IOC FOC TimeX The Transformational Spike • The basic (IOC) net-centric enabling environment can’t be grown over a long period of time • Effort is required up-front to create the core systems that creates the net-centric enabling environment • IOC • Core systems online • FOC achieved • Capabilities matured • Handle necessary classifications …All or nothing

31. The Transformational Implementation Challenge • To create a seamless, federated, single-electronic, IP based, net-centric enabling environment • Without affecting current operations • Net-centric enable all C4ISR & weapon systems • Without affecting current capabilities • Migrate all C4ISR & weapon systems into this net-centric enabling environment • Allowing for a smooth transition …Ready today, ready for tomorrow

32. Enter SOFNet Network Centric Warfare is the theory. Net-Centric Operations is the concept. SOFNet is the net-centric enabling environment for making the theory and concept a reality and allow SOF to operate in the cyber domain. “SOFNET is the operational construct and architectural framework for Special Operations Warfare in the Information Age which integrates Warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force, scalable across the spectrum of conflict.” Federated, net-centric enabled, operational Environment …Environment not enterprise

33. SOFNet as Weapon System SOFNet weapon system… …That supports & enables all USSOCOM weapon systems

34. SOFNet • SOFNet has 8 core systems • User, user device, transport, processing, storage, services, boundary layer, and SOFNet mgt systems • SOFNet created & managed by: • Standards, governance, IA strategy, data strategy • CIP assured via military and commercial systems • Creating decoupled • Infrastructure layer • Infostructure layer

35. SOFNet-Based Capabilities IA Data Strategy Standards & Governance Service-Oriented Architecture Enterprise Management Systems Single-Electronic, Operational Environment Intel Mission Area Capabilities Warfighting Mission Area Capabilities Business Mission Area Capabilities Enterprise Information Environment Mission Area Intel Enterprise Capabilities SOFNet/ Boundary Layer

36. Net-Centric Warfare OBJECTIVE SOFNet Based Capabilities Net-centric enabled capabilities operating on SOFNet’s net-centric enabling environment creates the ability to conduct net-centric warfare Creating Desired Effects Net-centric warfare allows SOF to focus in a synergistic fashion its highly skilled warfighting capabilities on the objective creating the necessary desired effects …Effects based ops

37. SOFNet Distributed Whether in the civilian or military space Like a holographic image, SOFNet appears the same to the user no matter how federated and distributed SOFNet the same whether accessed virtually or equipment deployed Whether in fixed, fixed/mobile or mobile mode

38. SOFNet Creation Options • Status Quo • Let networks continue to evolve via GIG plan (10+ yrs) • Identify one of the networks as the operational network • Accelerate • Standardize governance • Identify one of the networks as the operational network • Force implementation of net-centric enabling capabilities • Clean Slate – Create a CSTE domain • Create new organization, governance, NCE technologies • Identify as the operational net • Federate with existing networks • Continue the net-centric enabling of legacy networks …Stay the course or clean slate?

39. Recommendation • Option 3 - Create new net-centric enabled domain • Opsnet.mil • NCE CSTE • Allows the cultural, technological, & user communities to continue to operate in their legacy electronic environments • Allows for the development of a NCE environment • Current operations and capabilities not affected • Existing networks can continue slow migration to being NCE • Eliminates the cultural baggage of transforming an existing network • Doesn’t affect current operations or capabilities …opsnet.mil – build it and they will come

40. How will SOF get there? • Establish a capability-based approach for SIE systems • Establish the necessary governance to enable capability development • Implement SOFNet as a new “domain” and designate as SOF’s operational environment • Identify capabilities for this environment and create roadmaps • Connect necessary legacy networks to SOFNet • Enhance legacy networks to better interact with SOFNet to form a single-electronic environment …Effort underway

41. QUESTIONS? Contact Info SCOTT C. RUTHERFORD, Lt Col, USAF C4 Chief Technology Officer (CTO), USSOCOM Chief, C4I Strategy and Transformation Division, SONC NIPR: ruthers@socom.mil SIPR: scott.rutherford@hq.socom.smil.mil Phone:  813.828.5261 Cell:  813.966.3871 Fax:  813.828.7588 ? SOFNet = A FULLY NETTED FORCE A FULLY NETTED FORCE + 21ST CENTURY SOF WARRIOR = SOF Net-Centric Warfare

42. SOF & Net-CentricityFor DOD EA Conference Changing the Paradigms to Change the Future Lt Col Scott Rutherford C4 Chief Technology Officer Chief, C4 Strategy Division 18 Oct 2006