1 / 18

A Reputation Based Scheme for Stimulating Cooperation

A Reputation Based Scheme for Stimulating Cooperation. Aruna Balasubramanian, Joy Ghosh and Xin Wang University at Buffalo (SUNY), Buffalo, NY {ab42, joyghosh, xwang8}@cse.buffalo.edu. Outline. Problem definition Related Research

mismail
Download Presentation

A Reputation Based Scheme for Stimulating Cooperation

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. A Reputation Based Scheme for Stimulating Cooperation Aruna Balasubramanian, Joy Ghosh and Xin Wang University at Buffalo (SUNY), Buffalo, NY {ab42, joyghosh, xwang8}@cse.buffalo.edu

  2. Outline • Problem definition • Related Research • Our Solution: Reputation based solution for stimulating cooperation • Reputation System • Monitoring System • Cooperation System • Security System • Conclusions • References

  3. Problem definition: Ad hoc network characteristics Lack of central authority to coordinate routing Self organized network B Wireless links C A Communication between A and B using C: Multihop C routes packets for A and B

  4. Problem definition: Non cooperation • Non cooperation: Phenomenon when nodes in the network refuse to cooperate in providing network services. E.g. Routing • Non cooperation in routing manifested by dropping packet • Environment (lack of central control, existence of implicit trust) increases challenges in isolating non- cooperative nodes • If a large percentage of nodes do not cooperate in routing, the network throughput is considerably reduced • Stimulating nodes to cooperate is important to ensure optimum network utilization

  5. Problem definition: Reasons for Non cooperation Node Genuine Malicious Resource Constraint Selfish Irrationally malicious Rational malicious

  6. Using Incentive Management schemes [1], [2], [3] Maintain credit system Give credit to nodes that cooperate Give incentive to nodes that have a good credit Incentive: Providing network services such as routing Punishment based schemes [4], [5], [6] Identify nodes that misbehave (do not cooperate) Punish misbehaving nodes Punishment: Not providing network service such as routing Related Research • Game theoretical approaches [7] • Useful in analyzing the cooperation solution

  7. Related Research: Limitations

  8. Our solution: Both rewards well behaved nodes and punishes non cooperation COMPONENTS MONITOR SYSTEM Monitors neighbors nodes for packet dropping and forwarding Distribute reputation to neighbors Reputation reports from neighbors COOPERATION SYSTEM Punish nodes with low reputation Give incentive to nodes with high reputation Use reputation of node to ensure reliability REPUTATION SYSTEM: Calculates reputation SECURITY SYSTEM Ensures the security of all the components

  9. Reputation System • Reputation: Goodness of a node as perceived by its neighbors • Reputation increased for good behavior at the rate of α • Reputation decreased for bad behavior at the rate of β • New node has neutral reputation • If Reputation < Threshold, node is punished • Common problems of reputation systems • High α: Node builds up reputation faster and misbehaves for prolonged time • Low α: Not enough incentive • High β: Genuine node that drops packets due to network failure will be punished • Low β: Takes a longer time for misbehaving nodes to be punished

  10. Reputation System (Contd…) To solve this, in our solution, • α and β are chosen carefully according to the network characteristics • The reputation is not reduced or increased linearly, but as a function of the node’s current reputation and the number of packets dropped/forwarded • Smaller the reputation, smaller is the number of packets that are dropped to reduce reputation • Larger the reputation, more is the number of packets that need to be forwarded to increase the reputation • Reputation value is changed cumulatively, at regular intervals, and not every time a packet is dropped or forwarded

  11. Monitoring System • Neighbor monitors nodes to check if node forwards packets A transmits packet (sent by B) to C B A • B listens to this transmission because of omni-directional antenna If B does not hear its packet being transmitted for a while, it assumes that the A has dropped it A’s reputation is re-calculated C

  12. If B cooperation with A, but has no transaction with C, C will not know the real characteristic of B A B C Monitoring System (Contd…) • Reputation calculation based on own observation alone may not be sufficient • Every node distributes its reputation to all neighbor nodes, to ensure that all nodes have a consistent view about each other

  13. Monitoring System (Contd…) • Every node calculate reputation as a weighted mean of its own observation and the neighbor reports • Weights given to a neighbor report is proportional to how much the neighbor is trusted A receives reputation report of B, from C and D A A has three reputation of B (including its own) , RepAB, RepCB and RepDB C B B’s reputation Weight given to reputation report of C by A = Reputation of C with A, RepAC / (RepAB + RepCB + RepDB) Weight given by A to its own reputation = Ut (Maximum reputation) D A calculates the reputation of B as a weighted mean

  14. Monitoring System (Contd…) Common problems with monitoring systems • Distribution of false reputation reports by malicious neighbors • In our solution, false reputation reports are given less weight and thus their effect will not be significant • Incorrect monitoring, when packets are dropped due to congestion or collision • We implement a mechanism to identify congestion • Incorrect penalty due to incorrect monitoring is reduced considerably due to our tolerance scheme

  15. Cooperation System: Penalty • If the neighbor node has reputation lower than a threshold • Do not forward any packet for this neighbor • Re route packets, if the next hop is the misbehaving neighbor • Common problem with cooperation systems is the inability of a repentant node to rejoin the network • We provide alternate protocols for repentant nodes to rejoin the network • Idle protocol: Node finishes penalty time and joins the network with neutral reputation • Redeem protocol: Node participates in forwarding packets, and can start sending its own packets when its reputation increases to the neutral reputation

  16. Packet1 Cert 1 Cert 2 Cooperation System: Incentive • Intermediate nodes prioritize packets based on the reputation of source and destination Source sends first packet with the certificate of the source and destination Packet n Packet 2 Intermediate nodes stores certificate Source Destination Intermediate nodes prioritize subsequent packets based on the reputation of the source/destination Certificate certifies the reputation of a node by a trusted person

  17. Security System Certification • Decentralized • Certificate provided by the neighboring nodes themselves • Using threshold cryptography Leaving the neighborhood to avoid punishment • Thus a new node may either be genuine, or be a node with low reputation from a different neighborhood • Use route reply from others to identify a malicious node from a different neighborhood

  18. References • L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Enforcing Service Availability in Mobile Ad-Hoc WANs. In Proceedings of the IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC) , Boston, August 2000. • Hubaux, J., Gross, T., Le Boudec, J., Vetterli, M. Towards self-organized mobile ad hoc networks: The Terminodes project. IEEE Communications Magazine, (January 2001). • S. Zhing, J. Chen and Y.R. Yang, “SPRITE: A Simple, Cheat-Proof Credit-based System for Mobile Ad hoc Networks”, in Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM ‘’03, San Fransesco, CA, April 2003. • S. Marti, T. J. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker, "Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks," in Sixth annual ACM/IEEE International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, 2000, pp. 255--265. • S. Buchegger and J. Le Boudec. Nodes Bearing Grudges: Towards Routing Security, Fairness, and Robustness in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of the Tenth Euromicro Workshop on Parallel, 403 -- 410, Canary Islands, Spain, January 2002. IEEE Computer Society. • P.Michiardi and R.Molva, “CORE: A Collaborative Reputation Mechanism to Enforce Node Cooperation in Mobile Ad hoc Networks,” in Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security. Kluwer, B.V., 2002, pp. 107 - 121 • V.Srinivasa, P.Nuggehalli and C.Chiasserini, “Cooperation in Wireless Ad hoc Networks” in Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM ‘’03, San Fransesco, CA, April 2003.

More Related