'Vickrey auction' presentation slideshows

Automated Mechanism Design EC-08 tutorial

Automated Mechanism Design EC-08 tutorial. Vincent (Vince) Conitzer & Yevgeniy (Eugene) Vorobeychik. First half (Vince): overview. Part I: Mechanism design review Part II: Automated mechanism design: the basic approach Part III: Some variants and applications.

900 views • 71 slides

Vincent Conitzer Duke University

Vincent Conitzer Duke University. Computer Science and Mechanism Design: Two Case Studies namely: auctions with revenue redistribution & voting in highly anonymous environments. computational techniques to help economists design better mechanisms (part 1 of this talk). computer science.

638 views • 49 slides

Spectrum Pricing

Spectrum Pricing. 30 th April 2013. Sudhir Gupta Principal Advisor Telecom Regulatory Authority of India. Disclaimer The views expressed in this presentation are purely of the presenter and they do not reflect the position of TRAI. AGENDA. Spectrum: What is it?

655 views • 40 slides

Competitive Auctions Review

Competitive Auctions Review. Rattapon Limprasittiporn. Outlines. Bibliography Introduction Software seller problem Truthful Competitive Goal & Solution. Bibliography. Andrew V. Goldberg Microsoft Research

627 views • 40 slides

Pure and Bayes -Nash Price of Anarchy for GSP

406 views • 30 slides

Pure and Bayes -Nash Price of Anarchy for GSP

433 views • 30 slides

Envy-Free Auctions for Digital goods

A paper by Andrew V. Goldberg and Jason D. Hartline Presented by Bart J. Buter , Paul Koppen and Sjoerd W. Kerkstra. Envy-Free Auctions for Digital goods. Truthful Competitive Envy-free. Three desirable properties for auctions. Truthful = bid-independent Competitive Envy-free.

436 views • 30 slides

Algorithms, Games and the Internet

336 views • 24 slides

Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding

Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding. By Larry Ausubel and Paul Milgrom October 27, 2001.

456 views • 24 slides

Bayesian games and their use in auctions

221 views • 21 slides

Computing Best-Response Strategies in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information

Computing Best-Response Strategies in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information. Daniel Reeves and Michael Wellman University of Michigan. Definitions. Infinite Game = infinite action spaces Incomplete Information = payoffs depend on information that is private to the players

417 views • 20 slides

(Single-item) auctions

(Single-item) auctions. v(. ) = $5. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. v(. ) = $3. A few different 1-item auction mechanisms. English auction: Each bid must be higher than previous bid Last bidder wins, pays last bid Japanese auction:

137 views • 13 slides

Auctions

112 views • 10 slides

ECO 436

349 views • 8 slides