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Are the System Security Watchmen Asleep?

Are the System Security Watchmen Asleep?. ICIW 2008 University of Nebraska Omaha April 24, 2008. Dr. Roger R. Schell Roger.Schell@aesec.com. Overview. Executives often clueless about security They rely on professionals to be their “watchmen” “Acceptable risk” based on gross misperception

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Are the System Security Watchmen Asleep?

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  1. Are the System Security Watchmen Asleep? ICIW 2008 University of Nebraska Omaha April 24, 2008 Dr. Roger R. Schell Roger.Schell@aesec.com

  2. Overview • Executives often clueless about security • They rely on professionals to be their “watchmen” • “Acceptable risk” based on gross misperception • Serious failure by security professionals • Don’t warn of adversaries’ subversion attack tools • Don’t warn that current solutions are highly ineffective • “Watchmen” responsible for likely disasters • “Blood on the hands” of those not sounding alarm • Time to sound alarm -- need radical change • Proven verifiable protection is available, but languishes

  3. Air Gap Between Domains Is Secure– But Crippling … OSINT GWAN (IWS) Site Ops Net NSANET (IWS) JWICS (IWS) READOUT Multi-Net (IWS) SIPRNET JWICS VTC “Lack of multilevel security (MLS) not only slows information sharing but often prevents it altogether“ - Congressional Report on 9/11

  4. Misguided Management Response • Accredit & deploy low assurance platforms • SE Linux • Virtual Machine Monitor, e.g., NetTop • Trusted Solaris • DODIIS Trusted Workstation (DTW) • “Guards” and filters, e.g., Radiant Mercury, ISSE • Ignore that low assurance is unevaluatable • Technology can only assure finding “obvious flaws” • Attackers rule, disasters are likely • Exacerbate risks with plans to get well • Reliance on “added on” security makes things worse

  5. Outline:Watchmen – Sound the Alarm • Subversion threat is serious and growing • Unconscionable use of overly weak solution • Verifiable protection technology languishes

  6. Cross-Domain Solution (CDS)(Uninformed Executive Perception) Cross Domain Solution (CDS) Operating System High Network Domain ExecutivePerceptionof current CDSs: Controlled sharing (Believes CDS prevents high information from flowing down) Low Network Domain

  7. Challenge is CDS Connectivity(A “theorem” from science) Computer Security Intermediate-Value Theorem (Dr. David Bell, 2006:http://www.acsac.org/2005/papers/Bell.pdf) Connection of disparate domains is multilevel Corporate or Government High Networks Domain Low Networks or Internet Domain

  8. Cyber Warfare Subversion Likely • Tiger Teams: subversion is tool of choice • http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1979/jan-feb/schell.html • http://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/classic-multics.pdf • Adversaries can use 30 + years experience • The threat has only increased with time • Trojan horses – application subversion • Thousands in products, e.g., viruses and “Easter Eggs” • Trap doors – infrastructure subversion • Root kits, malware • Buy IT solution from your mortal enemy? • Better figure out how, because likely you are • Software of uncertain pedigree

  9. Trojan Horse Attack: Malicious code in use of CDS • Hidden functionality in application & CDS • Adversary usually outsider (stranger to victim) • Can be surreptitiously distributed • Application user is unwitting agent • Requires victim (user) to execute application • Constrained by system security controls on victim • Exploitation undetected & controlled by remote design • Current networks’ open vast opportunity • Testing & review to detect is futile and delusional • Little mitigation in applications and most CDS systems

  10. Trojan Horse Attack:Cross-Domain Solution (CDS) Cross Domain Solution (CDS) Operating System High Network Domain Determined adversary understanding ofrealityof current CDSs: Trojan horses exfiltrate data (Substantial high data leakage to low domain) Low Network Domain

  11. Trap Door Attack: Subversion of Infrastructure • Malicious code in platform • Software, e.g., operating system, drivers, tools • Hardware/firmware, e.g., BIOS in PROM • Artifice can be embedded any time during lifecycle • Adversary chooses time of activation • Can be remotely activated/deactivated • Unique “key” or trigger known only to attacker • Needs no (even unwitting) victim use or cooperation • Efficacy and Effectiveness Demonstrated • Exploitable by malicious applications, e.g., Trojans • Long-term, high potential future benefit to adversary • Testing not at all a practical way to detect

  12. Trap Door Attack:Cross-Domain Solution (CDS) Cross Domain Solution (CDS) Operating System High Network Domain Determined adversary understanding ofrealityof current CDSs: Trap door gives low attacker access to data (Low has repeated, undetected access to high information) Low Network Domain

  13. Summary of Subversion Process • Step #1 – infrastructure subversion • Integral to installed software, e.g. trap door • Added to software suite during lifecycle, e.g., viruses • Big attraction: easy to avoid being apprehended • Perpetrator not present at time of attack • Step #2 – execution of artifice software • Can activate by unique “key” or trigger • NPS demo, 12 lines of code (LOC) subverts Linux NFS • Step #3 – (optional) “two card loader” • Bootstrap small toehold for diverse customized attacks • NPS demo with 6 LOC to subvert XP and then IPSEC • Step #4 – access unauthorized domain data

  14. CDS Subversion Vulnerability Loss of Integrity Loss of Secrecy * Computer Security Intermediate-Value Theorem: Connection of disparate domains is multilevel * CDSs not verifiably multilevel secure (MLS) Corporate or Government High Networks Domain Low Networks or Internet Domain

  15. Outline:Watchmen – Sound the Alarm • Subversion threat is serious and growing • Low cost, low risk to attacker, virtually undetectable • Highly effective, extensible, e.g., “two card loader” • Unconscionable use of overly weak solution • Verifiable protection technology languishes

  16. Weakest Link is Flawed Solutions • Single flawed interface exposes whole net • “Defense in depth” as used is myth: ignores subversion • Plethora of “band aid” solutions, e.g., firewall, IDS, … • Low assurance CDSs, e.g., guards invite disaster • Like WW II crypto use sent thousands to watery grave • “Secure application” is non-computable • Determining it is multilevel secure (MLS) is impossible • Common practice and policy cannot change science • Equivalent to stream of “perpetual motion” patents

  17. “Secure” Pixie Dust Components • Vested interest research “sand boxes” • Saps funds and attention with little accountability • Implied accreditation shortcut inhibit warnings • Subsidized contribution drive out system solutions • Hard problems for MLS systems remain • Encryption “opiate of the naive” needs trusted control • No security hardware, e.g., TPM, composition defined • Virtualization hardware need high assurance monitor • Separation kernel needs reference monitor • Security from guard script language is non-computable • CDS can be no better than platform it is on

  18. Flaws in System Solutions Missed • False security from isolated components • Accreditors cannot responsibly judge flaws • Lack “approved” system security evaluation criteria • Unskilled in assessing methods to address subversion • Only a verifiably secure CDS is evaluatable • On verifiable trusted computing base (TCB) platform • Last coherent codification in TCSEC “Class A1” • System security must be designed in, not bolted on • Includes composition of “partitions” and “subsets”

  19. Impact Indications and Warning • Vendor downloadable product subverted “Cracker gained user-level access to modify the download file. . . . you pray never happens, but it did.” – WordPress, reported on wordpress.org, March 2, 2007 • Intrusion can replace traditional espionage “you can exfiltrate massive amounts of information electronically from the comfort of your own office.” – Joel Brenner, counterintelligence executive in CNN.com, October 19, 2007 • SW subversion steals credit/debit card data “an ‘illicit and unauthorized computer program’ was secretly installed at every one of its 300-plus stores.” – Hannaford Bros. Co., reported on eWeek.com, March 28, 2008 • Military recognition of subversion “vulnerabilities are introduced during manufacturing that an adversary can then exploit.” – Lt. Gen. Robert Elder, USAF, at Cyber Warfare Conference, April 2008

  20. State of Cyber Warfare Defense “Nearly thirty years ago, Roger Schell accurately predicted: systems not designed for the modern Internet threats, poorly implemented, forcing the installation of nearly daily security patches, and many millions of systems being compromised on an ongoing basis.” Dave Safford, Manager, IBM Global Security Analysis Lab http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/why_tcpa.pdf

  21. Outline:Watchmen – Sound the Alarm • Subversion threat is serious and growing • Low cost, low risk to attacker, virtually undetectable • Highly effective, extensible, e.g., “two card loader” • Unconscionable use of overly weak solution • Current practice invites catastrophic mission impacts • Pixie dust of “secure” components gives false security • Verifiable protection technology languishes

  22. Sharing Data AcrossDisparate Domains Need MLS • Any low connection => MLS • Must be Multi-LevelSecure (MLS) • Low/Medium assurance ineffective • No protection against subversion • Vulnerabilities unknown (unknowable) • Class A1 resists subversion • Is verifiably secure (high assurance) • Verifies absence of malicious code • Key enabler for CDS accreditation Multi-Level Secure Connection • Isolation obstructs missions • Tactical situational awareness • Efficient utilization of resources High Network Domain Low Network Domain

  23. Share but Resist Subversion Adversary plants trap door or Trojan horse Cross Domain Solution (CDS) Verifiably Secure TCB High Network Domain Impossible to find or Fix “an arms race we cannot win” – IBM VP at RSA, Apr 2008 TCB still prevents information from flowing down Low Network Domain

  24. Proven Methods Evaluated and Deployed TCB • Mature, proven trusted systems technology • TCSEC/TNI need not be used as organizational utterance for policy Balanced assurance, composable subsets for systems

  25. Verifiably Secure: Class A1 / EAL7 Common Criteria TCSEC NO VULNERABILITIES A1 EAL7 EAL6 B3 UNKNOWN VULNERABILITIES B2 EAL5 Beware of “No Man’s Land” B1 EAL4 C2 EAL3 C1 EAL2 Only Class A1/EAL7 excludes malicious software

  26. Proven Solution: Security Kernel Applications Appliances Security Services Verifiable Security Kernel Operating System Intel x.86 Hardware Platform Disk Network Monitor/ Keyboard Verifiably Secure Platform “The only way we know . . . to build highly secure software systems of any practical interest is the kernel approach.” -- ARPA Review Group, 1970s (Butler Lampson, Draper Prize recipient) A computable solution to process simultaneously a range of sensitive information

  27. Illustrative MLS Demonstrations,(at UNO on COTS GTNP Kernel) • Multilevel Secure Web Server • Browse down • Unhackable web resources • Multilevel FTP Server • Covert Communications Proxy

  28. Multilevel Web Server Demo Browser Browser Multilevel Web Server App Verifiable TCB (e.g., Class A1 GTNP) High Network Domain Low Network Domain High integrity administration (and Web page authoring)

  29. Illustrative MLS Demonstrations,(at UNO on COTS GTNP Kernel) • Multilevel Secure Web Server • Multilevel FTP Server • High network users see high & low files • Low network users cannot see high files • Covert Communications Proxy

  30. Multilevel FTP Server Demo Multilevel FTP Server App Verifiable TCB (e.g., Class A1 GTNP) Low Network Domain High Network Domain

  31. Illustrative MLS Demonstrations,(at UNO on COTS GTNP Kernel) • Multilevel Secure Web Server • Multilevel FTP Server • Covert Communications Proxy • Low sources put files onto high servers

  32. Covert Comms Proxy Demo MLS Covert Comms Proxy Verifiable TCB (e.g., Class A1 GTNP) Low Network Domain High Network Domain File Server

  33. MLS Demonstrations Summary (at UNO on COTS GTNP Kernel) • Multilevel Secure Web Server • Browse down • Unhackable web resources • Multilevel FTP Server • High network users see high & low files • Low network users cannot see high files • Covert Communications Proxy • Low sources put files onto high servers

  34. Previously Delivered MLS Solutions Validated Verifiable Technology • BLACKER – VPN (NSA product on GTNP) • HSRP – Pentagon MLS gateway (on GTNP) • CHOTS Guard – UK MOD system (on GTNP) • COTS Trusted Oracle 7 – (GTNP design) • SACLANT client/server (GTNP design) • AFFPB Crypto-seal guard (POC on GTNP)

  35. Examples of More Opportunities to Apply Verifiable Technology • MLS Networked Windows (Thin Client) • MLS network attached storage (NAS) • Guards and filters • Real-time exec (e.g., SCADA appliances) • Verifiably secure MLS Linux, Unix, *ix • Identity mgt (PKI quality attribute) • MLS handheld network devices (PDA)

  36. Cost & Benefit of Evaluated Protection Capabilities Development & evaluation cost if was rated, e.g., Aesec’s Class A1 GTNP Development & evaluation cost for newverifiably secure product C2 B1 B2 B3 A1 EAL7 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL3 Insurable, No Trap Doors; Immune to Trojan Horses Resistant to Trojan horses COSTS TO DEVELOP BENEFIT TO USER THREAT TCSEC Rating C1 Common Criteria Assurance EAL2 Best Commercial Practice

  37. Conclusion:Watchmen – Sound the Alarm • Subversion threat is serious and growing • Low cost, low risk to attacker, virtually undetectable • Highly effective, extensible, e.g., “two card loader” • Unconscionable use of overly weak solution • Current practice invites catastrophic mission impacts • Pixie dust of “secure” components gives false security • Verifiable protection technology languishes • Government impedes proven COTS verifiable MLS • “Competition” from Government in funding experiments • Discrimination in evaluation, e.g., no “certificates”, no RAMP • Users fail to validate product hypothesis to vendors • Often uninformed/misinformed by security professionals

  38. Are the System Security Watchmen Asleep? ICIW 2008 University of Nebraska Omaha April 24, 2008 Dr. Roger R. Schell Roger.Schell@aesec.com

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