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Secrecy Preserving Signatures

Secrecy Preserving Signatures. Filtering Packets without Learning the Filtering Rules. Preventing Attacks with Filtering. Threat Signatures. Commodity FW. Commodity FW. Filtered Traffic. Commodity FW. Inbound Traffic. Commodity FW. Blocked Traffic. Problem: Protecting IP.

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Secrecy Preserving Signatures

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  1. Secrecy Preserving Signatures Filtering Packets without Learning the Filtering Rules

  2. Preventing Attacks with Filtering Threat Signatures Commodity FW Commodity FW Filtered Traffic Commodity FW Inbound Traffic Commodity FW Blocked Traffic

  3. Problem: Protecting IP Threat Signatures Valuable/Sensitive Information Commodity FW Commodity FW Filtered Traffic Commodity FW Inbound Traffic Commodity FW Blocked Traffic

  4. Solutions Threat Signatures Valuable/Sensitive Information Commodity FW Commodity FW Filtered Traffic Commodity FW Inbound Traffic Commodity FW Blocked Traffic • Option #1: “Lock the Door” • The signature owner performs all filtering. • The third-party network operators improve their physical security. • We encase the hardware in tamper-resistant cases.

  5. Solutions Third Party Signature Owner Garbler Third Party Third Party Filtered Traffic Third Party • Option #2: Distribute the Signature Information • No single machine knows the signatures or can, by itself, determine whether a packetwould be filtered. • Compromising all machines would still not yield the full signature list, though it wouldallow for an attacker to test packets to see if they would be filtered.

  6. Solutions Third Party Signature Owner Garbler Third Party Third Party Filtered Traffic Third Party • Option #2: Distribute the Signature Information • System should be capable of deep packet inspection. • Performance must be practical. (If possible, make use of commodity FW technology.)

  7. Project Goals • To formally model our system and adversary and understand fundamental limits of what is possible. • To seek new algorithms with provable correctness,performance, and security guarantees. (The ability to perform regular expression string matching ina secrecy preserving, and reasonably efficient manner,will likely require new crypto.) • To use prototype-driven performance evaluation to validate the practicality of our most efficient solutions.

  8. Project Schedule & Budget • Phase 1 (formal model & fundamental limits): 4 months, $134,000 • Phase 2 (algorithms & proofs): 5 months, $152,000 • Phase 3 (system designs & prototypes):6 months, $221,000 • Total Budget: $507,000

  9. Thank You

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