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Epistemology

Section 3. Epistemology. Descartes’ Doubt. If it is possible that I am dreaming now, then I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. . Descartes’ Doubt.

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Epistemology

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  1. Section 3 Epistemology

  2. Descartes’ Doubt • If it is possible that I am dreaming now, then I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true.

  3. Descartes’ Doubt • If it is possible that I am dreaming now, then I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • It is possible that I am dreaming right now.

  4. Descartes’ Doubt • If it is possible that I am dreaming now, then I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • It is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore: I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true.

  5. What is the form of this argument? • If it is possible that I am dreaming now, then I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • It is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore: I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true.

  6. What is the form of this argument? • If it is possible that I am dreaming now, then I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • It is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore: I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • If p,

  7. What is the form of this argument? • If it is possible that I am dreaming now, then I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • It is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore: I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • If p, then q.

  8. What is the form of this argument? • If it is possible that I am dreaming now, then I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • It is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore: I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • If p, then q. • p.

  9. What is the form of this argument? • If it is possible that I am dreaming now, then I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • It is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore: I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • If p, then q. • p. • Therefore, q.

  10. Modus Ponens • If it is possible that I am dreaming now, then I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • It is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore: I have reasons to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true. • If p, then q. • p. • Therefore, q.

  11. Second Argument • It is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences.

  12. Second Argument • It is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences. • If it is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences, then I cannot know whether I am awake right now.

  13. Second Argument • It is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences. • If it is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences, then I cannot know whether I am awake right now. • If I cannot know that I am awake right now, then it is possible that I am dreaming right now.

  14. Second Argument • It is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences. • If it is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences, then I cannot know whether I am awake right now. • If I cannot know that I am awake right now, then it is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore it is possible that I am dreaming right now.

  15. What is the form of this argument? • It is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences. • If it is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences, then I cannot know whether I am awake right now. • If I cannot know that I am awake right now, then it is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore it is possible that I am dreaming right now.

  16. What is the form of this argument? • It is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences. • If it is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences, then I cannot know whether I am awake right now. • If I cannot know that I am awake right now, then it is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore it is possible that I am dreaming right now. • p.

  17. What is the form of this argument? • It is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences. • If it is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences, then I cannot know whether I am awake right now. • If I cannot know that I am awake right now, then it is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore it is possible that I am dreaming right now. • p. • If p, then q.

  18. What is the form of this argument? • It is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences. • If it is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences, then I cannot know whether I am awake right now. • If I cannot know that I am awake right now, then it is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore it is possible that I am dreaming right now. • p. • If p, then q. • If q, then r.

  19. What is the form of this argument? • It is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences. • If it is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences, then I cannot know whether I am awake right now. • If I cannot know that I am awake right now, then it is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore it is possible that I am dreaming right now. • p. • If p, then q. • If q, then r. • If p, then r (unstated)

  20. What is the form of this argument? • It is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences. • If it is impossible to distinguish with certainty between dream experiences and waking experiences, then I cannot know whether I am awake right now. • If I cannot know that I am awake right now, then it is possible that I am dreaming right now. • Therefore it is possible that I am dreaming right now. • p. • If p, then q. • If q, then r. • If p, then r (unstated) • Therefore, r

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