8th NOAA Fisheries Economics & Social Science Workshop September 22, 2010

1. Overview of Alaskan catch share program structure and AFSC researchAmber Himes-CornellAlaska Fisheries Science Center 8th NOAA Fisheries Economics & Social Science Workshop September 22, 2010

2. Alaska’s catch share programs • Western Alaska Community Development Quota • Halibut and sablefish IFQ program • American Fisheries Act implementation in BSAI pollock fishery • Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab rationalization • Amendment 80 – non-American Fisheries Act Alaska groundfish fishery catch shares • Gulf of Alaska rockfish

3. Western Alaska Community Development Quota • Created in 1992 by NPFMC • Goal: to provide small, rural western Alaska communities opportunity to participate in Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) fisheries • 6 CDQ groups formed to represent 65 CDQ communities through the Western Alaska Community Development Association • Percentage of all BSAI quotas for groundfish, prohibited species, halibut and crab

4. Context: North Pacific Halibut and Sablefish Fisheries • Fixed gear fisheries • Increasing problems developing from open access “derby” fishery • allocation conflicts • gear conflict • deadloss from lost gear • bycatch loss • discard mortality • excess harvesting capacity • product wholesomeness • safety • economic stability in the fisheries and fishing communities • Interest by rural coastal community to develop a small boat fleet • NPFMC adopted amendment in 1995 • Goal: limit access to fisheries, reduce overcapacity, address conservation and management problems associated with open access fisheries

5. Program Elements: Halibut and Sablefish IFQ • Individual rights to fish issued to past participants • Rights issued annually, specific to quantity, species, area and vessel class • Specific areas designated where fishing can take place • Quota shares are tradeable to U.S. citizens, and only to crew or corporations that received initial allocation • Vessel caps both for both fishing and holding quota • Quota owners must be on board while fishing is occurring • Buyers must be legally registered, all sales reported to NOAA Fisheries • Only applies to fishing with fixed gear • Discards are prohibited • Pacific cod and rockfish are permitted bycatch • CDQ allocation highest of all catch share programs (20% of sablefish quota; 20-100% of halibut quota depending on area)

6. Context: Bering Sea Pollock Fishery • 1998 – Congress passed American Fisheries Act (AFA) • Required americanization, decapitalization and rationalization • Multiple BSAI fisheries affected by AFA • BSAI Pollock • BSAI and Gulf of Alaska Groundfish • BSAI king and Tanner crab • Scallop • NPFMC tasked with implementing AFA passed amendments to BSAI groundfish management plan • Amendments to Alaska groundfish fishery management plan adopted by NPFMC in 2002 • Program goals • Co-management approach: NOAA Fisheries issues sideboards and season/area apportionments at sector level • Facilitate formation of fishing cooperatives to distribute catch shares • Prevent competition and race for fish in sideboard fisheries

7. Program Elements: AFA Implementation in the Bering Sea Pollock Fishery • 10% of TAC allocated to CDQ groups • Allocation of TAC by sector as defined in AFA • Fishery cooperatives • Coops explicitly defined in AFA, no new Coops can form • Catch shares allocated by sector to cooperatives • Coops assign shares to vessels based on catch history • Reliance on coops for day to day management • Sideboard limits on crab and scallop • Catch weighing and monitoring • Weigh on annually approved scales • 200% observer coverage – catcher/processors • Mandatory VMS transponder at all times while fishing

8. Context: Bering Sea/ Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries 1989 FMP established joint Federal/State management, largely deferred to State 8 BSAI crab stocks under federal jurisdiction Processing plants in remote locations; “stranded capital” Decline in harvests from historical highs in 80-90’s resulted in overcapitalization and derby fisheries Seasons very short Guideline harvest levels greatly exceeded Incentive to fish in dangerous weather June 2002 NPFMC motion to approve rationalization: Address management issues associated with race for fish Improve resource conservation, utilization and management problems Reduce bycatch and associated mortalities, and potential landing deadloss High levels of occupational loss of life and injury Reduce excess harvesting and processing capacity Improve economic stability for harvesters, processors and coastal communities

9. Program Elements: BSAI crab rationalization Three sectors: harvest, shoreside processing, catcher/processors “Three pie” quota share system: Processor shares, matched harvester shares, unmatched harvester shares Transferrable/revocable QS; in-season IFQ leases Required harvester/processor share matching Harvest cooperatives Use caps Initial allocation based on vessel/ plant history 10% of TAC allocated to CDQ groups Binding arbitration system Annual economic data collection Crew loan program Photo credit: Jan Haaga (AFSC)

10. Context: BSAI Non-AFA Trawl Groundfish Catcher-Processor Fishery Multi-species fishery: BSAI Targets: Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch, Atka mackerel, flathead sole, rocksole, Pacific cod, and yellowfin sole BSAI Prohibited Species Catch: salmon, halibut, crab Allowed Gulf of Alaska Sideboard limits in numerous species Historical limitation of the season Highest discard rate in BSAI Groundfish retention standard (GRS) applied only to AFA fisheries and Non-AFA vessels >125’ NPFMC identified need to reduce incidental catch and establish cooperatives in the Non-AFA Trawl Groundfish Catcher/Processor Sector – 28 vessels Adopted by NPFMC in June 2006

11. Program Goals: Amendment 80 Catch Shares • Improve retention and utilization of fishery resources by the non-AFA trawl catcher/processor fleet • Allocate BSAI non-pollock trawl groundfish species among trawl fishery sectors • Authorize the allocation of groundfish species to harvesting cooperatives • Establish a limited access privilege program (LAPP) for the non-AFA trawl catcher/processors to reduce potential GRS compliance costs, encourage fishing practices with lower discard rates, and improve the opportunity for increasing the value of harvested species • Limit the ability of non-AFA trawl catcher/processors to expand their harvesting capacity into other fisheries not managed under a LAPP

12. Program Elements: Amendment 80 Catch Shares Assigned Quota Shares (QS) for Amendment 80 species to vessel owners QS is tied to Amendment 80 vessel; non-transferrable separate from vessel Harvest cooperatives Allows consolidation of QS catch on cooperative member vessels Prohibited species catch assigned to coop based on QS of members GRS applies in aggregate to cooperative rather than by vessel Amendment 80 Limited Access Fishery Open to Amendment 80 vessels who decline to join cooperative; no exclusive harvest privilege receive TAC allocation remaining after A80 coops’ allocations No QS or groundfish retention standard pooling or consolidation Use Caps (to limit consolidation) GRS applies to all Amendment 80 vessels Gulf of Alaska groundfish and halibut “sideboard” allocations Increased monitoring: 100% flow scale on all tows, 200% observer coverage, Annual Economic Data Report

13. Context: Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Fisheries • Fishery based out of Kodiak • Managed under License Limit Program (LLP) • Season opening varied year to year • Goal: Complete rockfish fisheries early enough to distribute effort among other fisheries, mainly salmon • TAC reachedwithin a month, resulted in closures • 2003 – Congress directed NOAA to establish pilot program to manage rockfish fisheries in central GoA • 2007 – Rockfish pilot program implemented • 2010 – NPFMC finalized changes to the pilot program Photo credit: R. R. Lauth (AFSC), J. W. Orr (AFSC), D. W. Kessler (AFSC), K. Amaoka (NWAFC)

14. Program Goals: Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Pilot Program • Improve economic efficiency • Reduce incentives for bycatch • Reduce unnecessary physical risk when fishing conditions are hazardous • Establish a cooperative system • Lengthen fishing season • Maintain deliveries to processors in Kodiak • Redistribute deliveries to processors away from times of pink salmon processing (reduce pressure on plant crews) • Address a range of social concerns • Minimize conflict in timing with other fisheries (e.g., pink salmon) • Maintain processing workforce and contribution to local economy Photo credit: R. R. Lauth (AFSC), J. W. Orr (AFSC), D. W. Kessler (AFSC), K. Amaoka (NWAFC)

15. Program Elements: Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Pilot Program • 5-year pilot project effective from 2007 through 2011 • Allocation divided between catcher vessel and catcher processor sectors based on historical catch • Each sector allocated secondary catch and PSC limits • Option to fish as part of cooperative (95% of TAC) or in competitive, limited access fishery (5% of TAC) • Requirement for full retention preventing discards • Coops manage and coordinate fishing their allocations • Mandatory coop/processor associations • Only coops receive exclusive harvest privilege • Limited access fishery allocated catch once coops receive their • Extended fishing season (May 1 to Nov 15) • Quota shares are transferable within sectors and from Catcher Vessels to Catcher Processors (but not vice versa)

16. Alaska Catch Share Program Trends • Consolidation of the fleet • Stimulation of cooperative formation • Longer seasons, elimination of “race to fish” • Increase in safety at sea • Increase in CPUE (e.g., increase in crab pot soak time) • Switched from single to multiple deliveries to processors in a season • Reduction in discards • Improved value of landings and products produced

17. AFSC research projects • BSAI crab rationalization • Post-Rationalization Restructuring of Commercial Crew Member Opportunities in Bering Sea and Aleutian Island Crab Fisheries • Employment and Remuneration Effects of IFQs in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries • AFA implementation for Pollock • Fishing Revenue, Productivity, and Product Choice in the Alaskan Pollock Fishery • Measuring Productivity Change and its Components for Fisheries: The Case of the Alaskan Pollock Fishery, 1994-2002 • Halibut and sablefish IFQ • Fishing Rights and Small Communities:  Alaska halibut IFQ Transfer Patterns