INPO Update Operational Excellence Outcomes and Configuration Management

1. INPO UpdateOperational Excellence Outcomes and Configuration Management Glenn J. Neises, INPO Sr. Evaluator June 2004 CMBG

2. Session Content • INPO Mission and Cornerstones • Operational Excellence Outcomes Overview • Configuration Management Overview • INPO Perspectives • Configuration Management Current Themes • Future

3. INPO’s Mission To promote the highest levels of safety and reliability – to promote excellence – in the operation of nuclear electric generating plants

4. Accreditation and Training Analysis INPO Cornerstones Evaluations Assistance

5. Evaluations Plant Evaluation Areas • Organizational Effectiveness • Equipment Reliability • Operational Focus • Performance Improvement • Configuration Management • Radiological Protection • Work Management • Maintenance • Engineering • Operations • Chemistry

6. Analysis Analysis • Analysis of industry trends and data • Detect emerging industry trends • Predict future performance issues • Evaluation focus areas

7. Operational Excellence Outcomes

8. Why OEO? • Changed industry • High levels of safety and reliability • A few stations unable to keep pace • Events revealed increased effort needed in several areas • A few activities important to operational excellence not evaluated • Robust self-assessment and corrective action programs

9. Sustainable, Event-Free Operations Sustainable, High Levels of Plant Performance Avoidance of Unplanned, Long-Duration Shutdowns Operational Excellence Well-Managed and Understood Safety, Design, and Operational Margins Highly-Skilled, Knowledgeable, and Collaborative Workforce High Levels of Plant Worker Safety

10. CM.1 Maintaining Margins Consistent with Design Requirements Well-Managed and Understood Safety, Design, and Operational Margins CM.2 Operational Configuration Control CM.3 Design Change Processes

11. Configuration Management Overview

12. Why Configuration Management? • Plant safety degraded, long-term shutdowns caused by problems with: • Operating and design margins • Design basis validity • Plant status and configuration control • Design product quality • Quality and oversight of engineering programs

13. Evaluating Configuration Management CM.5 Reactor Cores Designed & Operated within Performance Limits CM.3 CM Processes Clearly Defined & Implemented CM.1 Performance & Configuration Consistent with Design Requirements Well Managed Margins CM.2 Activities Maintain Configuration, Operating & Design Margins CM.4 Engineering Provides Technical Information & Support

14. Evaluating Configuration Management Approved Programs For Fuel Movement & Storage Quality Design Requirements Documented & Retrievable Rigorous Programs For Core Design, Reactivity Mgmt, & Core Monitoring Design Authority is Clear Sound Engineering Programs Personnel Trained On Plant Changes Defect Free Fuel Operation FME Controls Infrequently Performed T&E Controlled Reactor Engineers Provide Support Written Guidance Controls CM Functions Degraded Conditions Evaluated Design Interfaces Effective Good Craft Workmanship CM.5 Reactor Cores Designed & Operated within Performance Limits SSCs Meet Requirements Temp Mods Controlled CM.3 CM Processes Clearly Defined & Implemented Design Control Is Rigorous CM.1 Performance & Configuration Consistent with Design Requirements Margins Verified Thru Testing Field Changes Evaluated Safety Evaluations Are Thorough Well Managed Margins PM & PdM Validates Margins CM.4 Engineering Provides Technical Information & Support Physical Plant Matches Documentation EOP and AOP Bases Documented Design &Operating Margins Documented CM.2 Activities Maintain Configuration, Operating, & Design Margins Design Authority is Clear Process Controls Maintain D &L Limits Vulnerabilities Identified Proper Vendor Oversight OP and MA Maintain Status Plant Training Addresses Roles Degraded Conditions Resolved Aggressively Sound Parts Evaluations Contingencies Planned Comprehensive Testing & Engineering Programs Extent of Condition Investigated Quality Engineering Products Emergent Issues Promptly Investigated

15. Evaluating Configuration Management • Advance Screening (analysis) • Historical or present issues and initiatives • Preliminary Evaluation Plan (3-4 weeks prior) • General focus areas • Specific document reviews • Refined Evaluation Plan (1 week prior) • Interview schedule • Specific focus areas • In-field activities / observations (on-site weeks) • dialogue on impacts, causes, extent of condition

16. INPO Perspectives

17. Performance Indicator Index *2004 values as of March 31, 2004

18. Performance Indicator Index All components of the index have declinedslightly • Unit capability factor • Forced loss rate • Unplanned automatic scrams • Safety system performance • Fuel reliability • Chemistry performance • Collective radiation exposure • Industrial safety

19. Why? • Equipment performance has declined • Grid and switchyard problems are challenging operations • Non-station personnel not well trained or supervised • Senior managers are less focused on operations • Short-term and long-term needs are out of balance

20. Declining Equipment Performance

21. Declining Equipment Performance

22. Configuration Management Current Themes

23. CM Areas for Improvement

24. Engineering Product Quality • Examples: • Engineering results not supported with rigorous documentation • Modification delays • Vendor errors • Temporary modification control • Calculation errors

25. Engineering Product Quality • Causes: • Supervisor engagement • Lack of operating experience use • Preparation & verification not thorough • Lack of human performance tool use • Inadequate modification review meetings • Inadequate vendor oversight • Insufficient verification or testing for vendor-supplied designs

26. Operational Configuration Control • Examples: • Changes to the plant without approved engineering documents • Uncontrolled temp power / temp mods • Long term open operability determinations • Mispositionings resulting in equipment damage • Uncontrolled equipment and setpoint changes • Blocking of protective equipment trips • Protective doors locked open

27. Operational Configuration Control • Causes: • Personnel lack an understanding of the design change process • Indicators limited to component mispositionings • Human performance weaknesses • Inadequate engineering management oversight • Tolerance of temporary, unauthorized changes • CM viewed by station personnel as a design engineering role as opposed to a station role

28. Margin Management • Examples: • Low operational margin on safety-related components • Safety-related heat exchanger tube blockage • Design documents & calcs not updated • Errors in operability determinations • Modifications don’t consider all operating regimes • Modifications cause significantly reduced operational margins

29. Margin Management • Causes: • Lack of operating margin focus • Inadequate testing and monitoring programs • Insufficient understanding of design information • Station management did not challenge and question power uprate evaluations • Power uprate was a fast-track project, and time pressure contributed to insufficient reviews

30. Reactor Engineering & Fuel • Examples: • Fuel Failures • Reactor engineering support & communication with operations • Incorrect values entered into computer calculations • Causes: • High localized power due to control rod movement • No long-term, integrated plan to achieve zero fuel defects • Unclear expectations for reactor engineering support • Inadequate human performance tool use

31. Engineering Programs • Examples: • Program results not verified or in error • Testing not adequately performed • Causes: • Inadequate management oversight • Insufficient coordination between modification & testing program • Inadequate program and component health monitoring • Turnover of program engineers

32. Recurring Causes • Management oversight • Human performance • Oversight of non-station personnel • Procedure / process adherence or adequacy

33. Future What else is out there

34. Transformers Grid Margins / Power Uprate Fuel Emerging

35. Actions • Evaluations • Margin Focus • Programs Review • Engineering Program Excellence Guidelines • Initiatives • Nuclear Fuel • Engineering Work Management • Non-station Personnel • Transformers and Switchyards

36. Good News! • Many strengths continue to be written (31) • CM steering committee used to raise awareness on low margin components • Improved procurement process for critical station components • Calculation simplification to reduce the probability design errors • Benchmarking to improve configuration management activities • Effective fleet communications to implement notable CM improvements • Operation without fuel defects for ten years

37. Good News! • Improved evaluation process • Pre-evaluation activities leading to better core team preparation • Improved counterpart dialog • Better developed causes, contributors, and insights • Higher-level, vulnerability AFIs • More issues related to manager and supervisor performance • Improved cross-functional evaluation process is being well received

38. Margins • “By decreasing our margins, we are relying more and more heavily on our operators, engineers, and managers to make the right decisions, and to make them in a timely manner.” Zack T. Pate WANO Biennial General Meeting March 2002

39. Discussion