1 / 13

SME’s main bank choice and organizational structure: Evidence from France

SME’s main bank choice and organizational structure: Evidence from France. Hiba EL HAJJ CHEHADE and Ludovic VIGNERON GERME – ESA UNIVERSITY OF LILLE 2 France NTU International Conference on Finance- December 2006. Question.

azriel
Download Presentation

SME’s main bank choice and organizational structure: Evidence from France

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. SME’s main bank choice and organizational structure: Evidence from France Hiba EL HAJJ CHEHADE and Ludovic VIGNERON GERME – ESA UNIVERSITY OF LILLE 2 France NTU International Conference on Finance- December 2006

  2. Question • Do SMEs choose their main bank according to its organizationnal structure? 2006 NTU International conference on finance

  3. Related literature • Distinction between relationship and transactional lending depends on the type of information produced and used in each one: • SOFT info VS HARD info. (Stein (2002), Berger, Klapper et Udell (2001),etc.) • This is related to the bank’s organizational structure: • hierarchical VS decentralized (Stein, 2002) 2006 NTU International conference on finance

  4. Related literature (continued) • Empirical results • Positive relationship between bank’s size and its customer’s size (Berger et Udell (1996), Strahan et Weston (1996), etc.). • Hierarchical banks are less likely to provide relationship financing and thus to finance opaque firms. (Berger, Klapper et Udell (2001)). • SMEs dealing with large banks are more likely to be rationed(Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2002)) 2006 NTU International conference on finance

  5. Hypotheses • 2 hypotheses to be tested • H1 : The probability that a firm chooses a decentralized main bank increases with its informational opacity. • H2 : The opaque firms that have hierarchical main banks are more likely to be credit constrained than those who have decentralized banks . 2006 NTU International conference on finance

  6. DATA • From DIANE, a sample of 6 258 SME working with 182 different banks. • The sample SMEs are less than 5 years old. • This data is completed by banks characteristics extracted from Bankscope 2006 NTU International conference on finance

  7. Dependent Variables • The decentralization of the main bank is estimated by 3 different measures: • Bank’s size measured by the logarithm of total assets. • A dummy equal to 1 if the bank has a decentralized structure. • The Ratio personnel expenses over total assets. 2006 NTU International conference on finance

  8. Summary of our empirical model 2006 NTU International conference on finance

  9. Estimations • Model 1: OLS • Model 2: Logit • Model 3: OLS 2006 NTU International conference on finance

  10. Main Results • Regressions on the full sample 2006 NTU International conference on finance

  11. Main Results (continued) • Regressions run on the sub-samples : SA and non SA • Rationing • Non significant for transparent firms (SA) • Significant coefficient for the opaque firms (non SA) • For the rest of variables, the results are the same as previous ones. • Regressions without « firm’s size » • For Market dummy: the coefficient becomes significant. 2006 NTU International conference on finance

  12. Conclusion • Purpose of the paper: to bring explanatory elements of the choice made by a company of its main bank. • The results of the different regressions support the two predictable hypotheses. They shows that: • Opaque firms choose main banks, which have an organizational structure adapted to their needs: decentralized banks that are able to provide them a relationship financing. • Opaque firms that choose to deal with hierarchical banks face rationing problems. • Importance of our research problem in the context of the current financial restructurings: • What are the consequences of such restructurings on the financing of small and medium-sized firms. • Is there really a decrease in the number of the decentralized banks and thus a decline in the financing of small and medium-sized firms. 2006 NTU International conference on finance

  13. 2006 NTU International conference on finance

More Related