The Zionist Irgun and the British In Palestine, 1945-1948

1. The Zionist Irgun and the British In Palestine, 1945-1948 PO 483: The Politics of Terrorism

2. Background • Hertzl and the Zionist Movement (1890s) • Balfour Declaration and Beginning of British Occupation, 1917 • Key Players – Historically Divided • Yishuv • Jewish Agency • Hagana (1920) • Irgun (1938) • Stern Gang (1940s)

3. Background • Key Issue: Immigration Restriction • Very few operations during war; anti-Arabism prevails • Irgun: One of only two groups who felt political options were at an end

4. The Irgun • Declaration of Revolt by Begin (February 1944) after continued restrictions, refusal to allow Jews into regular army units, and Allies gaining upper hand • Tactical Truce with Arabs • Dissociation from Stern Gang (political purposes)

5. Structure Commander (Begin) | High Command (14 ministers) | Major Operational Units (Combat, Reserve, Propaganda, Assault Force) | Regional/District Components Benefits: Secrecy, Accountability, Separation of Operatives

6. Irgun: Operations • Desired to be a cross between terrorist and guerilla unit (political purposes), but practical infeasibility limited this; even their terrorist tactics tried to ensure degree of legitimacy • Employed “part-time” terrorists: secrecy high, incognito – made British response likely to be against entire Yishuv, but could also turn Jews against them (Irgun rarely had support of Yishuv) • Robberies of weapons and currency, symbolic attacks, bombings of oil pipelines, transport, etc., military installations: goals were to weaken prestige, paralyze movement, weaken morale

7. Chronology • Early 1944: Symbolic and infrastructure attacks: Warning given. British response nonexistent • More major attacks against British infrastructure: little response • November 1944: Assassination of Lord Moyne by Stern Gang; condemned by Irgun, but led to launching of “Saison”

8. Chronology • March 1945: “Saison” ends with little British success (turned Yishuv against Hagana and Jewish Authority) • Continued infrastructure and pragmatic attacks through 1945 and 1946 • Lack of harsh British Response led Irgun to adopt more violent tactics (e.g., Goldsmith House attack)

9. Three Key Operations • King David Hotel: July 22, 1946 • Planting of bombs in basement of hotel (administrative seat of occupying government) • 91 people killed – large loss of life condemned by Hagana, Authority, even though they had helped plan attack - led to loss of reputation • Measured British response: get armed insurrection under control without disrupting relations with sympathetic portions of Yishuv • Operation Shark: Curfew, road closings - Capture as many members of Irgun and Stern Gang as possible (787 arrests) • Important lesson: more violent tactics could be effective, but not if they caused Yishuv to sympathize with British

10. Three Key Operations • Assault on Acre Prison, May 1947: • Retaliation for hanging of Irgun members; originally a jailbreak scheme, but high on symbolism • Nearly 250 people escaped during the attack, but only 30 were Irgun • British soldiers inflicted many casualties by trapping fleeing attackers • Marked new wave of violent attacks, and harmed British prestige (even though the British did not employ full-scale response), but taught the lesson that high profile attacks could result in further loss of Yishuv support and loss of members if not very carefully planned

11. Three Key Operations • The Hanging of the Two Sergeants, July 1947: • British had withdrawn some forces already • Hangings in retaliation for execution of Irgun members after months of protest by Yishuv (indicative of tit-for-tat approach); British did not believe they would do it • Bodies booby-trapped to maximize loss of life • Condemned by Yishuv, but effects on British were enormous • Commons condemned hangings • Increased calls in Britain for withdrawal • British troops responded by firing into crowds of civilians, smashing shop windows; made some Jews sympathetic • British also responded by eliminating death penalty • So, a harsh retaliation was elicited, but the support after even this was low, as another “Saison” ensued

12. Conclusions • Yishuv nearly always against Irgun, but the importance of international audiences ended up being crucial (especially in Britain) • Increase in attack severity when necessary to ensure larger response, decrease when Yishuv was in league with the British

13. The British Counterterrorist Effort • General Countermeasures: • Exile - Begun in 1944; effective (took away opportunity to conduct jailbreaks, depleted leadership) • Execution • Use political measures to turn sectors of the Yishuv against the Irgun • Martial Law • Extensive Searches • Committed more than 10,000 troops

14. Example of Success and Failure: Operation Agatha (June 1946) • Drive wedge between political leadership and Irgun, and bring about more moderates (arrest implicated leaders) • Limited in scope – did not want to destroy any groups, but neutralize their effectiveness • Borders closed, phone service cut off, curfews imposed, search campaign initiated – 2000 people arrested, numerous arms captured • Problematic: Paralyzed Irgun and Hagana, but only for a short time – harsh enough to alienate important sectors of Yishuv, but limited enough that allowed very many operatives and potential recruits to remain free

15. Why did the British effort fail? • Political Indecisiveness and Conflict of Attitudes in London • Military Incompetence and Displeasure with Political Decisions • Jewish Hostility • Waning Morale Amongst Troops • Low Public Opinion in Britain • Proponents of Zionism in the International Community