Deontological Ethics

1. Deontological Ethics Kant and the force of duty It is impossible to conceive of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will (I 1).

2. Deontological… • A deontic moral theory is concerned with duty (Greek deon = ‘duty). • Morally right action is performing one’s duty. • Certain sorts of acts are morally wrong in themselves. Hence, they are always morally impermissible even if done in pursuit of morally obligatory or worthy ends. • Moral evaluation does not look to consequences… • … but at the intentions and motives of the individual.

3. Duties…where from? What? • One culturally significant answer – God – divine revelation – holy texts and interpretation. • Kant – reason (our rational capacity) provides the basis for a universally binding morality. • Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals trans. H.J. Paton as The Moral Law. Thought developed in the later, Metaphysic of Morals. • Key reading – Brad Hooker, ‘Kant’s normative ethics’, RJP issue 1 • The need for 'pure ethics'. The certainty of our status as free agents. The Enlightenment goal of overcoming one's own immaturity (our immaturity); finding the source of authority within reason.

4. The basic question • What’s it all about (not quite the way Kant put things)? • What ought I to do? • In line with his approach in epistemology (think back to the course on reason and experience) Kant approaches moral philosophy by reflecting upon its nature. In a way upon the conditions for its possibility. • An answer to the question must be one that is an answer to whoever asks it. That is, an answer must be absolutely general or universal in scope. • Nothing can be a moral principle which can not be a principle for all. Moral principles cannot be grounded in our contingent desires, inclinations or needs.

5. Some distinctions • Inclination v. duty • Hypothetical v. categorical imperatives. • If you want X, do Y! • Do Y! • The key point is not one of grammar, but of motivation. • The categorical nature of morality. The universality and necessity of moral demands and the contingency of the demands of inclination and desire.

6. To ask what is morally right is to ask what is right for anyone to do. It is to ask for a reason to act which binds the will of absolutely everyone. • Answer not depend on how I’m feeling or what I want. Moral judgements command one’s actions independently of one’s particular desires, character and inclinations. • It is look for a categorical imperative. • Such an imperative cannot be identified by reference to the empirical conditions of agents (e.g. their particular desires, goals or circumstances). • So, moral theory involves the discovery through our rational capacity of a synthetic a priori imperative. The moral law is synthetic a priori.

7. The categorical imperative and universalisation • Huh? • Kant thinks that we can only find universally binding reasons to act once we’ve discounted all empirical conditions. • Once we’ve located such an imperative, then you’ll be doing what reason requires. • Hence, freed from the desires, ends and passions of any individual, such a moral duty will be binding on any rational being.

8. The categorical imperative and universalisation • Maxims - principle under which one acts. • Universalisation as a test for moral permissibility. • The categorical imperative – parallel formulations

9. Formula of universal law • Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law (II 52). • This is the most general way in which the categorical imperative can be expressed. Reason alone discloses to us the basis of morality, the form of the moral law commanding and directing our intentions and actions.

10. Formula of the law of nature • Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature. (II 52) • Law of nature? The idea is that a law of nature specifies an absolute regularity. Such maxims would apply to everyone and everyone would always follow them. • The formulation of CI in terms of laws of nature also captures the thought that the maxims or principles when universalised need to be consistent with the empirical facts of the natural world in which actions are undertaken.

11. Formula of the end in itself • Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end (II 66-67). • Respect for persons (perhaps most influential formulation of CI). Individuals as rational beings with their own projects and ends. Persons as the source of value of goods and practices. Persons as such possess dignity. • We must act in ways that leave intact the capacity of others to choose and act for themselves. • The failure to do so is a violation of their status as an agent, a failure to recognise them as properly a person. • To be autonomous, to pursue my ends it must be possible for me to dissent from or consent to what others do with respect to me. Reason therefore tells us that an individual cannot be treated as an end if he is subjected to coercion or deception. C.f. the victim of deceit cannot consent to the deceiver’s project.

12. Formula of the kingdom of ends • Act as if you were through your maxims a legislating member of the kingdom of ends (II 74) • This captures the idea that one act on principles all can share through their rationality and on principles which respect the capacities and dignity of each person. • In so far as we are rational each us would will just the same universal laws. • The image of the Kingdom of Ends invites us to think of each person as at once a legislator and bound by the very law enacted, law which respects the like status of all. In this sense the Kantian rational self is literally autonomous - self-legislating.

13. Illustrations 1. The suicide case. • Can this maxim be universalised? ‘From self love I make it my principle to shorten my life if its continuance threatens more evil than it promises pleasure?’ (II 53-54) 2.The case of false promising • Can this maxim be universalised? ‘Whenever I believe myself short of money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back within the fixed time, though I know this will never be done.’ (II 54-55) • No, neither can be universalised. Contradiction (in conception) would result. For example, the very possibility of maintaining the practice of promising (and so of false promising) would disappear if the maxim were universalised. • Perfect duties – duties which are always to be discharged; they hold for all agents all the time. Often negatively specified. • Do not take life. • Do not make false promises.

14. 3. Developing one’s talents. • Can we universalise a maxim of giving oneself over to pleasure rather than bothering about improving one’s natural aptitudes? 4. Helping those in need. • Can we universalise a maxim of not helping others (less fortunate than oneself)? • No. To do so would not result in strict contradiction, but in a ‘contradiction of the will’. A rational being cannot will that it be a moral law to neglect one’s talents. Nor can one will a law not to help since ‘many a situation might arise in which the man needed love and sympathy from others.’ (II 56)

15. Not all duties absolute – the point illustrated by 3 and 4. • Imperfect duties – not complete in the sense that one cannot always act on the duty and when they clash one will need to be given up for the other. Often positively specified. • Develop your talents! Help those in need!

16. Assisting others as a rational response to our vulnerability and mutual dependence. • To treat finite creatures like myself as ends requires not just that I adopt maxims which respect their capacity to act as freely determining agents, but that I support their limited and fragile capacity to act. • However, what limits are there to the possible assistance required by others? How could I have a perfect duty, one that can be discharged completely? • In a world with a plurality of agents our capacity to help others or develop ourselves is necessarily limited, indeterminate and selective. Obligations correspondingly imperfect.

17. Worries: freedom, God and immortality • Tension between natural world of causal determinism (which we experience directly through e.g. our desires and inclinations) and our experience qua agents of freedom in decisions. • Humans as parts of the natural, phenomenal world and parts of the noumenal world. Metaphysical incoherence? Two words or two ways of viewing our nature? • Freedom must be postulated. We know we are free from moral experience and it is a condition of the possibility of that experience. • Also tension between the moral goodness at which free agents aim and the happiness natural creatures pursue. Indeed, it might seem that often happiness is readily secured by those who fail to aim at moral goodness. • Co-ordination of moral goodness and happiness is the highest good and it is possible provided we postulate a benevolent God and immortality. • Kant accepts that three postulates cannot be theoretically known to be true, but they are necessary postulates of practice.

18. Challenges • Empty formalism and abstraction. • Cannot detach an account of morality from our conceptions of the good. Kant places the right before the good… • …but now there is no content in an understanding of morality. No appreciation of the embeddedness of moral relations in context. Can we separate what we ought to do from how we are, from those values and practices in which our lives gain value, purpose and cohesion? • Conflicts between duties - what do I tell the murderer seeking you?

19. Challenges • Insufficient role for inclinations, attitudes and emotions. • It is morally repugnant to act from duty alone. • It is impossible to lead a worthwhile life gripped by duty. • Also, what about the consequences? We do seem to accord a place for outcomes in our moral judgements.

20. Challenges • The die-hard racist, P, who consistently universalises the principle of extermination. • Even if P were in their position P would still will that they, including P, should be killed. • If that is so, then universalisation not a sufficient criterion of moral permissibility. • But universalisation is a necessary condition. Now a question arises of whether there are moral principles which one would be irrational to regard as a universalisable maxim. See Hooker pp.19-20. • Does the identification of non-universalisable maxims require the presupposition of substantive principles? False promising is incoherent, but do we already need to accept that we ought to endorse the practice of promising?