160 likes | 179 Views
Some Observations on Network Failures NANOG 15. Craig Labovitz <labovit@merit.edu>. Observations. Goal : Model Internet topological changes Lots of strange BGP routing Strange BGP routing went away What causes remaining BGP topological and policy changes?
E N D
Some Observations on Network FailuresNANOG 15 Craig Labovitz <labovit@merit.edu>
Observations • Goal: Model Internet topological changes • Lots of strange BGP routing • Strange BGP routing went away • What causes remaining BGP topological and policy changes? • Not just count flaps, but study how routing tables changes over extended periods • Not end-to-end
Internet Failures Analysis • Look at default-free BGP announcements from multiple large providers • Long lived (60 % of 9 months) • Consider stable if covered by less specifics • 15 minute filter window • Mean-time failure, repair and availability • Case study regional network
What We Did • Lots of probe machines • Mae-East, Mae-West, Paix, PacBell, AADs • A default-free collector at UM • Routeviews Multi-hop EBGP 6 providers US, Canada, Europe and Japan (300,000 routes) • Case study of regional backbone (OSPF, IBGP/BGP) • 42 gigabytes and four years of logged routing packets
RouteTracker • Peer with ISP routers • Log all routing packets to disk • Maintain statistics
Network Failures Michnet Backbone Failures 11/97 - 11/98
Observations • Internet significantly less availability than PSTN (99.99% +) • Low mean time to change
Next Steps • Host other routeviews machines? • Merit has several FreeBSD desktop boxes • Looking for peers… • ipma-support@merit.edu