The military consequences of some revolutions in technology

1. The military consequences of some revolutions in technology Professor David Kirkpatrick University College London

2. Perspective shaped by experience Experience Research in aerodynamics and aircraft design at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough Military operational analysis, cost forecasting and economic analysis in MoD Attache on the British Defence Staff Washington Delivery of postgraduate education in defence equipment acquisition at UCL Perspective � Eurocentric, technological, financial There are valuable lessons from other cultures. Technological and financial factors are not always sufficient to ensure victory; military forces also need a motivating cause, a valid doctrine and an effective military culture.

3. Contents Rationale for the observed growth in the unit cost of defence equipment. Increase in the fixed/variable cost ratio in defence budgets. Consequences for UK policy Cause for concern?

4. Impact of technology (1) Throughout history successive developments in technology have revolutionised warfare. Bronze and iron Chariots and composite bows Horseshoe, stirrup and built-up saddle Gunpowder During the 18th and early 19th centuries military technology remained essentially unchanged, and forces relied on � Smoothbore muskets and cannon Cavalry with swords and lances Wooden sailing ships, firing cannon in broadsides

5. Period of stasis In the period 1700-1850 when military technology was stagnant, all leading nations had the same weapons and victory was won by superior numbers. God was on the side of the big battalions. When high courage or clever generalship won against superior numbers, it was considered remarkable. Clausewitz ignored differences in weaponry. In that period the losses of a defeated army were rarely more than double the losses of the victors.

6. Impact of technology (2) Since about 1850, a series of technological advances have transformed warfare. Rifled rapid-fire small arms, and rifled guns with recoil control Ironclad ships and vehicles, powered by steam or i/c engines Aircraft and submarines ICBM and WMD Microchips Developments in military technology in that period have enabled rapid improvements in weapon system performance.

7. Improvements in weapon performance

8. Better weapons win When military technology is advancing rapidly (as in 1850+), there are often significant differences between the weaponry deployed by opposing forces and the outclassed army can suffer much higher losses; it is futile and highly-dangerous to fight with obsolete weapons. Victory depends on marginal differences in the performance of weapons deployed by the opposing forces. The force with better weapons usually wins, and the loser suffers high losses.

9. Loser/winner loss ratios

10. Replacement of weapon systems To avoid dangerous inferiority, obsolete weapons must be replaced by new designs with higher performance, to maintain adequate effectiveness against hostile nations concurrently deploying new equipment. Replacement rates vary with - Performance improvements provided by technology Extra military effectiveness conferred by such improvements Level of threat (wartime>peacetime) National financial resources Successive generations of weapons in a particular class achieve higher performance and have higher unit costs.

11. Increasing unit costs As a result of advances in technology, the unit cost of successive generations of military equipment has been rising rapidly since WWII Obscured by monetary inflation and short-term focus Sometimes attributed to �gold-plated requirements and rapacious contractors Actually the inevitable result of military rivalry and technological development Real increases in equipment unit cost � Affect most types of equipment, in medieval & modern times Can be rapid, and can persist for many decades Unit cost of combat aircraft has risen at 10% p.a.

12. Combat aircraft UPC growth

13. Increasing unit costs Concurrently the UPC of most weapon systems has been growing at between 5% and 10% per year. For mature weapons (e.g. rifle, mg) cost grew more slowly. For weapons with rapidly-increasing capability (e.g. attack and ASW helicopters) cost grew more rapidly Cost grew even faster for weapons adopting new configurations (e.g. air-ground ordnance, infantry anti-tank weapons) The growth in the unit cost of capital ships (battleships, later aircraft carriers + embarked aircraft) has continued from 1860-1980, and was only temporarily restrained by the Washington Treaty.

14. Contrasting time trends in real unit cost Costs of many consumer goods and services fall. Electronic goods Air transport Cost of goods in limited supply rise. Works of art Land Costs of �tournament� goods, services and personnel rise, often rapidly, Weapon systems First-rate sporting equipment Electoral campaigns Promotion of mass media products Talented individuals

15. Proposed countermeasures to unit cost growth in defence equipment? Economies of scale via More emphasis on exports International collaboration in development and production Increased industrial productivity through Computer-aided operations Leaner management Improved organisation Reforms in government procurement strategies e.g. More competition Integrated project teams, and other �Smart� initiatives More (or possibly less) oversight and regulation All these savings are insignificant relative to recent growth rates.

16. Future unit cost growth e.g. for aircraft Diminishing returns from speed and agility Increasing use of commercial components Replacement of humans by electronics Requirement for invulnerability (via stealth?) Need to avoid collateral damage (CNN factor) Varied scenarios Network-centric warfare It is prudent to plan for persistence of the historic trend.

17. Increasing fixed costs within projects As unit costs rise, the number of weapon systems procured falls from one generation to the next. British fighters - 1954 1000 Hunters, 1983 165 Tornado US bombers � 1955 680 B52, 1986 100 B1B Modern projects are increasingly reliant on software, which has a high ratio of fixed/variable cost. JSF may have 5 million lines of code For both these reasons, the proportion of fixed/variable cost in modern weapon systems is rising During the Cold War the development/production cost ratio for European aircraft projects was 10-20%. Now ratio is 30-50%.

18. Increasing fixed cost in force structure Formerly many weapon systems operated autonomously, with limited inter-communication and cooperation. Then a nation�s military power rose with the number of weapon systems deployed. Today weapon systems are increasingly interdependent, and their operations are directed by an electronic network, incorporating sensors communications and control. The network requires large investment, but acts as a force multiplier. In future conventional warfare, rich nations which have a network will have an enormous advantage over poorer nations which have not.

19. Advantage from networks

20. Responses to increasing unit cost Second-rate weapons systems? Guarantees bloody defeat Smaller fleets Fragile forces Diseconomies of scale Withdrawal from one or more classes, or from a major military role Consequent inability to undertake some military missions Role specialisation within an alliance Develop new weapon systems but produce only to match emergent threat Production surge may lag threat Under-equipped forces

21. Responses to higher fixed/variable cost Slower replacement cycles High cost of maintenance for geriatric equipment Danger of impotence Larger groups of nations collaborating on procurement, to share fixed cost Delay and dissention? Incremental acquisition, to spread costs Heterogeneous equipment mix Successive problems of subsystem integration? Availability Fewer projects, procuring multi-role equipment Even greater complexity

22. Future outcomes Development of first-rate weapons will be concentrated in those nations which can afford the up-front costs. Within these nations, design and production work on such systems will be concentrated in a few prime contractors; expert in all relevant aspects of network-centric warfare wealthy enough to bear financial risks. Only large rich nations can afford networks, so the forces of smaller and poorer nations become increasingly outclassed. US, with a research budget far exceeding those of potential rivals, can be a very dominant superpower

23. Alternative national policies, for smaller nations, like the UK Independence Limited capability for some second-division warfare Alliance with a larger power Common weapon systems, training and doctrine Alliance with other, similar powers Integrated planning and budgets Payment to a superpower or trans-national alliance to provide global security Most nations prefer not to decide, but have no real alternative.

24. Cause for concern? Rising unit costs and rising fixed/variable cost ratios concentrate power in the wealthiest nation. The current system of democracy and diplomacy was born when military technology was stagnant and widely-diffused weapons favoured superior numbers (Saratoga, Valmy), and when several nations could afford first-rate military forces. The system may be at risk when only the wealthy have access to the latest combat and information technologies, and power is concentrated in elite forces Royal siege train, panzer division, stealth aircraft, spooks?