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Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

Lattice Based Attacks on RSA. Outline. Lattices and Lattice reduction Lattice Based Attacks on RSA Hastad ’ s Attack Franklin-Reiter Attack Extension to Wiener ’ s Attack. Lattices and Lattice reduction. Given a set of m linearly independent vectors, {b 1 , … ,b m } in R n .

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Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

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  1. Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  2. Outline • Lattices and Lattice reduction • Lattice Based Attacks on RSA • Hastad’s Attack • Franklin-Reiter Attack • Extension to Wiener’s Attack Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  3. Lattices and Lattice reduction • Given a set of m linearly independent vectors, {b1,…,bm} in Rn. • The set of all real linear combinations of these vectors, , is a vector subspace. Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  4. Gram-Schmidt process: takes one basis {b1,…,bm} and produces a basis {b1*,…,bm*} which is pairwise orthogonal. • b1*=b1 Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  5. Example: Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  6. Given a set of basis vectors {b1,…,bm} in Rn, and m<=n. • A lattice is a set of all integer linear combinations of the bi. Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  7. Definition 1: A basis {b1,…,bm} is called LLL reduced if the associated Gram-Schmidt basis {b1*,…,bm*} satisfies Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  8. For all non-zero , we have Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  9. Lattice Based Attacks on RSA • Original problem: Given a polynomial over the integers of degree d and the side information that there exists a root x0 modulo N which is small, say |x0|<N1/d, can one efficiently find the small root x0? Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  10. The answer is YES • Basic idea: find a polynomial s.t. , and should be small Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  11. Lemma 2: Let of degree at most n and let X and N be positive integers. Suppose , then if |x0|<X satisfies h(x0) = 0 (mod n) then h(x0)=0 over the integers and not just modulo N Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  12. f(x0) = 0 (mod N) => f(x0)k = 0 (mod Nk) • For some given value of m: then gu,v(x0) = 0 (mod Nm) for all 0<=u<d and 0<=v<=m Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  13. We wish to find au,v s.t. h satisfies Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  14. example • f(x)=x2+ax+b • wish to find an x0 s.t. f(x0) = 0 (mod N) • Set m=2: Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  15. Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  16. det(A)=N6X15 Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  17. Theorem 3 (Coppersmith): • Let be a monic polynomial of degree d • Let N be an integer • If there is some root x0 of f modulo N s.t. • Then one can find x0 in time a polynomial in log N and 1/ε, for fixed values of d Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  18. Lemma 4: • Let be a sum of at most w monomials • h(x0,y0)=0 (mod Ne) for some positive integers N and e where integers x0 and y0 satisfy |x0|<X and |y0|<Y • Then h(x0,y0) holds over the integers Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  19. Hastad’s Attack • Given 3 public keys (Ni,ei) with the same ei=3 • If a user sent the same message to all 3 public keys => can recover the plaintext using CRT Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  20. Receiver 1 (N1,e) c1=me mod N1 User Message: m Receiver 1 (N2,e) c2=me mod N2 Receiver 1 (N3,e) c3=me mod N3 Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  21. Now we pad some user-specific data before a message m • For user i, ci=(i • 2h+m)3 (mod Ni) => can still break this system using Hastad’s attack Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  22. gi(m)=0 (mod Ni) • Set N=N1N2…Nk and using CRT, we can find ti s.t. and g(m)=0 (mod N) • Using Thm 3 we can recover m in polynomial time Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  23. Franklin-Reiter Attack c1=m1e mod N Bob Message: m1,m2 m2=f(m1) mod N Alice (N,e) c2=m2e mod N Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  24. Let g1(x)=xe-c1, g2(x)=f(x)e-c2 • Let s(x)=gcd(g1(x),g2(x)) • m1 is a root of s(x) • Example: f(x)=ax+b, e=3 • g1(x)=x3-c1=x3-m13 • g2(x)=f(x)3-c2 =f(x)3-m23 • s(x)=x-m1 Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  25. We can append radom bits to the message: • m’=2n-km+r • Suppose Bob sends the same message to Alice twice: • m1=2n-km+r1 • m2=2n-km+r2 Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  26. The attacker sets y0=r2-r1 and solve the equations • g1(x,y)=xe-c1 • g2(x,y)=(x+y)e-c2 • The attacker forms the resultant h(y) of g1 and g2 w.r.t. x. Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  27. y0=r2-r1 is a small root of h(y), which has degree e2 • Using Thm 3 the attacker can recover y0 and then recover m1 using Franklin-Reiter Attack Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  28. Extension to Wiener’s Attack • N=pq with q<p<2q; p,q are prime • ed=1 (mod Φ), where • d is small and • Wiener’s Attack works when • ed+(k/2)Φ=1 Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  29. ed+(k/2)Φ=1 • Set Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

  30. We can using Lemma 4 to solve the problem • This problem has a solution when δ<=0.292 • This attack works when d<N0.292 Lattice Based Attacks on RSA

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