EU Enlargement

1. EU Enlargement From Rules forAccessionto a PolicyTowards Europe (Wallace, Pollack and Young, Policy-Making in the EU, Chapter 17) Rosa Amann 4013R002-1, 1st Year MA, 11.11.2013

2. EU-Enlargement

3. Agenda • The Origins andDevelopment ofEnlargementPolicy • The Three Stages ofEnlargementPolicy • ConditionalityandEnlargementas a ForeignPolicy Tool • Conclusionsand Summary • Personal Comments • Brain Teasers

4. 1.The Origins andDevelopment ofEnlargementPolicy Decisionsabouttheconditionsunderwhichnewmemberscanjointhe EU. 1957: Treaty ofRome (Creationof EEC and EURATOM bysixfounderstates)Founders‘ desiretocreate „an evercloserunionamongthepeoplesof Europe“called „upon theotherpeoplesof Europe whosharetheir ideal tojoin in theirefforts“. Art. 237 EEC (Today Art. 49 TEU): „Any European State (…) mayapplytobecome a memberofthe Union.“ Reference to„Europeanness“, but nosophisticatedrulesforaccession. Terms foraccessionwerelefttonegotiations.

5. However: Demand foraccession was limited (Iron Curtain, remainingauthoritarianregimes in Europe (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Greece etc.) → Enlargement was restrictedtodiscreteepisodesandad-hoc bargaining Note: - 7 other European countries (DK, GB, Norway, AUS, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland) were notinterested in integrationorsovereigntytransferandfounded EFTA instead - GB appliedfor EC membershipasearlyas 1963, but France vetoed 1973: 1st „Northern“ Enlargement Round: Denmark, Ireland, UK joinedthe EC (Norwayhad a negative referendum)Denmark, UK left EFTA (EFTA was weakened) 1978: Declaration on Democracy: „respectforandmaintenanceofrepresentativedemocracyand human rights ineach Member State are essential elementsofmembership“ 1981:Greecejoins (Commissionisagainstit, but Council doesn‘tfollowitsopinion) 1986: Portugal and Spain join

6. 1987: Single European Act (SEA) (singlemarketpolicy; addedtherequirementthat EP giveitsassenttoenlargementdecisions) 1989: Fall of Berlin Wall – markedthe end oftheCold War 1990: German Reunification → Political Situation in Europe changedconsiderably → EFTA membersalreadyengaged in membershipbidsandhadsimilarideological/politicalconvictionsandgeographicalproximity → But howto manage relationswith potential applicantsthatwere post-communistand at variousstagesoftransition? → EU-enlargementandpolicy was/issupportforthetransitionstomarketeconomiesanddemocracy Since 1989, thisframeworkhasdevelopedconsiderablyandnowgoesfarbeyond Art. 49 TEU andincludeseverysinglestep. Fromthefirstday a countrydeclaresitsdesiretojoinuntilthedayofaccessionandbeyond.

7. 2. The Three Stages ofEnlargementPolicy Note: - Before 89, applicationformembership was thestartoftheprocess Today, itstarts a lotearlieranddoesn‘tnecessarilystopwithaccession - The threestagesareoverlapping 1. Association Agreements Europe Agreements (EAs):- templatefor CEECs- containsfreetradeareaforindustrialproducts, politicaldialogue on foreignpolicy, PHARE, economicandculturalcooperation) Problems:noclear link tofuturemembership, limited marketliberalization in sensitivesectors(agriculture, textiles, coalandsteel) Amendmentswereimplementedtocaterto CEECs needs, but still dissatisfaction

8. StabilizationandAssociation Agreements (SAAs):- templateforthe Western Balkans andmostsuccessorstatesofYugoslavia - after NATO‘smilitaryintervention in Kosovo, the Council endorsed a „StabilizationandAssociationProcess“ (SAP) → supportingeconomic, democratictransition, regional cooperation, CARDS, explicit preparationsfor eventual accession Differenceto EAs:morepoliticalconditionality European Economic Area Agreement (EEA): • alternative toaccession (created out ofconcernthatsome countries onlywantedeconomicbenefitsbyjoining EU) • somevoice but novotes • enables EFTA statestoparticipate in internalmarket (exceptagriculture)

9. 1992: Maastricht Treaty (EMU, CFSP, PJCC) 1993: Council ofCopenhagen(CopenhagenCriteria) 1995: 2nd „Northern“ Enlargement Round: Sweden, Finland, Austria join → EEA became residual arrangementforIceland, Liechtenstein, Norway → Switzerlanddidn‘tratify; it‘smembershipapplicationbecamedormant 1997: Amsterdam Treaty (referencetoArticle 6 was included – valuesofthe EU likeliberty, democracy, ruleoflaw, respectfor human rightsand fundamental freedoms)

10. 2. Pre-accessionalignmentand (potential) candidatestatus parallel toaccession • Most aspirantswere/are not readyformembership • Checklist ofnecessarypreparations (mainlyconcerningadjustmenttotheacquiscommunautaire) → pre-accessionboth a tooltoaccelerateorslow down enlargement • Regulatoryalignmenttotheacquisaidedby TAIEX • (Potential) candidatessetup National Programmes forthe Adoption oftheAcquis (NPAAs)→mostimportant: - measures essential tothefunctioningofthesinglemarket (e.g. reductionoftradebarriers) - measuresaiming at other EU policyobjectives (e.g. in thesocialrealm) • 1st: European Partnerships (EPs) = Potential Candidate Status • 2nd: AssociationPartnerships (APs) = Candidate Status The criteriaforthegrantingof „candidatestatus“ are not very explicit

11. CopenhagenCriteria (European Council 1993) • stableinstitutionsguaranteeingdemocracy, theruleoflaw, human rights, andrespectforandprotectionofminorities; • a functioningmarketeconomy, aswellasthecapacitytocopewithcompetitivepressureandthemarketforceswithinthe Union; • abilitytotake on theobligationsofmembership, includingadherencetotheaimsofpolitical, economicandmonetaryunion; • theEU‘scapacitytoabsorbnewmembers, whilemaintainingthemomentumof European integration

12. Speed ofalignmentislargelylefttothecandidates, but noprogress = nofinancialaidandpossibledelay • Commissionsupervisesentireprocessandgives Annual Regular Reports • Council decides (QMV) and EP givesitsassent on theprioritiesandobjectivescontained in individual APs submittedtocandidate countries 3. Accession • CommissionOpinions • Annual Regular Reports → possibilitytodelay → „prospectivereadiness“ → inclusive vs. merit-basedapproach in Commissionand Council

13. Accessionnegotiations: • Conductedbythe Council Presidency on behalf ofthememberstates • Bilateral • Screening byCommissioniscarried out beforehand • Bothsidessubmittheirnegotiationpositions • Chaptersareopenedandclosedaccordingly (acquisis not negotiable,certainbenefitscanbewithheldifitis not yetfullyimplemented) → discriminationagainstnewmembersbyapplyingstrictconcessions (e.g. restrictmovementofworkers; capreceiptsfromstructuralfunds) • Ifagreementisreached, accessiontreatyissignedby all governments • Ifthereareviolations, accessioncanbepostponedbyoneyear, amongstotherpossiblesanctions

14. Three Stages ofEnlargementPolicy

15. 3. ConditionalityandEnlargementas a ForeignPolicy Tool • Anchoring fragile democracies in a prosperousanddemocratic international community • The EU‘sstrategicuseoftheincentiveofmembership in ordertoinduceorpreservespecificpolicychanges in non-memberstates • CopenhagenCriteriaareonlythebasis:→ depending on thespecificsituation, moreconditionscanberequired→ considerableleverageforvariousinterestgroupstoinfluencetheprocess

16. Effectivenessofconditionalitydepends on: - domesticsituation in respectivecountry - credibilityofconditionality: →memberstatesmight send contradictorysignals →candidatecountryhasreasonstodoubtthatit will succeed, evenif all criteriaaremet • Insertion ofother intermediate stepsorbenefitsasrewardsforcompliance (e.g. liftingvisarequirements) • After accession: continuedmonitoringandpossiblesanctions

17. European NeighborhoodPolicy (ENP): • Template forsuccessorstatesoftheSoviet Union • Formerly „PartnershipandCooperation Agreements“ (PCAs)nowreplacedbyAssociationAgreements • Since 2009 „Eastern Partnership“ (EaP) • Contain e.g. potential freetradezone, gradual visaliberalization Problems: noreferenceto eventual futuremembershipormilitarysecurity → effectiveness?? EaPmaybeeffective in dealingwithspecifictopics, byofferingrewards,but not in changingprevalentpoliticalsituations

18. 4. Conclusionsand Summary EnlargementFatigue- EU‘sabsorptioncapacity (budgetary, institutionalimpacts) • Inclusionof Romania andBulgariapremature? • Ukraine (isiteven European?) • Turkey (EU‘sambiguousstance, human rightsissues, etc.) • ………. - PrevioustroublewithLisbon Treaty ratification • Financial Crisis 2008 → lesssignificanceofenlargementas a foreignpolicytool (memberstates‘ opinionsdiverge, domesticadjustementcostsarebecominghigher) ThreeOverlapping Stages ofEnlargementunderpinnedbyincreasinglydemandingconditions, diverse proceduresanddynamics

19. Association Stage – Community LevelPre-accession Stage – Community Level - Commissionasthekeyplayer - Council hasthe final say - EP givesitsassent AccessionNegotiations – Intensive Transgovernmentalism - Member statesdecideEU‘spositions (mindfuloftheirown national interests!) - Commissioncanidentifycompromises - Ifweregardenlargementas a partofForeignPolicy (evenifitistraditionallytransgovernmental), theCommissionhas a biggerrole in itnow

20. 5. Personal comments on thereading • Comparedtotheotherreading (Andi), theSedelmaieroneisverydetailed (maybe a littletoomuch) • Nochronologicalorderofevents, jumping back andforthin time andevents • But provides a lotofdetailedinformationandsomeanalysis

21. 6. Brain teasers • Think ofexampleslikeHungary, Bulgariaor Romania orevenItaly. Do youthinkenlargementisreally an effectivewaytoshapedomesticpolicy-making? What do youthinkisnecessarytoensuredemocraticprinciplesarebeingfollowed in thelongrun? • Do youperceivethe EU as a credibleactor in foreignpolicymatters?Ifyes, why? Ifno, why not? • Do youthinkthefinancialcrisisis a valid argumentagainstenlargement?

22. Thankyouforyourattention.