Rethinking the War on Drugs in Mexico: A policy perspective

1. Rethinking the War on Drugs in Mexico: A policy perspective Pablo Vázquez MSc candidate in Criminal Justice Policy London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) London, United Kingdom

2. Agenda • Some relevant facts about Mexico • A brief history of drug markets in Mexico • Present situation • Triggers of violence • Government’s response • Results – Has the strategy failed? • Media and public perception • Critical perspectives • The ‘paradox of expected punishment’ • A harm reduction approach • Research agenda • Questions & Answers • Bibliography

3. Mexico: “Far from god close to the US”

4. Some relevant facts about Mexico • Land: 1,943,945 sq km • Borders: Belize (250 km), Guatemala (962 km), United States (3,141 km) • Population: 113,724,226 (July 2011 est.) • Government: Federal Republic • Federal Power: PAN since 2000; after 70 years of PRI’s hegemony • Political division: 31 states and 2,456 municipalities • GDP: $1.56 trillion (2010 est.) – 12th economy in the world • Military expenditure: 0.5% of GDP (2006 est.) Source: CIA World Factbook – March 2011

5. The history of the drug market in Mexico • History involves changes within continuity - Phenomena may change, intensify or degrade according to historical developments, but its original features are always identifiable. • In this sense, in spite of our self-induced “collective amnesia”: • There has always been a demand for drugs and someone willing to supply them. However, both variables have changed in late modernity… • Prohibition is a labelling process (objective or moral) affecting the market for drugs as an externality. Societies can be more or less willing to label, and more or less prone to punitive measures… • History is full of “super-villains and super-heroes”, “final and definite crackdowns”, and “massive escalation and most violent times”…However “patient politicians and long term projects” are extremely rare… • Drug trafficking is a social phenomenon: Corruption has always been there as a two-way street, and local communities have always protected its heroes…Believe me: the Mexican state has been in the verge of collapse far too many times now… • The current strategy is different from previous strategies in that it has intensified the level of punitiveness generating massive escalation of violence. But its main drivers are the same as those guiding Mexican drug policy since the early 1940s. See: Garland (2001)

6. The history of the drug market in Mexico 1900 - 1945 1945 - 1982 1982 - 2006 • Existing demand both in US and Mexico (alcohol and opium) - Localized production (resource availability) • Prohibition in the US and prohibition in Mexico (moral crusades) – Volstead and Harrison • Enforcement: local vs federal governments (taxes and autonomy vs centralization) • Economy affected by WWI and WWII – changes in consumption patterns • Mexico seen as a threat; source of drugs (most drugs come from Mexico) • Global prohibition consolidates – Nixon’s War on Drugs • Economic stability -Demand and supply increase (Product cycle: cocaine appears in the market; top down logic) – followed by economic crisis 1970s and 1980s • Anti-supply campaigns: Interceptor and Condor – social impact – internal displacement • War on drugs and communism – traffickers vs rebels • The mafia model is adopted as an explanation: “us vs them” logic is invoked…authorities manipulate history…CA I • Free markets and globalization • Massive production and the rise of “consumerism” • Product diversification (chemical drugs – top down) • The OC model consolidates: the word cartel appears – the local is eroded: national / global • Camarena case – Certification process by the US • NAFTA followed by the Tequila effect; Mex-US migration • Punitiveness - Crackdowns radicalize – militarize. • Mexican “democratization” –CA II See: Recio (2002), Astorga (2005)

7. The current situation 2006 - 2010

8. A recipie for a perfect storm or so the story goes… • Step 1: The Caribbean Corridor is closed by US law enforcement efforts at the beginning of the 1990s • Step 2:Illegal drug flows, especially cocaine coming from the Andean region, shift to Mexico • Step 3: Law enforcement efforts in Mexico contribute to fracture existing OC structures: • Juarez Cartel – Amado Carrillo dies in 1997 • Tijuana Cartel – Arrested or killed between 1998 and 2002 • Gulf Cartel – Osiel Cárdenas arrested in 2003 • Step 4: Political fracture in 2000. «Monolitic» PRI steps down from office after 70 years in power.

9. A recipie for a perfect storm or so the story goes… • Step 5: Fierce competition to control OC structures, drug trafficking routes and political protection begins (!!!)… • Step 6: Violence becomes the conflict resolution tool par excellance • Step 7: OC structures develop paramilitary forces to face competition • Gulf Cartel – Zetas • Sinaloa Cartel – Los Pelones and Artistas Asesinos • Juarez Cartel – La Linea • Step 8:US response to 9/11 attacks results in tighter controls of the US-Mexico border (2001 to date)

10. A recipie for a perfect storm or so the story goes… • Step 9: Surplus in drug supplies boosts Mexican drug consumption. A trend consolidates: Mexico is no longer a «transit country» but also a «consumption» one… • Step 10:Conflict among OC structures intensifies, this time to gain control of local markets • Step 11: Paramilitary structures become extremely relevant and seek autonomy. Violent new players enter the market. • Step 12: The effectiveness of the government’s strategy pushes cash-hungry OC structures to other criminal enterprises (i.e. extortion, kidnapping, counterfiting, and people smuggling)…

11. Drug trafficking routes in Mexico Source: Reforma (2010)

12. Cartel presence in Mexico Source: Stratfor quoted in Reforma (2010)

13. The usual suspects (Sinaloa) Source: Reforma (2010)

14. The usual suspects (Gulf) Source: Reforma (2010)

15. The usual suspects (Zetas) Source: Reforma (2010)

16. The usual suspects (Tijuana) Source: Reforma (2010)

17. The usual suspects (Pacifico Sur) Source: Reforma (2010)

18. The usual suspects (Juarez) Source: Reforma (2010)

19. The usual suspects (La Familia) Source: Reforma (2010)

20. Government’s response See: Castañeda and Aguilar (2009). *People between 12 and 65 years in urban and rural areas / US: 41.7%; See: http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/factsht/druguse/

21. Government’sresponse • Operational objectives: • Dismantle vertically integrated structures through ‘beheading’ tactics • Imprisonment • Extradition • Assassination (?) • Recover control of territories and disturb distribution and production • Military and federal police presence in risk areas • Border controls (northern Mexico) • Erradication • Stop arms flow from the US

22. Government’sresponse • Operational objectives: • Law enforcement coordination to match OC structures’ national reach • Centralize police forces as means of standarizing quality and preventing corruption taking place at local levels • Build police capabilities to match OC structures’ fire power and resources • Legal reform • More powers to the police and prosecuting authorities • Public security powers to the military • Anti-money laundering law (2010!!)

23. Results: Failure? Promoting intercartel competition and intensifying leadership struggles? Source: CNN, (November 2010), also see: Carpenter (2010)

24. Results – Failure? Sources: Garcia Luna (2010), Cook (2008), Astorga (2010)

25. Results – Failure? Official figures (homicide): The justification / effectiveness paradox Source: García Luna (2010)

26. Results – Failure? • According to Mexican authorities between December 2006 and July 2010 28,353 people were killed as a result of the War on Drugs taking place in Mexico. • 80% of total homicides took place within 6% of Mexico’s 2,456 municipalities – Those where military led operatives have taken place. • But also those where municipal authority (local police strength) has been eroded. Is the unification/centralization of police forces a good idea? Former local market organizers lost power in places like Chihuahua and Tamaulipas Source: Escalante (2009)

27. Results – Failure? Homicide rate in Mexico 1990 – 2009 (homicides for every 100,000 inhabitants) Source: Escalante (2011)

28. Results – Failure? Homicide rate in Mexico 1990 – 2009 (militarized vs non-militarized states) Source: Escalante (2011)

29. Results – Effects on global drug markets? Cocaine prices in the US and Europe Source: UNDOC (2008)

30. Results: Recent trends on cocaine prices Coca derivative prices in production and consumption countries Source: UNDOC (2010)

31. Potential outcomes • From a risk-based perspective considering four variables (political, economic, social, military, and external stability), Becerra proposes three scenarios to the current situation: • Scenario One (Moderate) – Strategy continues as it is now • Scenario Two (Moderate) – Crackdown intensifies • Scenario Three (Low) – Pax Narcotica See: Becerra (2010)

32. Media war on drugs

33. Mediatic war – General overview See also:http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2009/03/mexicos_drug_war.html

34. Mediatic ‘War’? – The Government • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iUiuWguZqrU • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j35yXiZ_YSg&feature=fvst • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z_H5J8uyKEo

35. Mediatic ‘War’? – OC structures • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f_JMBiWEoKo&feature=fvst • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NoIn7mJ2_U0&feature=related • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=67XwSiyV0dA

36. Mediatic ‘War’? – Reality? • Local news network – Shooting in Tamaulipas: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MsrNurrUsbU • Home video – Shooting in Tamaulipas: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=caP12M9RXiA • Blog - Live feed from citizens in the Northern Border: http://gruporeforma.elnorte.com/Libre/Offlines/Mty/Frontera/default.asp?Prevista=0&EstadoSelecc=2 • Narco pop - Narco-corridos (selection): http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=narcocorridos&aq=0s

37. Critical perspectives

38. The paradox of expected punishment “…just relying on traditional sanctions to counteract organized crime will tend to create an incentive for criminal groups to expand their corruption rings thus increasing the feudalization of the state by criminal groups while enhancing their operational capabilities…” Source: Buscaglia (2008)

39. The paradox of expected punishment • Drawing on Buscaglia’s argument it would be reasonable to conclude that: • President Calderon’s strategy does not represent a break with the past - The current situation in Mexico is the result of a continous dynamic between OC groups and the government mainly informed by the spiral effect of PEP • If Mexico remains on the same track we should only expect the situation to deteriorate or slide into a “negotiated impasse”. Progressive feudalization. • The only way of solving the PEP is by limiting OC groups’ capability to corrupt public officials and build other protective capabilities (i.e. violence) Source: Buscaglia (2008)

40. The paradox of expected punishment • After analyzing experiences in 107 countries, Buscaglia concludes that the only way of controlling OC groups is by applying a “four wheel model” as stated in the Palermo Convention: • Introduction of effective judicial decision-making control systems • Introduction of effective financial intelligence systems and asset confiscation mechanisms • Attacking high-level public sector corruption • The presence of government (or non-government) prevention programs in high risk areas Source: Buscaglia (2008)

41. The paradox of expected punishment • Buscaglia’s argument could be questioned from a methodollogical point of view: OC conceptualization, data selection and homogeinity, and arbitrarity in composing its indexes. • Also, Buscaglia’s argument eludes structural elements informing the OC situation in Mexico and thus provides a limited explanation of the causes behind the War on Drugs. • In this sense, Buscaglia never answers the question of how many assets and how much money is necessary to seize in order to deter OC groups. • Finally, he seems to overlook the “bidirectionality” of incentives in corruption schemes. What is the role of authorities in a corruption scheme. Shouldn’t we abandon the «us vs. them» logic? • His argument does not go beyond the “war” or “conflict” paradigm. Therefore, the solution provided is limited to the short and medium terms. After all everything may become an «expected punishment».

42. No margin for maneuver: A harm reduction approach • Drug markets have proven extremely resilient in the face of significant seizures • Drug markets are highly fluid and adaptable e.g. dealers manipulate purity and alter weights to maintain revenue • Seizures and enforcement had little adverse effect on availability, purity and price of illicit drugs See: Reuter and Stevens (2007), and McSweeney et al, (2008)

43. No margin for maneuver: A harm reduction approach • Since 2000, average street prices have fallen consistently for heroin,cocaine, ecstasy and cannabis • Drug laws do not appear to have direct effects on prevalence of drug use: ‘tougher’ enforcement not necessarily deter use • Some estimations indicate that sustained seizure rates of 60-80% are required to put major traffickers out of business • Local drug markets also adapt to local crackdowns (balloon effect). It is important to note that no crackdown strategy has been permanent. See: Reuter and Stevens (2007), and McSweeney et al, (2008)

44. No margin for maneuver: A harm Reduction approach • Why don’t more people use drugs? • Fear of police detection less widespread than concerns about harm • Concern about illegality mediated by concern about harm • Patterns of use aligned more closely to harmfulness than legal classification See: Shiner (2009)

45. No margin for manoeuvre: A harm reduction approach • Suppliers and enforcement agencies interact with each other: corruption • Cultivation of informants and escalation of penalties has pushed drug trade into being more security conscious and violent • Increasing brutality used to legitimize heavierlaw enforcement and so the spiral of violence goes on • ‘It seems easier for the legal apparatuses to reshape patterns of crime, including drug markets, than to prevent them’ (p. 185) See: Dorn, N., and South, N. (1990)

46. No margin for maneuver: A harm reduction approach “Given that crimes such as drug distribution may be occasioned in ways which are more or less socially harmful (e.g. with or without shootings), it follows that the policy of harm minimization can be invoked. This concept is now widely accepted as an aim in relation to drug consumers: minimizing the social, legal, and medical harms that may be associated with drug consumption, as well as trying to reduce drug consumption itself, are now accepted as the twin goals of prevention. It may now be time to discuss harm minimization in relation to drug distribution. The question is, given that we cannot totally prevent illegal drug markets (and there is reasonable consensus on that proposition), what sort of markets do we least dislike, and how can we adjust the control mix so as to push markets in the least undesired direction?” Source: Dorn and South (1990)

47. Research agenda • Scope of the OC debate • Counterfeiting, human trafficking, arms trafficking (other crimes)? • Rackets affecting private corporations • Trade union and government corruption • Corporate and financial crime • How is OC structured in Mexico? • Hierarchies / Network approach • Localism / Elite connections • How does OC operates in Mexico? • Differences between local and national contexts? • Differences depending on activity? • Differences dependingon organization?

48. Research agenda • Historical perspective? • Is the current situation something new? • Does the balloon efect theory sustains? • Structural and/or cultural perspective? • Corporativism and democratization • Centralism • Social inequality and relative deprivation • IIRR: Asymetric relationship with the US / Bilateral corruption • How’s in charge of fighting OC? • Specialized police corps? Local or national level? • Civil society, the private sector and the responsabilization doctrine.

49. Questions and answers Thank you! Pablo Vazquez C. p.vazquez@lse.ac.ukpvazquezcam@gmail.com

50. Bibliography • Astorga, L. (2005), El siglo de las drogas, Mexico: Plaza & Janes. • Astorga, L. (2010), El trafico de armas de EEUU a México: Responsabilidades diferentes, London: International Drug Policy Consortium • Becerra, O. (2011), ‘Drugs of choice: Mexico faces security dilemma’, in Jane’s Intelligence Review, United Kingdom • Buscaglia, E. (2008), ‘The Paradox of Expected Punishment’, in • Castañeda, J., and Aguilar, R. (2009), El narco: la guerra fallida, Mexico: Punto de Lectura. • Carpenter, A. (2010), ‘Beyond drug wars: Transforming factional conflict in Mexico’, in Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 27(4), Wiley Periodicals, Inc. • Cook, C. (2008), CRS Report for Congress: Mexico’s drug cartels, Washington: US Congress. • Escalante, F. (2009), ‘Homicidios 1990 – 2007’, in Revista Nexos, Mexico.