University autonomy, IP legislation and academic patenting: Italy, 1996-2006

1. University autonomy, IP legislation and academic patenting: Italy, 1996-2006 Francesco Lissoni1,2, Michele Pezzoni2, Bianca Potì3, Sandra Romagnosi4 1 GREThA– Université Bordeaux IV - France2 KITeS– Università "L. Bocconi", Milan - Italy3 CERIS-CNR, Rome - Italy4 Parco ScientificoUniversità "Tor Vergata", Rome - ItalyTo be presented at the APE-INV workshop “Scientists & Inventors” KU Leuven, 10-11 May 2012

2. Motivation • Contribute to recent literature on academic patenting in Italy (Europe) by: • Assessing trends in academic patenting: • Weight of academic patenting on total domestic patenting • Universities’ share of IP over academic inventions (vs individuals’, PROs’, and business companies’ share) • Exploring links between (1) and two policy changes: • The granting of autonomy to universities (incl. financial autonomy), in 1989 (effective kick-off: 1995) • The introduction of the professor privilege, in 2001

3. Reasons for focusing on universities’ autonomy • Policy: widespread diffusion of autonomy-granting/enhancing reforms (e.g. Italy, 1989-96; “loiPecresse” in France, 2007); large universities’ quest for more autonomy (e.g. EUA’s report, 2009) • Scholarly research - in sociology: “entrepreneurial university” (Clark, 1993); in economics: autonomy&competition perfomance link (Aghion et al., 2009) • NB1: Lots on emphasis on “third mission” • NB2: Financial autonomy has gone hand in hand decrease of “block grant” funding  project funding & technology transfer as additional sources of revenues • NB3: Autonomy in recruitment changes the academic profession (from civil servants to university employees)

4. Reasons for focusing on the professor privilege • Policy: • wave of abolitions in German-speaking and Scandinavian countries since 2000  inefficient legal institution, standing in the way of commercialization of academic research results • BUT Italy has introduced it in 2001  incentive-setting justification • Scholarly research – some recent advocacy for the privilege (Kenney, 2009)

5. Outline • Methodology for data collection • Academic patenting trends & distribution • University autonomy in Italy: a quick look • The professor privilege in Italy: an even quicker look • Econometric STEP1: probability of an Italian patent to be academic, 1996-2006 • Econometric STEP2: probability of Italian academic patent to be owned by the inventor’s university (or the inventor himself)

6. Methodology for data collection Name disambiguation of inventors (EPO patent applications, 1978-onward)  see previous APE-INV “NameGame” workshops Professor-inventor name matching: 3 professors’ cohorts (from ministerial lists)  inventors 1996-2006 [academic patent = patent with at least 1 academic scientists among inventors] Filtering of false matches by: (i) automatic criteria (ii) past surveys (iii) ongoing survey

7. Academic patenting trends & distribution • Upper vs lower bound estimates (unfiltered vs filtered) • Upper estimates suggest upward trend in academic patenting (nr and share of domestic patenting) • Both estimates suggest increasing IP control by universities, albeit with very different values • Distribution by tech class of both academic patents and their ownership in line with previous research • Moderately decreasing concentration of academic patents, by university (high level? C4  25%) • Role of size and demand (by industry or PRO): most academic inventors are in large universities or universities in Northern Italy and Lazio (main exception: Catania  STMicroelectronics) • No clear university pattern emerges for ownernship

8. Table 1 – Number of academic patents, 1996-2006; upper & lower bound estimates

9. Table 2 – Share of academic patents over all patents by domestic inventors, 1996-2006; upper & lower bound estimates (% values)

10. Table 3 – Ownership distribution of academic patents, 1996-2006; upper bound estimates (% values)

11. Table 4 – Ownership distribution of academic patents, 1996-2006; lower bound estimates (% values)

12. Table 6 – Share ofacademicpatentsoverallpatentsbydomesticinventors, 1996-2006 – bytechnicalfield; upper boundestimates (% values)

13. Table 7– Share ofuniversity-ownedacademicpatents, 1996-2006 – bytechnicalfield; upper boundestimates (% values)

15. University autonomy: features • L.168/1989: basic principles and creation of Ministry of University and Research plus reporting duties ( CNSVU) • Several laws/decrees from 1990 to 1996: autonomy with respect to governance, educational offer, recruitment, and financial management. • Financial autonomy • Universities receive block grants to be administered within some limits set by the State (instead of getting earmarked funds for expenses and having staff directly paid by the State) • Key block grant: FFO ("FondodiFinanziamentoOrdinario"): starts at 90% of all revenues  set to decline automatically over time (algorithms tied to students' enrollmentand graduation speed/success) • Universities are free to collect other revenues  great heterogeneity: (capped) student fees, contract research, commercialization (IP and start-ups), local authorities' support… • No systematic tie with university-industry technology transfer policy

16. University autonomy: yearly data /1 • SystematicdeclineofbothFFO_RATIO and SCIENCE_RATIO… • … BUT temporaryincreaseof public R&D (relative to GDP and to private R&D) • FFO_RATIOdeclineisrelativelyhomogeneousbyuniversity (and region), butlevelsexhibitcross-regionalvariation • FFO_RATIObearslittlerelationshipwithregionalR&Dintensity (size and historymatters more for FFO; heterogeneityofnon-FFOrevenues) • Others: • Absolute & relative increaseof public R&D BUT littlecross-regionalvariation

17. Weightof block funds (FFO) and public fundsforscientificreserach on ItalianUniversities’ totale revenues (source: AQUAMETH DB and CNSVU survey)

18. R&Dsharesoffirms, universities, and PROs: trends 1991-2008 – National level (source: ISTAT)

19. - DeclineofFFO_RATIOis common toallregions - Regionsdifferasforlevels ownelaboration on AQUAMETH DB and CNSVU survey

20. - DeclineofSCIENCE_RATIOislessevenlydistributed - No clearregional pattern ownelaboration on AQUAMETH DB and CNSVU survey

21. FFO_RATIObearslittlerelationshipwithregionalR&Dintensity (size and histo

22. University autonomy: yearly data /2 • (Epidemic) diffusionof IP regulations (IP_STATUTE) and TTOs at the university-level • Little correlationbetween the twodiffusionprocesses (regional data) • Some correlationbetweenIP_STATUTE and TTO diffusion and R&Dintensity at regional , especially in centralyears (1999-2002) • FFO_RATIObearslittlerelationshipwithregionalR&Dintensity (size and historymatters more for FFO; heterogeneityofnon-FFOrevenues) • Others: • Absolute & relative increaseof public R&D BUT littlecross-regionalvariation

23. Diffusionof IPR statutes and TechTransferOffices in ItalianUniversities (sources: ownelaboration on NETVAL survey; CNSVU survey)

27. The professor privilege • Introduced in 2001 • Unsolicited, indeed resisted by universities (unsuccessfully at legal level; possibly successfully at IP regulation level) • Reformed in 2005 (abolished for research co-sponsored by industry)

28. REGRESSION “STEP1”:probability of an Italian patent to be academic, 1996-2006 • Key expected results: • positive impact (correlation with?) IP_STATUTE and/or TTO • negative impact of FFO_RATIO (to the extent that non-FFO revenues come from tech transfer) • no trend left after controlling for all relevant factors ( no impact of professor privilege) • Others: • Differences by technological classes and science intensity of the patent (citations to NPL) • Positive impact of RD/GDP (demand factor) • Psitiveimpact of RD_SHARE_PAUNI

29. REGRESSION “STEP2-university”:probability of Italian academic patent to be owned by the inventor’s university • Key expected results: • Positive impact of IP_STATUTE • Differences by technological classes and science intensity of the patent (citations to NPL) • no trend left after controlling for all relevant factors ( no impact of professor privilege) • Others: • Positive impact of RD_SHARE_PAUNI (“unsold” IP or research potential)

36. Conclusions • When looking at IP_STATUTEs: autonomy looks like having had expected impact on academic scientists’ propensity to engage in patenting and in universities’ propensity to retain related IP • When looking at FFO_RATIO: autonomy seems to have had confused effects  better data would be necessary to distinguish btw non-FFO resources • Professor privilege has been largely irrelevant, but for “spike” in individual ownership right after its introduction • University-owned patents may also hide “unsold” IP or IP resulting from research run with no connection to industrial R&D  in line with evidence on modest value of Italian university-owned academic patents

37. Further research • Complete the filtering survey ( convergence of upper/lower bound estimates) • Extend data to 2009 (PatStat 2011 edition) • Check for reverse causality of IP_STATUTE in STEP1 regression • Use lagged variables!!! • Check for IP ownership changes • Is it worth extending research to patent value (citation-measured)?