Traditional security conception

1. Hosting emigrants as the R2P of States: Ethiopia’s Human Security Policy Reponses for Eritrean Refugees and the Prospect for Normalization Meressa Tsehaye Gebrewahd Mekelle University, Ethiopia African Globalities- Global African University of Pecsi, Hungary June10,2016

2. Traditional security conception • Traditionally, security has been exclusively defined as state’s security, territorial independence- Territorial nationalism, “war makes state” • State’s national interest was also conceptualized as power politics specifically defined by military buildup and capabilities. • the threats to state/national security were exclusively from external to the state sovereignty and are militaristic in their nature. • Therefore states were considered as the only referent object for security • Walt (1991: 212) also narrowly defined security studies as “phenomenon of war” and argued that national security is simply “the study of the threat, use and control of military force…, and threats are external and militaristic in nature”

3. the end of the Cold War served as a major blow to traditional led to the emergence of alternative voices within security studies field, calling for a ‘widening’ and ultimately a ‘deepening’ of the subject (Hough, 2004:6-4). • The wideners also got policy attention with the increasing ‘securitization’ (not Militarization) of international economy and environment in 1970s and 1980s which were traditionally considered as predominantly ‘low politics’ (Ibid). • By widening, therefore, the critical schools are arguing for the inclusion of non-military threats and threats emerging from within the sovereign jurisdiction of the nation- state which are considered as potential threats to national security (Willans, 2004). • Horizontal inclusion of threats without challenging the state as referent object. • Barry Buzan proposed five possible sectorial dimensions of security that are all interrelated including military, political, economic, societal and environmental.

4. Barry buzan Triangular security thought • In his conceptualization of national security, Buzan used “Triangular modal” of national security taking “the physical base, the institutional expression, and the ideas of the state” (1991:65) as its major components and units of analysis. • In his modal, even though he gave more emphasis to the ideas of the state (as the essence or core of national security) than the first two components, he underlined that there is no suggestion that the three components stand separately, for they are obviously interlinked in myriad ways . the idea of the state (nation and ideology) The physical base (population and territory) institutional expression (institutions and constitutions) The component part of the state adapted from Barry Buzan (1991:65).

5. Deeping Security schools • The deepening of security evolved from the debate surrounding widening and they identified three features of deepening: • the referent of security shifts from the state to the individual, • there is recognition that the state can be the source of threats to individuals and • there is an ontological shift that frames security as a human condition. • Therefore this school argued that states are not only guarantors of security but also sources of insecurity to the nation as well as its citizens.

6. Human Security • The generally accepted beginning of the formalization of human security is associated with the United Nations Development Report of 1994. • The report envisioned human security as radical new way of thinking about security and as revolutionary force for change in the immediate future . • According the report human security is based on two aspects: First, safety from such Chronis threats as hunger, disease, and repression. Second, it means protection from sudden hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily life.”

7. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P) • The International commission on intervention and state sovereignty (2001)defines human security as : “ the security of people- their physical safety, their economic and social well being , respect for their dignity and worth as human beings ,and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms” • Therefore, human security shifts the referent for security from state to humanity and its well being . “ All people , no less than all states , have a right to a secure existence and all state have an obligation to protect these rights” ( Wing: 2000:47).

8. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF R2P A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

9. Elements of R2P • The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities: A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk. B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

10. the Horn of Africa and security dilemma • the Horn of Africa seems to be the litmus paper for different kinds of nation-building attempts and failures ranging from secession -war-born-(Eritrea and South Sudan ), centralization,(Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia pre-1995 ) federation, failing, and collapsed states. • The state making project in the region is also inherently conflictual as the contingent nation-building strategies are diametrically opposite and their success is expected to be based on “mutual intervention” (Clapham, 2000:4) • the absence of established “Security and economic community” (Medhane, 2004:1) and lack of strong state with a balancer role that could peacefully contain emerging conflicts and their spillover effects due to the mutual mistrust among the neighboring states further aggravated regional security of complex.

11. Ethiopia and Eritrea: the historical context and challenges • The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea is strongly grounded on an all-inclusive structural, socio-cultural, historical, and political economic ties (Tekeste, 1997). • The two states are also shared pre-colonial history (Eritrea was part of the core of Abyssian state-) ,the history of thirty years protracted war for territorial integrity (in defense of Greater Ethiopia ) and war of “decolonization” in Eritrea until 1991. • Indeed, what makes complex their relationship is that Eritrea won its independence through protracted armed struggle defeating the Dergue government in alliance with TPLF/EPRDF- an Ethiopian guerrilla fighting on the base of national question and oppression within Ethiopia (Gebru, 2009).

12. The defeat of the Dergue regime in Eritrea by the EPLF was mainstreamed in the national rhetoric of Eritrea as EPLF’s total victory against the Ethiopian state and its people. • The leadership claimed that “a small Eritrea had defeated greater Ethiopia that enjoyed massive support from the US and the former Soviet Union” (Gebru, 2006:58) by sidelining the role of the TPLF. – invincibility of Eritrean army, Israeli of the Horn, or “Nakfa Syndrome”- Yikaaolo-Generation. • After independence, Eritrea followed militarized nation building project (Sawa Propect– Warsay- Yikaalo)from Above under the motto “one People, one heart”- Melting down diversity against its “Part-nation state nature” • With the economic vision of Making Eritrea the “heart land of the horn- ” via extracting resources from “hinterlands” of Ethiopia and Sudan

13. Post-2000 trajectories : “no war, no peace” stalemate and human security crisis • Following Eritrea’s defeat at the hand of Ethiopian army in 2000, Ethiopia not only retaken its contested areas (Badme, Irob, Zalambesa, Bura) but also deeply penetrated into the Eritrean territory. • On 12 December 2000, the Algiers Peace Agreement was signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea to resolve their border dispute by a neutral boundary commission. • At the center of the agreement was that the governments agreed “the delimitation and demarcation determinations of the commission to be final and binding” (Art. 4. 15:6). • 2004 the EEBC came up with a decision and said Badme lies within the Eritrean claim line, the Ethiopian government expressed its regret and declared that it would not accept the ruling of the commission specifically the awarding of Badme to Eritrea that it was historically administered by Ethiopia. • In a letter written to the UN Security Council on September 2003, Prime Minister Meles condemned the commission’s decision as “unjust” and “illegal” that violated the center pit of the Algiers Agreement, i.e. ensuring lasting peace and stability in the region.

14. On 25 November 2004, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles zenawi came up with a “Five -Point peace initiative” to resolve the Ethio – Eritrean conflict ” : • Resolve the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea only and only through peaceful means. • Resolve the root causes of the conflict through dialogue with the view to normalizing relations between the two countries. • Ethiopia accepts, in principle, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission decision. • Ethiopia agrees to pay its dues to the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission and to appoint field liaison officers. • Start dialogue immediately with the view to implementing the EEBC’s decision in a manner consistent with the promotion of sustainable peace and brotherly ties between the two peoples.

15. Eritrea from the very beginning strongly declared that “any notion of dialogue regarding the border issue with Ethiopia is closed and hermetically sealed” (Kinfe2004, 228-229). • The Commission made the decision “Crystal clear that the case was put to rest once and for all…,…final means binding there is not dialogue to be carried out on the issue”. • The after EEBC decision ,Eritrea reduced every thing to the border demarcation neglecting other far-reaching issues –declaring that Eritrea was/is under “state of emergency” . • On the Ethiopian side, the government redefined its pre-1998 good neighborhood policy towards Eritrea and re-institutionalized the policy of building modern army to “deter and isolate (EFNSP, 2002) Eritrea .

16. The Responsibility to Host Eritrean emigrants: challenges and prospects • the Ethio-Eritrean war of the 1998-2000, the human security of Eritreans is viewed as increasingly deteriorated. • torture and imprisonment of its citizens are aired as endemic identity of the regime. • Eritreans were subjected to some of the most serious rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, incommunicado detention, arbitrary arrest, torture, inhumane prison conditions and indefinite national service (Warsay-Yikaalo Project). • "excessive militarization (militarization of Eritrean society)" of Eritrea is affecting the very fabric of its society and its core unit, the family (Keetharuth 2014). • The young generation is either in the military trenches indefinitely awaiting imaginary enemy or escaping the state. • Eritrea remains with underage and over aged people compromising the succeeding generation to evolve) rightly stated that “Eritrea essentially is losing a whole generation—“depleting entire villages,” (Keetharuth 2014). • Somalization of the Eritrean state and life of the society - no constitution, no Parliament, no judiciary, no election, no functioning institution- (Yosief, 2013).

17. Eritrea is referred as the North Korea of Africa for being the regime is becomingisolated totalitarian,and also ‘second Somalia’ (Tronvoll and Goitom, 2013) for the reason that state and regime are functionally ‘failing’ and its descent into civil war in the hotbed region of the Horn of Africa. • the government introduced “shoot to kill” policy but it failed to contain the problem. • The migrants includes civilian from all walks of life, military personals from trenches and military training centers ,Sawa, which in turn undermines future defense of the state. • The regime also faced a continues defection of top political leaders ( like Ministry of information Ali Abdu,Ambassador Mohammed Idris Jawij ,Eritrea’s representative African union) , famous artists (like Wedi Tukabo, Hagos Weldegebrial, Mereb Estifanos, Robel Haile, etc), military pilots who defected to Saudi Arabia with the president's private jet in April 2013, members of Eritrea's Olympics team at the London Games in 2012,  13 players on an Eritrean football team (known as “the red sea Camels”) in Botswana in2015, and so on.

18. Cognizant of the above facts, the human security situation in Eritrea fulfilled one of the core principles of R2P for intervention for the cause of humanity that “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or some other sort of state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility” (2001, XI).

19. Ethiopia’s response to Eritrean emigrants • According to 5ppI, Ethiopia requested for addressing “the root cause of the conflict with a view to normalize relations between the two countries and peoples” (Melese, 2004). • After the peace initiative, most of the Eritrean are migrating to Ethiopia which they previously considered it colonialist and potential enemy to their sovereignty. • Ethiopia’s responses includes • Peacefully hosting via establishing refugee campus • In western Tigray, Shimelba (2004) , Mai aini (2008), Adiharush(2010) refugee camp also was established – dominantly Tigrigna and Kunama speaking people • In eastern part of Ethiopia, Afar region, there are two major camps for Eritrean Afar

20. 2. Since 2010 the Ethiopian government introduced “out of camp policy” for Eritrean refugee which revokes most legal and political restrains. According to the policy: Eritrean refugees can live in any part of the country, provided they are able to sustain themselves financially or have a relative or friends who commits to supporting them. 3. The Ethiopian government also arranged resettlement opportunities for Eritreans repatriated from third countries like Egypt, Sudan. • As part of the “out of camp policy” of 2010 the Ethiopian government is continuing to award special quota of university scholarships to Eritrean refugees in all Ethiopian universities in any field they preferred. • Finally, as part social responses the Eritrean artist/musician are allowed to organize an open air musical concerts in Mekelle and Adigrat ,in Tigray with a warm welcome from the youngsters in Tigray.

21. Challenges a head against R2P in Ethiopia • The substantialpart of Tigray and Afar- where all the Eritrean camps are situated are within the ring of ‘no war, no peace’ zone. • As a result, the situation created unattractive for big investors of national and international origin who could contribute to the successful economic integration of Eritrean refugees to local community as part of “out of camp policy”. • The huge army of refugees is still living in camps with no substantial social and economic integration to the local community. • The refugees are also supposedly creating environmental stress. • More critically, the Eritrean migrants are using Ethiopia as a “transit country” to their destine Europe, America, and Australia which in turn undermines the political and social reconciliation.

22. if the statuesque ante continues, the normalization policy with Eritrea will be prolonged, hosting refugees and giving scholarship could only be short terms solutions. • Finally, the international community especially Europe, as a destine of most Eritrean refugee, should support the Ethiopian government’s efforts of hosting migrants and give special attention like the case in Turkey by designing projects which transcend the current “transit objectives” of Eritrean refuges and fundamentally transform the “no war ,no peace” situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

23. Thank you!!!!