BYU Kennedy Center International Forum Presentation 3 May 2006

1. Policy, Behavior, and Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Crucible of Strategic Culture: An Initial Framework for Comparative Analysis BYU Kennedy Center International Forum Presentation3 May 2006 Dr. Kerry M. KartchnerChief, Division of Strategy and Policy StudiesAdvanced Systems and Concepts Office

2. Overview • The study of culture and “strategic culture” • ASCO’s Project on “Comparative Strategic Cultures” • Methodology Issues and Developing a Comparative Framework • Selected Case Studies • Policy Implications (“So what?”)

3. Why study “strategic culture”? • Understanding strategic cultures is vital to effectively implementing and safeguarding U.S. national security and foreign policy. • There have been multiple calls to better understand and integrate the cultural context for U.S. national security and foreign policy implementation. • According to the 2004 Defense Science Board Study on Strategic Communications: • Hostility to U.S. national security goals and policies is undermining U.S. power, influence, and strategic alliances. • Much of this hostility is driven by a lack of understanding of the cultural and regional context for U.S. policy. • It is important to “know thine enemy” – better assess and understand new and emerging threats. • But, it is also important to know our friends and allies, and the regional context for U.S. national security policy.

4. Defining “Culture” • Culture as shared meaning and identity. • Culture as value preferences. • Culture as template for human strategy and action. Source: Valerie M. Hudson, “Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda,” in Valerie M. Hudson, ed., Culture and Foreign Policy, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, pp. 1-26.

5. Examples of Culture and Foreign Policy Behaviors • Asian cultures are predisposed to take a longer-term perspective than other cultures. (Desmond Ball) • Certain cultures are more likely to exhibit particular aspects of decision-making and interpersonal styles than others. For example: “Middle Eastern leaders were much more distrustful of others than leaders from other cultures and therefore more likely to discount discrepant information.” (Margaret Hermann) • Cultures that rely on consensual decisionmaking may not be as open to dissonant information – even from reliable sources – as cultures in which majority vote is sufficient for decisionmaking. (Fritz Gaenslen) • Certain cultures may predispose one to abstractive versus associative reasoning, and to universalistic versus case particularistic reasoning. (Yaacov Vertzberger) • Chinese foreign policy behavior corresponds to relatively specific scripts of action inherited from exemplary episodes in that nation’s history. (Chih-yu Shih and Lawrence Katzenstein) Source: Hudson, “Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda.”

6. Defining “Strategic Culture” • For purposes of this project, “strategic culture” is defined as: “Shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.”

7. Overview of ASCO’s Comparative Strategic Cultures Project (2005) Phase I Results: • Reviewed status of scholarship in the field. • Identified critical outstanding methodology issues. • Assessed some preliminary case studies (China, Pakistan, India) • Validated the utility of “comparative strategic cultures” for gaining insights into policy, behavior, and incentives for acquiring, using, or proliferating weapons of mass destruction. (2006) Phase II Objectives: • Develop a framework for comparative analysis. • Select specific case studies with relevance to issues of WMD. • Derive some policy-relevant insights for WMD and strategic culture. • Craft a curriculum for use in military and civilian institutes of higher learning.

8. Methodology Issues • There is no commonly accepted definition of “strategic culture.”Solution: Develop provisional definitions and a common analytical framework. • Scholars disagree on the intellectual boundaries of “strategic culture” and how it relates analytically to other theories/paradigms (eg., realism, constructivism, etc.) Solution: Determine and assess the geo- and socio-political boundaries of those strategic cultures most relevant to deterrence and non-proliferation of WMD. • There are debates about the sources of strategic culture and rate of transformation within selected strategic cultures.Solution: Track change with respect to specific WMD-related events and decisions. • There are obstacles to communication between the social science and the policy communities.Solution: Agree on a provisional theoretical framework for applying social sciences to specific issues of national security. Foster dialogue between the two communities.

9. Criticisms of Cultural Analysis • Causality • Culture as an explanation is seldom direct and seldom operates alone; it is linked to other variables and approaches • Methodology • How do we ensure we are measuring orientations correctly? This is abstract, and the researcher is one level removed from the data • Stasis • Cultures change, and subsets may arise at various times; so how can we identify the real underlying culture? • Relevance • Has the rise of global culture, globalization, and interdependence diminished the cultural distinctions between societies?

10. Developing a Comparative Framework Our approach: • Phase I “scoping effort”. • Confronting and addressing the methodological issues. • Defining “Strategic Culture”. • Crafting a framework for comparative analysis. • Selecting case studies. • Exploring issues beyond the case studies. • Developing a curriculum for teaching strategic culture.

11. Key Elements in a Description of the Selected Strategic Culture • What does the given strategic culture have to say about conflict and human nature? • What does the given strategic culture say about “the enemy”? • What does the given culture have to say about the utility of violence, or laws of war?

12. A Common Framework For each case study, authors will identify: • Sources of strategic culture • National experiences • Core writings, literature • “Keepers” of strategic culture • Strategic beliefs of leader(s) • National identity, beliefs about self • Adversary identification and assessment • Views regarding WMD (esp. nuclear weapons) • Legitimate uses of violence, moral and ethical considerations

13. Criteria for Case Study Selection • Relevance to WMD • Researchability • Baseline cases • Curriculum development • Salience for addressing methodology issues

14. Selected Case Studies • The United States - Thomas Mahnken • Israel - Greg Giles • Iran - Willis Stanley • North Korea - Joe Bermudez • Syria - Murhaf Joejati • Pakistan - Peter Lavoy • India - Rodney Jones • China - Chris Twomey • Russia - Fritz Ermarth

15. Beyond the Case Studies: Essays • Strategic culture and non-state actors • Strategic culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction (policy implications) • The future of strategic culture as a field of study, as an analytical tool • James Smith • Kerry Kartchner • Darryl Howlett

16. Policy Implications: Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction Does culture matter? • When, under what conditions, and to what extent does culture shape behavior and define values in discernible and measurable ways? • Which behaviors and values are most subject to cultural influence, or find their origins most firmly rooted in cultural grounds? Premise: understanding culture is necessary to successfully: • Assure allies and friends of U.S. commitment to their security. • Dissuade states and non-state actors from acquiring WMD. • Deter states and actors from employing WMD. • Defeat those states and non-state actors who cannot be deterred from using WMD.

17. When Does Strategic Culture Matter? According to Michael C. Desch: • “Cultural variables may explain the lag between structural change and alterations in state behavior.” • “Cultural variables may account for why some states behave irrationally and suffer the consequences of failing to adapt to the constraints of the international system.” • “In structurally indeterminate situations, domestic variables such as culture may have more independent impact.” - “Culture Versus Structure in Post-9/11 Security Studies,” Strategic Insights, vol. IV, Issue 10 (October 2005).

18. Translating “Academic Speak” for Policymakers • “Cultural variables may explain the lag between structural change and alterations in state behavior.” = States do not always respond immediately to changes in the structure of international relations, such as altered balances of power. • “Cultural variables may account for why some states behave irrationally and suffer the consequences of failing to adapt to the constraints of the international system.” = Some states may have modes of behavior that resist outside influences, and which may appear irrational to other states. • “In structurally indeterminate situations, domestic variables such as culture may have more independent impact.” = Cultural influences may become more important when domestic or international circumstances are in flux.

19. Additional Hypotheses Strategic Culture is more salient relative to other considerations (economics, geography, ideology, leadership style), when: • There is a strong sense of danger to the group’s existence, identity, or resources, or when the group believes that it is at a critical disadvantage to other groups. • There is a strong “messiah complex,” or sense of mission, associated with the group’s identity, and its relationship to other groups. • There is a pre-existing strong cultural basis for group identity. • The group’s leadership frequently resorts to citing cultural symbols in support of its national security aspirations and programs. • There is a high degree of homogeneity within the group that is centered on “shared narratives.” • Historical experiences strongly predispose the group to perceive threats and to respond with violent (military) means.

20. Policy Implications • Acquisition of WMD – does strategic culture create or enhance incentives for acquiring WMD? • Employment of acquired WMD – does strategic culture influence decisions to use WMD? • Proliferation of WMD – does strategic culture promote or inhibit tendencies to proliferate WMD? • Adherence to international regimes and norms associated with WMD – does strategic culture strengthen or militate against international or domestic norm-adherence behavior?

21. WMD and Strategic Culture: Some Propositions • Scriptural justification: What if significant views were emerging among the “keepers of the culture” that using nuclear weapons could be justified by the culture’s shared oral/written “narrative”? • Fatalistic assumptions: What if the culture assumed that a wider conflict with other civilizations was inevitable? What if some even believed that such a conflict should be instigated, and that the instigating culture would even emerge from it better off? • Nuclear naiveté: What if the culture’s leaders did not appreciate how profoundly destructive a nuclear war would or could be? • Demonization of threat: What if the culture believed its principal enemy was “the Great Satan” and deserved to be annihilated? • Messianic status: What if the culture’s shared narrative included a view that it was the “chosen” people of God, that God was on its side, that God justified its policies, that God would help it vanquish or punish its enemies, and prevail in any conflict with those enemies? = Absence of traditional normative constraints on using nuclear weapons.= Weakening or failure of the “presumption of non-use.”

22. Preliminary Conclusions • “Strategic Culture” may help explain state behavior under conditions and in circumstances that cannot be explained by other theoretical frameworks. • “Strategic Culture” may provide insights into State behavior with respect to acquiring, using, or proliferating WMD. • “Strategic Culture” provides essential context for threat assessment, as well as implementing coalition-building, deterrence, and non-proliferation policies.

23. QUESTIONS?COMMENTS?

24. BACKUP SLIDES

25. The Decision to Acquire WMD • Predisposition to resort to technological solutions to security dilemmas. • Existential threat perceptions. • Asymmetric threats or other near-irreconcilable security dilemma. • Access to WMD materials, technology, expertise. • In most cases, the decision to acquire WMD also means violating international agreements or norms.

26. The Decision to Use WMD • To deter or to be deterred. • The presumption of non-use. • It may be necessary to distinguish between chem/bio and nuclear.

27. The Decision to Proliferate WMD • If a given strategic culture defies international norms and predisposes a state to seek counter-balancing allies, it may believe that selling or transferring WMD technology or expertise is in its interests. (e.g. North Korea) • Alternatively, if a state has a culture that fosters independent actions or rogue players within its ranks, it may be predisposed to allow or overlook private efforts to sell or transfer WMD technology. (e.g. Kahn)

28. Adherence to WMD Norms • Culture and law abidance. • Culture and negotiating style. • Culture and international integration.