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PRESENTATION TO LEDGER CONFERENCE MARITIME SECURITY FOR 2010 FIFA SOCCER WORLD CUP. Capt (SA Navy) Nick Snyman 2 December 2010. AIM. To present the SA Navy Operating Concept for Underwater Security support during 2010 SWC. Scope. Area of Operations Resources Threats Concept Conclusion.
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PRESENTATION TO LEDGER CONFERENCE MARITIME SECURITY FOR 2010 FIFA SOCCER WORLD CUP Capt (SA Navy) Nick Snyman 2 December 2010
AIM To present the SA Navy Operating Concept for Underwater Security support during 2010 SWC
Scope • Area of Operations • Resources • Threats • Concept • Conclusion
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Area of Operations Harbours and their approaches Inside the harbour Know the whole harbour Concentrate on the area from port entrance to identified quays Sea bottom Structures in the water (jetties, quays and installations) Outside the harbour From fairway buoy to harbour mouth Width of approach channel to be determined Sea bottom and bathymetry Key installations, buoys and obstructions
Area Of Operations - Defined 3 Major ports Durban Cape Town Port Elizabeth Areas of priority Port entrance to quays where cruise liners will berth – RED Quays where liners are berthed – RED Fairway Bouy to port entrance and port areas where most traffic can be expected and which will be vulnerable to threats attempting to close the harbour – BLUE
Possible Maritime Threats Military type threats Explosives Targeting traffic (on sea bottom, on water surface or in water column) Deployed from land Deployed from surface craft Deployed by underwater vehicle/swimmer Targeting stationary vessels and structures Deployed by underwater vehicle/swimmer Criminal acts Boarding/hostage taking from sea Theft Protesters/Rioters Accessing prohibited areas Vandalism
Civil Defence Support at Sea (SAN providing assistance) Search and rescue at sea Containment of spills/dangerous substances in ports/at sea Force protection (terrorist attack alongside or at sea) 9/11/2014
Possible Underwater Threats No threat is expected from conventional mine warfare in terms of numbers or extent If a threat exists it is likely to be non-conventional Generic underwater threats Divers/swimmers (scuba, snorkel) Vehicles (diver scooter, AUV) Mine like explosives (similar to limpet mines or sea mines) Sabotage devices (recognisable or disguised)
Frigates Maritime Reaction Squadron teams onboard Conducted surveillance and security patrols by boat and helicopter 20
SAS DRAKENSBERG (Supply Vessel) Had Maritime Reaction teams on board. Conducted security patrols 21
Maritime Patrol Aircraft Assisted frigates to establish Surface Picture 22
SAS PROTEA (Survey Vessel) SAS PROTEA served as HQ for underwater security using divers, work boats and Mine Countermeasures vessels to execute survey and other underwater security tasks Shallow Water Route Survey system was developed and deployed 23
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SA NAVY SHALLOW WATER ROUTE SURVEY SYSTEM(SWRSS) 11 September 2014 RESTRICTED 26
DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM (2) 7125 MBES 7128 Forward Looking Sonar SBP System SSS System • EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN (Wet) • ResonSeaBat 7125 (400 khz) Bathy MultibeamEchosounder (MBES) • ResonSeaBat 7128 (200 khz) Forward Looking Sonar (MBES) • Edgetech 300 khz / 900 khz Dual Frequency Side Scan Sonar (SSS) • USBL with 1m accuracy • Edgetech 2 khz / 12 khz Sub Bottom Profiler (SBP) RESTRICTED 27 11 September 2014
Retrofitted HPB / Namacurra SMB Interior RESTRICTED 28 11 September 2014
Capabilities Required Control of traffic in and around ports (people and vehicles) Detection of persons, boats, ships etc. – surveillance Detection of underwater traffic – sonar surveillance Detection of above water traffic – radar, IR, visual Identification of detected traffic Permits Database Enforcement of authority Armed patrol of ports and approaches
Capabilities Required Be able to counter static threats Detect mines, sabotage devices etc. on sea bottom and against hulls and quays where liners are berthed Identify, classify and neutralise detected devices Be able to counter mobile threats Detect mobile underwater threats Track and intercept underwater threats Neutralise underwater threats
Summary • Principles for underwater surveillance and above water surveillance are the same • Longer processes for underwater surveying • Slower speed • Long time to analyse data • Identification and recognition problems exist in both environments • Identification more difficult in underwater environment