The European Union-Ukraine-Russia “triangle”: what’s next?

1. The European Union-Ukraine-Russia “triangle”: what’s next? Dr. LyubovZhyznomirska, Department of Political Science, Saint Mary’s University Halifax, 13 February 2014

2. Presentation Outline: • An EU-Ukraine-Russia “triangle:” a political and geopolitical dimension • Key junctures in the EU-Ukraine relations • #Euromaidan in Ukraine • The potential impact of the current protests on the EU-Russia relations and on the EU-Ukraine relations

3. Explaining the EU-Ukraine-Russia “triangle” • No institutionally formalized “triangle” at the international level • EU/Ukraine, EU/Russia, Russia/Ukraine • Ukraine – between two competing projects of regional integration – the European one by the EU and the Eurasian one by Russia, influenced by both: • 1) political, economic, social, and cultural relations; • 2) asymmetric relations; • 3) facing a so called “civilizational” choice – European democracy versus Eurasian authoritarianism – a question of attraction and choice • Choice by political and economic elites or people? • Russia: Ukraine an essential object in geopolitical plans in Eurasia, Ukraine’s European choice – potential threat to their political regime • The EU: Ukraine’s Eurasian choice is unfortunate but not a problem; cordon sanitaire on Ukraine’s western border, rather than the eastern one

4. Explaining the EU-Ukraine-Russia “triangle” • Russia – the EU’s “strategic partner”? • Views the EU as a competitor in the territory of the shared neighbourhood; • The EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its Eastern Partnership initiative as a “threat” to Russia’s “sphere of geopolitical interest” • European and transatlantic political, economic, and security arrangements as threatening Russia’s domestic political regime, its international stature • Russia’s reaction to the potential signature of the Association Agreement (AA), subsequent U-turn by Ukrainian President V. Yanukovychand Euromaidan protests may: • change the EU’s stance in the shared neighbourhood and its relations with Russia; • force the Ukrainian elites to make a “civilizational” choice demanded by the majority of people, and; • provide an opportunity for Ukraine to develop healthier relations with Russia

5. Ukraine’s European Choice

6. Ukraine’s European Choice • Sept. 1997, the first EU-Ukraine summit: Leonid Kuchma confirmed Ukraine’s European choice in line with the PCA. • June 1998, EU-Ukraine Co-operation Council: Ukrainian PM ValeriyPustovojtenko, spoke about Ukraine's desire to receive an association status • July 2002 - Kuchmaannounced key plans: • signing an association agreement with the EU by 2003-2004, negotiating a free-trade area, fulfilling all the requirements for the AA to enter into force by 2004-2007, creating a customs union with the EU by 2005-2007 and meeting all EU membership requirements by 2007-2011

7. EU’s foreign policy: Ukraine • 1994 PCA – post-soviet space, not part of CEECs – no EU membership prospect • “close relations building upon the existing historical links;” the “common values;” and the recognition and support to “the wish of Ukraine to establish close cooperation with European institutions” • 1999 Common Strategy – UA “strategic partner” • Acknowledged “Ukraine’s European aspirations and welcome[d] Ukraine’s pro-European choice” • 2004 – Ukraine included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) • 2008 – the ENP receives an eastern dimension– the launch of Eastern Partnership

8. The EU-Ukraine relations: asking for EU membership prospect • The conversation of the deaf regarding EU membership prospect for Ukraine and regarding the sequence of the “prospect-reform” agenda • The EU: • a lack of strategic vision, implicit support to the status quo on Russia’s influence in Eastern Europe and on Ukraine in particular (Balfour, 2012), • positioning of Ukraine outside of the circle of European countries with a prospect of accession • Ukraine: • inconsistent with its political, economic and social reforms; • dual-track foreign policy, with political situation affecting changes in strategic choice for cooperation • high expectations unmet by the EU policy proposals, disappointed but left with no choice but to accept what the EU has to offer

9. EU’s policy towards Ukraine 1999–2009 - no change – “European aspirations” and “pro-European choice” rhetoric

10. The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: • Political association and deep economic integration • Beyond the European aspiration and pro-European choice? • “The close historical relationship and progressively closer links between the Parties as well as their desire to strengthen and widen relations in an ambitious and innovative way,” • the commitment “to a close and lasting relationship that is based on common values” and to “the principles of a free market economy, which would facilitate the participation of Ukraine in European policies,” • Ukraine “as a European country shares a common history and common values with the Member States of the European Union (EU) and is committed to promoting those values,” • “The importance Ukraine attaches to its European identity,” • “European choice” = commitment to building “deep and sustainable democracy and a market economy.” • The common values (i.e., democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law)

11. Decisive times: 2011-2013

12. EU-Ukraine AA: a beginning to an end of the status quo?

13. #EuroMaidan in Ukraine: what is it?

14. #EuroMaidan: Who supports it? • 50% support EuroMaidan, 42% don’t support (20-24 December 2014 survey by DIF). Support in: • Western Ukraine – 80% and 7%, • Central Ukraine – 63% and 28%, • Southern Ukraine – 20% and 71%, and • Eastern Ukraine – 30% and 65%. • Participated in the protest activities: Western – 26%, Central – 15% (Kyiv – 39%), South – 5.5%, and East – 3% • Support antiMaidan – 27%, against it – 57%. • 3 surveys conducted by the fund "Democratic Initiatives of IlkaKucheriv" and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, sponsored by the Renaissance foundation • 7-8 December 2013 during the rally (1037 respondents) • 20 December 2013 (515 resp.) • 3 February 2014 (502 resp.) • From maidan-camp to maidan-sich: changes in residents of maidan: • 88% men, 12% women; the average age – 37 years; high education – 43% (higher than the national average), incomplete secondary education – 4%; increased number of entrepreneurs – from 12% to 17%; students – 6% (down from 10%); dominated by people outside of Kyiv – 88% (55% from the west, 24% from centre, and 21% from east and south)

15. The #EuroMaidan • The Russian factor • Potential presence on the ground in Ukraine • The package of assistance “without conditions” • Immense anti-maidan information campaign domestically and internationally • Mobilization of Russophiles within Ukraine and scenarios of federalization

16. The Effects of the EuroMaidan • EU-Ukraine relations: • First stage – fully supported the aspirations of the Ukrainian people, calls for restraints • Mediation of the opposing sides by Fule and Ashton • Calls for the official opposition to distance itself from the “radicals” • The AA deal still on the table • EU Commission President Barroso: EU will not compete with Russia by offering a better financial package • Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolution, 30 Jan 2014 • European parliament resolution, 5 February 2014 • EU Foreign Affairs Council statement, 10 February 2014 • EU-Russia relations