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Expeditionary Operations in the 21 st Century

Expeditionary Operations in the 21 st Century. Jim Strock Director, Seabasing Integration Division Capabilities Development Directorate Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 703-784-6094 james.strock@usmc.mil. B.L.U.F.

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Expeditionary Operations in the 21 st Century

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  1. Expeditionary Operations in the 21st Century Jim Strock Director, Seabasing Integration Division Capabilities Development Directorate Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 703-784-6094 james.strock@usmc.mil

  2. B.L.U.F. • We are in a Long War with an adaptive enemy • We are continuously evolving with changing character of war: • Meeting guidance from QDR—shifting focus to both IW and maintaining conventional competencies • Learning from ongoing operations • Anticipating who, where and how we will fight in the future • Future naval capabilities will provide CoCom’s with flexible capabilities via innovative concepts • Exploiting operational maneuver from global commons • Phase 0: Contributing to maritime security and cooperation • Phases 3 and 4: Decisive Ops and SASO • Industry input vital to bring these capabilities to fruition ASAP and at reasonable costs

  3. Understanding the Future • How to keep our Naval forces relevant and able to • Threaten an asymmetrical enemy • While maintaining dominance for the conventional fight • Phase 0 requirements • CONPLAN GWOT demands • Naval emphasis in area denial and anti access environments • Temporal nature of the battlespace • World-wide deployment support structure is on the decline • Forward Staging Bases: 38 to 12 • Strat Airlift: declining fleet numbers: 160 fewer than 1989; projected down to 250 by 2010 • Flexible, adaptable, self-sufficient, DO capable, seabased forces a must

  4. Strategic Guidance Naval forces need to establish steady state capability: Active Partnering and Tailored Shaping Must contribute to Long War & transnational/ regional deterrence Build Partner Capacity Deter or Prevail in Conventional Campaigns

  5. CMC Planning Guidance “Working closely with our Navy and Coast Guard partners, we will advance the amphibious and expeditionary capabilities the Combatant Commanders rely upon to meet their emerging challenges.” CMC Planning Guidance

  6. Traditional Naval EthosWell Tailored for Non-Traditional Missions • Naval in character • “Packaged” command, ground combat, aviation, CSS capabilities in any size (not just ARG/MEUs) • Commander designation is mission dependent • Joint, Coalition, Interagency friendly in composition • Comfortable and adaptable on non-traditional platforms • Motherships can lighten the maneuver element • Add or subtract “specialists” based on the mission • Aviation and Combat Service Support lily-pad as far forward as required on all ships/crafts afloat

  7. Adjusting Our Aim Rebalanced Capabilities • Irregular & Traditional • Phase 0 • Naval emphasis • Temporal nature • Requires self-sufficiency early on Irregular Catastrophic Traditional Disruptive “ …our national strategy calls for more widely dispersed forces to provide increased forward presence, security cooperation, and global response to crises…” The Naval Operations Concept, 2006

  8. Naval Operations 1982-1989 (15X) Naval Operations 1990-1999 (40X) Naval Operations 2000-2005 (21X) The Naval Security EnvironmentAcross the Entire Range of National Security Strategy • 21 Forcible Entry Operations • 10 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations • 6 Amphibious Assaults • 3 Amphibious Raids • 2 Peace Operations “Arc of Instability” “Islamic Caliphate” 76 Amphibious Operations in 23 Years

  9. Stability and Support Operations • Small Wars and Counterinsurgency • Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Nation Building • Peace Operations • Combating Terrorism • Counter-Proliferation • Combating Drug Trafficking and Crime • Noncombatant Evacuation Operations #2 #3 #1 #X Piracy Crises and Conflicts Sunni Insurgency Micro-nationalist Insurgencies Shia Insurgency

  10. 7 10 ? 3 2 8 4 ? 1 5 ? 9 6 ? >35% Population Undernourished High Earthquake Risk >20% Population Undernourished Nuclear Armed States Top Ten Proven Oil Reserves 2004 10 Significant Drug Regions <50% Population Have Access to Clean Water ? Known Reserves Contributors To Crises Crises Are Certain

  11. Recent Examples .

  12. Naval Response Patterns (By platform type and by decade) Source: CNA Study, US Naval Response to Situations 1970-2000, Dec. 2000 Number of Responses If anything, this demand signal for versatile, expeditionary response has been extended even greater since 2001

  13. Increasing Forward PresenceWell Beyond Today’s ESGs and MEUs SPMAGTF ESG Distributed Ops SPMAGTF ESG Distributed Ops SPMAGTF

  14. Conduct Expeditionary Ops Conduct NEO Conduct Information Ops Conduct ISR Conduct Maritime Interdiction Conduct Maritime Security Ops Conduct Strike/Power Projection Conduct Special Ops Conduct Command And Control Maintain SLOCs Provide Consequence Management Provide Force Protection Provide Log/CSS/Facilities Maint Provide Operational Air and Missile Defense Conduct Civil Affairs Provide Law Enforcement and prisoner handling Provide staging for joint and combined forces Conduct coalition, interagency and NGO coordination and support Provide Humanitarian Aid Conduct Maritime Domain Awareness Share intelligence information Provide support for Homeland Security Support Proliferation Security Initiative What Do We Need to Do?GWOT Operational Tasks “21st Century UNITAS”

  15. The Anti-Access Challenge…OIF I Turkey: Access Not Granted, Even with $26B Offer

  16. Enhancing Phase 0-1 CapabilitiesVia Expanded Naval Missions Global Fleet Station Distributed Globally Networked Adaptive force packaging Aggregate, disaggregate & re-aggregate Culturally aware Task focused Build partner capacity Cross Fleet Standardization • Sized, shaped, and globally • postured for: • Forward Naval Presence • Security Cooperation • Counterinsurgency (COIN) • Counterterrorism • Civil-Military Operations • Counter-proliferation • Maritime Security Operations • Crisis Response • Deterrence • Sea Control • Air and Missile Defense • Expeditionary Power Projection

  17. Enhancing Phase 0-2 CapabilitiesVia Distributed Ops Capable SPMAGTFs Employed from platforms like LCS, riverine craft, destroyers… Counter- proliferation Forward Presence Deterrence Counter- terrorism ESG/MEU(SOC) Air & Missile Defense COIN Security Cooperation at Sea Security Cooperation Maritime Security Civil – Military Operations Crisis Response …While supported by Amphib motherships

  18. Enhancing Phase 2-3 CapabilitiesBy Re-aggregating Naval Forces Power Projection Sea Control Forward Postured CONUS Based

  19. Marine Corps Amphib & MPF(F)Shipbuilding Requirements • Shipbuilding Requirements • Amphibious Warfare Ships • 2.0 MEB AE per Strategic Planning Guidance; 15 Ao Ships per MEB AE • Total 30 operationally available ships • 10 LHD/LHA(R) • 10 LPD-17 • 10 LSD-41/49 (or equivalent replacement) • Average availability is 85% (for planning purposes) • Minimum 11/11/11 ships to meet 30 Ao requirement • Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) • One squadron (per May 2005 Acting SecNav/CNO/CMC decision) • Legacy Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons • Retain two squadrons to maintain afloat prepositioned war reserve capacity • Capabilities • Amphibious Warfare Ships • Inherent survivability, self-defense, and Navy crewing • Maritime forcible entry operations • Forward presence, deterrence • Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) • Capable of at-sea arrival and assembly of forces • Selective offload of equipment sets to meet Seabasing mission requirements • Supports forward engagement and forcible entry • MPF(F) by design is not assault echelon shipping; therefore, MPF(F) forces are not forcible entry capable MPF(F) Squadron Composition Notional 15-Ship ATF Five LHD-1 (Wasp Class) Five LPD-17 (San Antonio Class) Five LSD-41 (Whidbey Island Class) 2 LHA(R) 3 MLP 1 LHD 3 T-AKE 3 T-AKR 2 Legacy T-AK

  20. TSCP COBRA GOLD BALIKITAN Marine Corps JHSVShipbuilding Requirements • JHSV Capabilities & Characteristics • Shallow draft (< 15’), high speed (> 35 kts loaded) • Ability to enter small, austere/degraded ports unassisted • Self-deploying between theaters • 600-700 ST payload, 1200 NM range, 35 kts, Sea State 3 • Smaller payloads = greater range, larger payloads = less range • Seating for 312 Marines (Co (rein)); berthing for 104 Marines • 20-22,000 sqft mission deck/cargo bay (M1A2, MTVR compatible) • Slewing ramp (astern to 40 degrees forward) • Level I, Class 2 flight deck for H-60s, H-46s, UH-/AH-1 helicopters • Fuel only, no services • 20 ST crane for TEU movement, small boat launch & recovery • Net Ready C4 system (plug and play) • JHSV is not a combatant, operates in a permissive environment • MSC standard for ATFP capabilities • JHSV Quantity and Basing • 8 JHSVs funded (5 Army, 3 Navy) • Quantity funded does not equal quantity required • Acquisition objective TBD by MS B (Mar ’08) • PACOM, AoA, MCCDC studies suggest 16 JHSVs needed across DOD • 7 JHSV equivalents meet USMC requirements • Based on MARFOR TSCP, GWOT, intra-theater lift requirements • Requirement quantified in “vessel days per year” v. specific # of JHSVs • Assumes 180 days operational availability (Ao) per year per JHSV • Does not explore overlap between USN, USMC requirements • Notional basing scheme (JHSVs swing between theaters as needed) • PACOM = 3 (Hawaii, Guam, Okinawa) • CENTCOM = 2 (Bahrain) • EUCOM = 1 (Rota) • CONUS = 1 (Norfolk) USMC JHSV CONOPS (The “Intra-Theater Connector”) Possible JHSV Candidates Seabasing Support FIE Austal 126 INCAT 112 Sea Base TSL - 140 Self-deploy Adv Base NSE Austal 105 MDV-300 MPF ESG HA/DR

  21. Seabasing Research and Development High Capacity UNREP Selective Offload Skin-to-Skin Transfer Stabilized Cranes Joint Modular Intermodal Container (JMIC) Automated Cargo Handling Mobile Landing Platform Interface At-Sea Arrival, Assembly, Employment, Sustainment

  22. Other Research and Development Opportunities • Cultural Awareness and Tactical Language Training • Responsive Naval and Joint Fires suitable for Restricted ROE • C4ISR Interoperability and Intel Fusion Support Technology • Key Equipment Characteristics • Weight • Mobility • Armor • Power

  23. Conclusions • Evolving security environment expands challenges we face • Blurring character of war generates premium for agile forces with adaptive ethos • Security context calls for greater maritime cooperation and interoperability • International and interagency

  24. Questions?

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