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Implementing NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC): Implications for NATO Response

Implementing NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC): Implications for NATO Response Force’s Envisioned Roles Reynold F. Palaganas Colonel, US Army Commander, NCSA Sector Mons.

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Implementing NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC): Implications for NATO Response

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  1. Implementing NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC): Implications for NATO Response Force’s Envisioned Roles Reynold F. Palaganas Colonel, US Army Commander, NCSA Sector Mons

  2. Agenda • Thesis • Discussion • Findings • Conclusions • Recommendations

  3. View of NATO Transformation “… NATO will no longer have the large, massed units that were necessary for the Cold War, but will have agile and capable forces at Graduated Readiness levels… [to] prepare the Alliance to meet any threat….” - General (ret) James L. Jones, former SACEUR

  4. Thesis To transformNATO Response Force (NRF) operations from a “platform-centric” to a “network-centric environment,” NATO Consultation, Command and Control (C3) elements, NATO’s two strategic commands, member nations, and industry must move beyond Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) rhetoric and a “business as usual” Cold War mindset as enterprise network stakeholders by implementing a federated NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) concept as the interoperability driver that joins common interfaces and information services.

  5. The Challenge: A Pictorial View Users Users / Outcomes Maritime Land Air Logistics Targeting Air Other Network & Comm Services provided within functional areas Layers and ‘Building Blocks’ of services provided across functional areas to multiple users From this - “Stovepiped” Interoperability To this - “Gridded” Interoperability

  6. NRF Concept and Principles • NRF Concept – Two Envisioned Roles • Modular, quick reaction force • NATO’s transformation catalyst: entry point for capability improvements • NRF Principles(Relative to Capabilities) • Deployability • Scalability • Rotation

  7. NRF at Full Operational Capability (FOC) Deployable Joint Task Force HQ Land Air Maritime NATO Task Force Brigade Combat Team 200 Combat Sorties/Day • With Strategic Enablers • Sea/AirLift • Intelligence • Force Protection • Combat Support • Combat Service Support Total Force – approx up to 25,000 Plus Special Forces

  8. Bi - SC Strategic Vision Bi - SC Strategic Vision EFFECTS BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONS EFFECTS BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONS CAPABLE FUTURE FORCES CAPABLE FUTURE FORCES ACHIEVING ACHIEVING ACHIEVING COHERENT DECISION JOINT DEPLOYMENT EFFECTS SUPERIORITY & SUSTAINMENT Transformation Goals (TG) Transformation Objective Areas (TOA) EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT EXPEDITIONARY INFORMATION OPERATIONS SUPERIORITY JOINT MANOEUVRE NETWORK INTEGRATED ENABLED LOGISTICS CAPABILITY ENHANCED CIMIC CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 1/3/2006 2 1/3/2006 2 NATO Commanders’ Bi-Strategic Vision Concepts

  9. NNEC: It’s About People – Information – Networks NATO’s blueprint transformation from a stovepiped to a Networking Information and Infrastructure (NII) enterprise

  10. Relevant NATO Bodies for NNEC NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) NC3 Organisation Military Committee (MC) NATO C3 Board (NC3B) SACEUR SACT NC3 Reps OPCON OPCOM NATO CIS SERVICES AGENCY (NCSA) NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) STRATEGIC COORD (for CD&E) JFC OPCON NRF- #

  11. Findings – NNEC Impediments (1 of 3) • Dealing with a Legacy Platform-Centric • Environment • Lack of Coherent Network-centric Guiding Principles or Keystone Authoritative Reference • Outdated Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)

  12. Findings – NNEC Impediments (2 of 3) • Technological Insertion Concerns – two themes: • Obtaining Nations’ Consensus to Open Standards Architecture • Bridging the Technology/Capability Gap • Nations Pursuing Different Levels of Ambition • Info Technology Transfer (Transatlantic • Gap; Also, Info Sharing within Europe)

  13. Findings – NNEC Impediments (3 of 3) • National Funding and NATO Common Funding • Support Concerns • National Funding – for Provision and Prioritized Investment of National Military Assets • NATO Common Funding – “Cost-Shares” for NATO Capability Projects or NATO Owned Assets

  14. Conclusions (1 of 2) • NATO and nations will rely upon NRF as a focal point to operationalize CIE network enabled common services; however, implementing NNEC presents interoperability challenges in migrating stakeholders away from a platform-centric legacy environment to a network-centric force – a “paradigm shift”

  15. Conclusions: Role Implications (2 of 2) • NRF in quick reaction force role - Can’t leverage NRF capabilities without NC3 bodies breaking away from stovepiped policies, architectures, and management approaches NNEC is intended to overcome with this plug-and-operate concept • NRF in transformation catalyst role - Can’t accelerate NNEC evolutionary programs or improve NATO/national systems without firm mutual stakeholders’ national commitments to reduce technology and capabilities gaps

  16. Recommendations (1 of 3) • 1st: Regarding NRF’s quick reaction force role - NC3 organizational bodies must reassert overarching CIS interoperability roles and responsibilities and focus on “quick wins”

  17. Recommendations (2 of 3) • 2d: Regarding NRF’s transformation catalyst role - NC3 organizational bodies should exploit distributed Alliance cross-cutting capabilities, integrating NNEC economies of scale where consensus is possible - Nations must have political will to invest upfront in network-centric initiatives while reducing investments to recapitalize national legacy systems

  18. Recommendations (3 of 3) • 3d: Regarding industry - NC3 organizational bodies and nations must stay connected with industry forums such as Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium – implementing NNEC in the NRF is an intellectual teaming effort

  19. Comments/Questions Published work can be found at this website: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp Click on “Information as Power”

  20. Backup Charts

  21. Discussion: Network Centric Warfare (NCW) Background

  22. Discussion: NNEC - Background • Network-Centric Frames of Reference • U.S. – Net Centric Operations and Warfare (NCOW) • U.K. – Network-Enabled Capability (NEC)

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