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ENRON: The Movie • Hollywood will find a way to make this story an “entertainment” • But at its core it was a scheme to enrich management through a complex web of lies and misrepresentations Previous Page Next Page
WELCOME TO THE REAL WORLD BEFORE ENRON, ALMOST ALL CREDIT RATERS BELIEVED THAT: • When you asked management a direct question, you would receive a fundamentally honest answer • Despite the potential conflicts of interest in providing both auditing and consulting services, accountants recognized that credibility rested on confidence in their independence, and acted accordingly
INVESTMENT GRADE AAA/Aaa AA/Aa A/A BBB/Baa SPECULATIVE GRADE BB/Ba B/B CCC/Caa CC/Ca C/C D LONG-TERM DEBT RATING SCALE
What the Agencies Did Right! • For years, Enron’s ratings were in the “BBB/Baa” range, only one category above speculative grade • Met regularly with Enron management to perform normal due diligence • Communicated their credit opinions to the market
What the Agencies Did Wrong! • Didn’t recognize on a timely basis numerous “red flags” (i.e. extraordinary growth, lack of transparency, extreme corporate arrogance, inexplicable management changes) • Were overly concerned about domino effect on Enron’s liquidity of a decision to downgrade out of investment grade • When they finally acted, it didn’t matter!
After Enron the Agencies Considered Whether to: • Apply a shorter perspective when assigning long-term debt ratings (no more “rating through the cycle”) • Incorporate current market sentiment (i.e. market prices) directly into ratings • Investor reaction was overwhelmingly negative, so more subtle changes have been adopted
Changes in Agency Attitudes & Practices • More intense surveillance, particularly where there are liquidity and funding risks • 1) recognize that changes in banking practices have altered liquidity risks • 2) recognize that share and bond price changes can effect liquidity & funding risks (slide 1 of 3)
Changes in Agency Attitudes & Practices • Ask more questions about ratings & equity price triggers & other contingent financial commitments • Incorporate assessments of corporate governance into rating decisions (slide 2 of 3)
Changes in Agency Attitudes & Practices • Publish opinions more frequently on individual credits of market interest and importance • Use existing communication tools, including CreditWatch & Rating Outlooks, more effectively • Have far less patience, especially when there are perceived liquidity & funding risks (slide 3 of 3)
Implications of Changes for Investors/Lenders • The number of rating changes may increase • Individual ratings may change more often • Greater ratings volatility may cause larger swings in regulatory capital, demanding more cautious investing/lending approaches (slide 1 of 2)
Implications of Changes for Investors/Lenders • If agencies become more proactive, it may not be so easy to anticipate their actions • If agencies provide more predictive guidance, it will be necessary to become more of a “student” of ratings • If agency research improves, internal credit research will have to improve (Slide 2 of 2)
Implications of Changes for Borrowers/Counterparties • Need to convince agencies you’re not another Enron and are deserving of their trust • Need for greater familiarity with the rating process and how different agencies work • Need to establish and maintain open lines of communication with key agency personnel (slide 1 of 2)
Implications of Changes for Borrowers/Counterparties • Need to understand rating criteria being applied to your industry and be able to address them when you meet the agencies • Agencies have certain “hot buttons” - know what they are and how to address them • Managing the rating process will be harder, but the benefits of doing so and the penalties for not doing so will be greater (slide 2 of 2)
Current Rating Agency “Hot Buttons” • Corporate Governance • Triggers & Contingent Financial Obligations • Liquidity & Funding Risks
Ownership Issues 1) transparency of ownership 2) owner’s influence Relationships with Financial Stakeholders 1) shareholder meeting & voting procedures 2) protection of owner’s rights Information Disclosure & Transparency 1) Quality of disclosure 2) Timeliness & ease of access to information 3) Independence & credibility of auditors Board of Directors 1) Structure 2) Responsibilities 3) Effectiveness Corporate Governance
Triggers & Other Financial Contingencies • Rating and equity price triggers • Operating and synthetic leases • Explicit and implicit commitments under structured financings • Guarantees/commitments between affiliates • Make-whole commitments to third parties
Liquidity & Funding Risks • Internal liquidity • Quality of external liquidity supports • Dependence on asset/business unit sales to meet maturing debt • Dependence on refinancing to meet maturing debt • Magnitude and timing of contingent cash demands tied to performance triggers
Final Thoughts • Enron has severely shaken investor confidence in capital markets • Due to their role, the rating agencies reconsidered some long-standing policies • They concluded that drastic changes were not called for and could be even more disruptive • Still, the formal and informal changes are important for all users of ratings to understand
Roy P. Weinberger Credit Research, Advisory Consultingsm 1004 Monarch Circle Statesboro, GA, USA 30458 Tel/Fax 912 564 5073 rweinberger@frontiernet.net