1 / 65

H Y D R O G E N I M P L E M E N T I N G A G R E E M E N T

H Y D R O G E N I M P L E M E N T I N G A G R E E M E N T. International Energy Agency Hydrogen Implementing Agreement Executive Committee Meeting Petten – November 7-9, 2006 Task 19 – Hydrogen Safety. William Hoagland.

goro
Download Presentation

H Y D R O G E N I M P L E M E N T I N G A G R E E M E N T

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. H Y D R O G E N I M P L E M E N T I N G A G R E E M E N T International Energy Agency Hydrogen Implementing Agreement Executive Committee Meeting Petten – November 7-9, 2006 Task 19 – Hydrogen Safety William Hoagland AN IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY

  2. Review (task history, goals and objectives, participation, organization and management) Current status and progress Vancouver experts meeting – Sept 2006 Future activities and milestones Task products Open items/problems Outline of Presentation

  3. October 04 Annex Approved by ExCo February 05 Work Plan Final Draft March 05 1st Experts Meeting (Paris) WP Approved September 05 2nd Experts Meeting (Pisa) March 06 3rd Experts Meeting (Long Beach) September 06 4th Experts Meeting (Vancouver) Task History (2004-2006)

  4. To conduct a collaborative program to develop predictive methods, data and other information that will facilitate the accelerated adoption of hydrogen systems. Specific objectives: Characterize and assess risks and hazards and QRA metholodogies; Conduct collaborative testing program to validate the models that have been developed and to further refine those tools for use in real-life scenarios; and Document and convey resultsand data to reduce the barriers that inhibit commercial introduction of hydrogen systems. Task 19 Goals and Objectives

  5. Participation Organization Management

  6. Canada EC France Italy Japan The Netherlands Norway United Kingdom United States Participating Countries

  7. A. Risk Management: QRA and test methodology development around which a collaborative testing program can be conducted Testing program: Evaluate the nature and consequences of safety-related events under a range of real-life scenarios, environments and mitigation measures Information Dissemination: Develop targeted information packages for stakeholder groups Task Organization

  8. Logical Approach Knowledge Gaps • Existing information • Incidents DB • RA methodologies • Frequency data • Probability data Risk Assessment Experimental Testing • Testing methods • Databases • Raw data • Consequences • Mitigation effects TargetedInformation Packages

  9. Vancouver Experts MeetingSeptember 6-8, 2006

  10. Three days instead of two More time for discussion/planning Review progress/milestones/products Subtask C integrated into A & B Plan for third year (October 2006 to September 2007) Meeting Agenda/Structure

  11. Subtask progress updates/discussion Activity plans for next 12 months Products and deliverables Identification of new activities and leaders Revised Task Information Plan Schedule of future meetings Follow on proposal? Meeting Goals / Expectations

  12. How can we improve task communications/collaboration? Subtask meetings? Expanded use of website? Papers/presentations? Coordination with other tasks? What task products for first 3-year period? Who will take lead for each? How do we see our relationship to other Safety activities? National programs Hysafe/IPHE, etc. Others??? Questions and Issues

  13. Consensus on knowledge gaps Definition of structure and use of HYTEX database Better definition of information plan and agreement on information products Plan for third year and accomplishments Vancouver experts meetingResults

  14. Survey of RA Methodologies Review of RA Studies R&D Modeling and Experimental studies Subtask A - Risk Management QRA and test methodology development around which a collaborative testing program can be conducted

  15. Subtask A Activities and sub-activities: • Activity A1:Survey existing methodologies for relevant case studies • Activity A2:Comparative QRA of hydrogen stations with existing systems using conventional fuels • Activity A3: Probabilistic and deterministic risk and consequence analysis • Sub-activity 3a: Hazard identification and analysis, and accident progress analysis • Sub-activity 3b: Modeling of component failures

  16. Subtask A Benefits Integration via • Sharing: • Technical knowledge • Experience / expertise • Ideas • Achieving synergy: • Sharing the work and • Reducing duplication of work

  17. Subtask A Scope, Progress & Products • Integration takes time and commitment • Meetings - encourage sharing and achieving synergy • What are expectations of Task 19 and are they realistic? • Products to reflect realistic commitment (1st 3 yrs) • RA methodologies survey with periodic updates • Collection of RA studies • Knowledge gaps survey with a joint plan for experimental and modeling work • Key product – development of the foundation for a global network of hydrogen safety experts

  18. Subtask A Participation L– leader;P– participant;NP– not participating

  19. Report type: Public use by industry professionals Schedule First draft (limited scope) - January 2006 Meeting to discuss expanded scope – October 2006 Final draft doe review – May 2007 Publication – October 2007 Product: Survey of Risk Assessment Methodologies

  20. Intended for internal use by participants Scope Part 1: Collection of RA Studies – January 2007 Part 2: Comparative Analysis Scoping meeting: October 2006 Draft: January 2007 Review: May 2007 Publish: October 2007 Comparative Analysis of RA Studies

  21. A1:Draft presented at March Experts meeting, under internal review by participants A2:Has been kicked off: Netherlands and Canada will prepare a “straw man” based on Dutch and Canadian studies–60% complete A3:Has been kicked off: Canada, Norway and France will prepare “straw man” on this activity topics –30% complete Subtask A - Initial Plan and Progress

  22. Risk Assessment SurveyActivity Leader: DNV

  23. Survey of RA Methodologies for Relevant Studies (examples provided by participating countries) International and National RA Standards (national standards information and analysis provided by participating countries) International Best Practices Recommendations Activity A1: Survey of Existing RA Methodologies Summary Scope:

  24. National Studies (examples provided by participating countries) : Description Main Findings Recommendations Activity A2: Comparative RA Studies of H2 vs HC Stations Summary Scope:

  25. Generic station site plan for HazID Comparative QRA - HazID • Station Perimeter • The generic station consists (regardless of technology) of the following major components or “boxes”: • fuel delivery / on-site production (will also include purification for reformer technology); • compression; • storage; • dispensing / vehicle interface (vehicles themselves are excluded). Station Convenience Store Car Wash Fuel delivery / Generation on-site Purification / Compression Storage Dispenser

  26. Survey of Databases on Component Failures Hazard Identification Methods Accident Progression Analysis Modeling of Component Failures (Pierre Benard) Recommend Scenarios for Test Program – Subtask B (Joe Wong) Activity A3: Probabilistic and Deterministic Risk and Consequence Analysis Summary Scope:

  27. A3 Risk and consequence analysis enhancement A3.2: Achieved results in CFD modeling (Canada)

  28. How do we collect experimental data? Format? Test reports? Web site? • Link between subtask B & subtask A (A.3), i.e. validation of CFD codes to be applied in H2 risk assessment • Could the following objective be one of the objectives of IEA Task 19 activity? • Definition/Elaboration of a “common” validation matrix for CFD codes • Example of the Containment Code Validation Matrix (focuses on H2 risk in NPP) elaborated in the framework of an OECD/NEA Group of Experts

  29. Validation, calibration and enhancement of CFD modeling capabilities for simulation of hydrogen releases and dispersion using available experimental databases CFD Validation Scenario Matrix

  30. Pedro, Peneau, Oshkai & Djilali (Auto 21 - 2006) Shock wave patterns from high pressure hydrogen releases

  31. Leak while refuelling • Leak from the dispenser hose

  32. Leak originating from a crack having the dimensions 7.2 mm x 1 mm. Normal vector to the leak surface is directed upward, horizontally and downward. The leak location is set at a height of 0.86 m from the ground. The size of the simulation domain is 9.2 m 9.2 m6.9 m. The height of the canopy is 5 m. Sonic leak : 8.7 10-4 kg/s. Leak during refuelling

  33. Vertical Jet 4% 2%

  34. Horizontal Jet 4% 2%

  35. Downward jet 4% 2% 8%

  36. How do we define a clearance distance when we don’t know in which direction the leak will be pointing? Knowledge gap

  37. Scenario 2: Fueling station : disconnected hose while refuelling • The hole is 2.36 m above the ground and has a diameter of 9.5 mm. • Time dependent leak from an initial pressure of 30 MPa • Volume : 21.38 10-5 m3

  38. Results 0.0033 sec 0.0111sec 0.0148sec 0.025 sec

  39. The leak is located at the junction between the handle and the piping 1.35m above the ground. Area of the leak 1.1315 10-4 m2 Mass flow rate :12.4 g/s x = 26.1 m, y = 16.3m, z = 6.6m Scenario 3: Leak from the dispenser while idle

  40. Results 4% 2% Horizontal extent

  41. High pressure jet releases • Comparisons of clearance distances between methane/H2 flares and various models (on-going) • Shell Model (not validated for hydrogen) • Larger distances for methane • (Critical and subcritical) • Sonic releases (LEFT Kinston U UK simulation; RIGHT 700 bar release simulation)

  42. Simulation of a release from a high pressure storage unit (700 bars)0.5 meters above ground Plane XZ Plane XY

  43. Mass flow rate Calculated using Paraschioviu method

  44. Turbulence model : RNG k-e Tank capacity : 150 L Tank size : 413 x 1534 mm external; 372 x 1381 mm internal Tank pressure : 700 bars Temperature : 293 K Release diameter : 6 mm Final mesh size: 1,801,905 cells Final domain size : 82x22x14 m Simulation details

  45. 0%-100% molar faction hydrogen contours (1) 1.0 sec 2.5 sec 5.0 sec 7.5 sec

  46. Flow structure close to the nozzle 0.5 seconds 17.5 seconds

  47. Preliminary results Difficult, fussy and long simulations Time dependent phenomena must be verified using grid adaptation Fundamental consideration: what is the effect of the fact that the velocity of sound of hydrogen is 4 times larger than the velocity of sound of air ? Sonic transition is determined by hydrogen sound velocity Importance of solving the shock wave pattern close to the nozzle No convergence could be obtained without resolving this region with FLUENT VS Phoenics Effect of boundary conditions on flow propagation Free jet vs External flow For this simulation the 1/distance dependance of the concentration field was only observed several meters from the jet oricice: surface effect? Note that a clear measurement of the maximum extent is difficult due to the disconnections of the envelopes Vortex shedding around obstacles may also leads to puffing Raises issues of defining the extent of the cloud (statistically?) Free jet simulation will be undertaken Conclusion

  48. Safety of materials studies for metal hydrides (material sciences issues which we are not addressing directly) Leakage issues: Modified flow rates 2 phase flows: solid may be ejected Material safety issues: Magnesium, Alanates, etc (DOE efforts) Can we extract clearance distance criteria from this? Will be important to specifically address portable applications (metal hydrides) Short term H2 applications Safety issues vs air transportation Comparative safety studies with respect to conventional Li-Ion batterie Flares: Effects of crosswinds on flamelength, flame shape still needs to be addressed – can the Shell-Thornton model still be applied? Other knowledge gap issues

  49. Testing and Experimental Program Evaluate the nature and consequences of safety-related events under a range of real-life scenarios, environments and mitigation measures Subtask B

  50. Subtask B – Testing and Experimental ProgramActivity B.2: Survey of Ongoing or Planned Programs and Projects • Suggested contents • Nomenclature and definitions • Ongoing or planned programs and projects • Overview of testing laboratories and facilities worldwide • Categorization of test projects • Database of performed, ongoing or planned test projects • HYPRO • Review of performed, ongoing or planned programs and Review of performed, ongoing or planned programs and projects • If applicable, results of the projects could be compared based on the • categorization of studied subjects • Summary of review • Discussion, evaluation and recommendations P

More Related