Katlo v. Briney

1. Katlo v. Briney LiShiyu 2012141021096

2. Content Fact Procedure issue Rule & Instruction My opinion

3. Fact Plaintiff : Katol (Plaintiff lived with his wife and worked regularly as a gasoline station attendant in Eddyville, seven miles from the old house where occured it. ) Defendant : Briney (They lived several miles away from the old house where occured it. ) Privilege : Defense of prorerty ( real property,a house in an 80-acre tract in southwest Mahaska County ,lowa,1971)

4. Fact ( house ) Prior to 1957 1957 1957-1967 Briney’s grandparents and parents lived. Briney inherited farmland from her parents. Her husband, Edward, attempted to care for the land. He kept no farm machinery thereon. The outbuildings became dilapidated. There occurred a series of trespassing and housebreaking events with loss of some household items, the breaking of windows and messing up of the property in general. Defendant posted “no trespass” signs on the land. The nearest one was 35 feet（10.7meters）from the house. 1967.6.8. latest trespassing and housebreaking event.

5. Fact ( shotgun trap ) 1967.6.11. defendants set "a shotgun trap" in the north bedroom. After Mr. Briney cleaned and oiled his 20-gauge shotgun, the power of which he was well aware, defendants took it to the old house where they secured it to an iron bed with the barrel pointed at the bedroom door. It was rigged with wire from the doorknob to the gun's trigger so it would fire when the door was opened. Briney first pointed the gun so an intruder would be hit in the stomach but at Mrs. Briney's suggestion it was lowered to hit the legs. He admitted he did so "because I was mad and tired of being tormented" but "he did not intend to injure anyone.“ He gave no explanation of why he used a loaded shell and set it to hit a person already in the house. Tin was nailed over the bedroom window. The spring gun could not be seen from the outside. No warning of its presence was posted. 1967.7.16. event occueed.

6. Fact——1967.7.16. ( Prior to the date )Plaintiff had observed it for several years while hunting in the area and considered it as being abandoned. He knew it had been uninhabited. In 1967 the area around the house was covered with high weeds. Plaintiff and McDonough ( his companion ) had been to the premises and found several old bottles and fruit jars which they took and added to their collection of antiques. On the latter date about 9:30 P.M. They made a second trip to the Briney property. They entered the house by removing a board from a porch window which was without glass. While McDonough was looking around the kitchen area plaintiff went to another part of the house. As he started to open the north bedroom door the shotgun went off striking him in the right leg above the ankle bone. Much of his leg, including part of the tibia, was blown away. Only by McDonough's assistance was plaintiff able to get out of the house and after crawling some distance was put in his vehicle and rushed to a doctor and then to a hospital. He remained in the hospital 40 days.

7. Fact ( relating ) Defendant："I didn't think it would go through quite that hard." There was undenied medical testimony that plaintiff had a permanent deformity, a loss of tissue, and a shortening of the leg. The record discloses plaintiff to trial time had incurred $710 medical expense, $2056.85 for hospital service, $61.80 for orthopedic service and $750 as loss of earnings. In addition thereto the trial court submitted to the jury the question of damages for pain and suffering and for future disability. Plaintiff testified he knew he had no right to break and enter the house with intent to steal bottles and fruit jars therefrom. He further testified he had entered a plea of guilty to larceny in the nighttime of property of less than $20 value from a private building. He stated he had been fined $50 and costs and paroled during good behavior from a 60-day jail sentence. Other than minor traffic charges this was plaintiff‘s first brush with the law. On this civil case appeal it is not our prerogative to review the disposition made of the criminal charge against him. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and against defendants for $20,000 actual and $10,000 punitive damages.

8. Procedure The overwhelming weight of authority, both textbook and case law, supports the trial court's statement of the applicable principles of law. After careful consideration of defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial, the experienced and capable trial judge overruled them and entered judgment on the verdict. Defendants appealed. Affirmed. All Justices concur except LARSON, J., who dissents.( as following ) Prosser on Torts, Third Edition, pages 116-118; Case Hooker v. Miller, 37 Iowa 613 Case State v. Vance, 17 Iowa 138 Case Allison v. Fiscus, 156 Ohio 120 Case Bird v. Holbrook,4 Bing. 628,130 Eng. Rep.911( C.P.1828 )

9. Issue 1. What is the intention that the defendant set “a shotgun trap”? Protecting their property , or giving the intruders punishment? 2. Whether could the defendants defend to property by setting a spring gun as “a shotgun trap” ?

10. Rule & Instruction The Restatement (Second) of Torts reflect the lower priority afforded the privelege to act in defense of one’s property: 77#.DEFENSE OF POSSESSION BY FORCE NOT THREATENING DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM An actor is privileged to use reasonable force , not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm , to prevent or terminate another’s instrusion upon the actor’s land or chattels , if, (a) The instrusion is not privileged…and (b) The actor reasonable believes that the instrusion can be prevented or terminated only by the force used , and (c) The actor has first requested the other to desist and the other has disregarded the request , or the actor reasonably believes that a request will be useless or that substantial harm will be done before it can be made.

11. Rule & Instruction 79#,DEFENSE OF POSSESSION BY FORCE THREATENING DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM The intentional infliction upon another of harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm by a means which is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm , for the purpose of preventing or terminating the other’s intrusion upon the actor’s possession of land and chattels , is privileged if , but only if , the actor reasonably believes that the intruder , unless expelled or excluded , is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to the actor or to a third person whom the actor is privileged to protect.

12. Rule & Instruction Instruction 5: "You are hereby instructed that one may use reasonable force in the protection of his property , but such right is subject to the qualification that one may not use such means of force as will take human life or inflict great bodily injury. Such is the rule even though the injured party is a trespasser and is in violation of the law himself.“

13. Rule & Instruction Instruction 6: "An owner of premises is prohibited from willfully or intentionally injuring a trespasser by means of force that either takes life or inflicts great bodily injury ; and therefore a person owning a premise is prohibited from setting out ‘spring guns’ and like dangerous devices which will likely take life or inflict great bodily injury, for the purpose of harming trespassers. The fact that the trespasser may be acting in violation of the law does not change the rule. The only time when such conduct of setting a ‘spring gun’ or a like dangerous device is justified would be when the trespasser was committing a felony of violence or a felony punishable by death , or where the trespasser was endangering human life by his act.” Instruction 7: “To entitle the plaintiff to recover for compensatory damages, the burden of proof is upon him.

14. All Justices concur except LARSON, J., who dissents. because the majority wrongfully assumes that by installing a spring gun in the bedroom of their unoccupied house the defendants intended to shoot any intruder who attempted to enter the room. Under the record presented here, that was a fact question. Unless it is held that these property owners are liable for any injury to an intruder from such a device regardless of the intent with which it is installed, liability under these pleadings must rest upon two definite issues of fact：did the defendants intend to shoot the invader, and if so, did they employ unnecessary and unreasonable force against him? …… There being no statutory provisions governing the right of an owner to defend his property by the use of a spring gun or other like device, or of a criminal invader to recover punitive damageswhen injured by such an instrumentality while breaking into the building of another, our interest and attention are directed to what should be the court determination of public policy in these matters.

15. All Justices concur except Larson, J., who dissents. I would hold there is no absolute liability for injury to a criminal intruder by setting up such a device on his property, and unless done with an intent to kill or seriously injure the intruder, I would absolve the owner from liability other than for negligence. I would also hold the court had no jurisdiction to allow punitive damages when the intruder was engaged in a serious criminal offense such as breaking and entering with intent to steal. …… Although the court told the jury the plaintiff had the burden to prove "That the force used by defendants was in excess of that force reasonably necessary and which persons are entitled to use in the protection of their property," it utterly failed to tell the jury it could find the installation was not made with the intent or purpose of striking or injuring the plaintiff. …… Under such circumstances as we have here the issue as to whether the set was with an intent to seriously injure or kill an intruder is a question of fact that should be left to the jury under proper instructions, and that the mere setting of such a device with a resultant serious injury should not as a matter of law establish liability.

16. All Justices concur except Larson, J., who dissents. In the case of a mere trespass able authorities have reasoned that absolute liability may rightfully be fixed on the landowner for injuries to the trespasser because very little damage could be inflicted upon the property owner and the danger is great that a child or other innocent trespasser might be seriously injured by the device. In such matters they say no privilege to set up the device should be recognized by the courts regardless of the owner's intent. I agree. …… On the other hand, where the intruder may pose a danger to the inhabitants of a dwelling, the privilege of using such a device to repel has been recognized by most authorities, and the mere setting thereof in the dwelling has not been held to create liability for an injury as a matter of law. In such cases intent and the reasonableness of the force would seem relevant to liability.

17. My opinion It is the police and director of public prosecution who govern and have the jurisdiction over trespassing and housebreaking events like this. While what police can do is so limited and late justice injustice , people could and should take some measures to protect themselves , I view which as remedy by someoneself. However , remedy by someoneself should be restricted by law and defense of property should not take risk of one’s life even the one is an intruder. Take an instance , there is an accusation “to the crime of endangering public safety” in Chinese tort law. And I suppose the instructions mentioned before passing on the same intention, which place a higher value upon human safety than upon mere rights in property. Think further : Utilitarianism? There is a higher value upon human safety than upon mere rights in property. ?

18. Case Hooker v. Miller, 37 Iowa 613 Case State v. Vance, 17 Iowa 138 In Hooker v. Miller, 37 Iowa 613, we held defendant vineyard owner liable for damages resulting from a spring gun shot although plaintiff was a trespasser and there to steal grapes. At pages 614, 615, this statement is made: "This court has held that a mere trespass against property other than a dwelling is not a sufficient justification to authorize the use of a deadly weapon by the owner in its defense; and that if death results in such a case it will be murder, though the killing be actually necessary to prevent the trespass. The State v. Vance, 17 Iowa 138." At page 617 this court said: "[T]respassers and other inconsiderable violators of the law are not to be visited by barbarous punishments or prevented by inhuman inflictions of bodily injuries."

19. Case Allison v. Fiscus, 156 Ohio 120 The facts in Allison v. Fiscus, 156 Ohio 120, 100 N.E.2d 237, 44 A.L.R.2d 369, decided in 1951, are very similar to the case at bar. There plaintiff's right to damages was recognized for injuries received when he feloniously broke a door latch and started to enter defendant's warehouse with intent to steal. As he entered a trap of two sticks of dynamite buried under the doorway by defendant owner was set off and plaintiff seriously injured. The court held the question whether a particular trap was justified as a use of reasonable and necessary force against a trespasser engaged in the commission of a felony should have been submitted to the jury. The Ohio Supreme Court recognized plaintiff's right to recover punitive or exemplary damages in addition to compensatory damages.… The facts in Allison v. Fiscus, 156 Ohio 120, 100 N.E.2d 237, 44 A.L.R.2d 369, decided in 1951, are very similar to the case at bar. There plaintiff's right to damages was recognized for injuries received when he feloniously broke a door latch and started to enter defendant's warehouse with intent to steal. As he entered a trap of two sticks of dynamite buried under the doorway by defendant owner was set off and plaintiff seriously injured. The court held the question whether a particular trap was justified as a use of reasonable and necessary force against a trespasser engaged in the commission of a felony should have been submitted to the jury. The Ohio Supreme Court recognized plaintiff's right to recover punitive or exemplary damages in addition to compensatory damages.…

20. Case Bird v. Holbrook,4 Bing. 628,130 Eng. Rep.911( C.P.1828 )

21. End Thanks a lot