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Research Objectives: Analyzing Adaptation

Comparative Risk Analysis & Threat Adaptability: Civil Aviation and Biological Terrorism November 2004 Terry O’Sullivan CREATE Homeland Security Center University of Southern California. Research Objectives: Analyzing Adaptation.

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Research Objectives: Analyzing Adaptation

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  1. Comparative Risk Analysis & Threat Adaptability: Civil Aviation and Biological TerrorismNovember 2004Terry O’SullivanCREATE Homeland Security CenterUniversity of Southern California

  2. Research Objectives:Analyzing Adaptation • By closing (or impeding) one method of terrorism, we may increase the risk of another • Terrorists may find easier alternatives, or adapt tactics to new impediments • Alternatives might be even worse than the original threat • Public Policy Countermeasures Allocation Decisions: • Comprehensive view of ALL possible risks • Terrorism is not the only security risk • “Dual Benefit” solutions may be among most cost-effective

  3. Threats to Civil Aviation & Public Health: • First Stage: Assessing Threat Risks • Proliferation of Weapons, Agents, Threats • Weapons/Threat Capabilities • Susceptibility to attack • Countermeasures to Reduce Susceptibility • Countermeasures to Improve Survivability • Second Stage: Modeling Risks • Model threats using dynamic Bayesian structures • Assess the Probabilities of different modes of attack • Later Stages: • Assess Economic Costs and Benefits of the Investments,

  4. Possible Terrorist Goals • Large-Scale Casualties • Disruption of Travel, Gov’t, Lifestyle • Harm to Industries, Institutions • Harm to Economy Generally • Fear, Punishment and/or coercion

  5. External Weapons Threats to Commercial Aviation

  6. Commercial Aviation: Terrorist Attack Options Tactics Hijack, maybe use as weapon Suicide Attack on Airplane Explosive on Plane Sabotage External Weapons AirAttack Airport GroundAttack MANPADS RPG/Etc Sniper Rifle .50 Mach. Gun Mortar

  7. Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPG-7s) • Afghan Mujahideen used against low-flying Soviet aircraft • Could down civilian jet (taking off or landing) • Could be lofted over airport perimeter fences • Night-vision capability

  8. Large Caliber Sniper Rifles • A combination of long range & power (1.5 miles +) • .50 cal. have been sold to al Qaeda, IRA, Iraq (used against Coalition forces) • Could target fuel tanks, passengers, pilots, down aircraft in worst case • Muhammad-Malvo scenario?

  9. Man-Portable Aerial Defense Systems: MANPADS Missiles * Widely Proliferated: 500,000 to 700,000 have been produced since the 1960’s.

  10. MANPADS: Causes for Concern • Robust Black Market • Easily Transportable (e.g., in golf bag) 25- 35 pounds and are 4-5 feet in length • No foolproof or comprehensive countermeasures • Three main types: • Infrared • Laser-riders • Command Line of Sight (CLOS)

  11. Russian Arms Manufacturer KBM Website

  12. Previous Use of MANPADS • Large and Slower Moving Commercial Aircraft are Easy Targets. 25 documented instances of use of weapons against commercial aircraft, resulting in close to 1000 deaths. • Very Effective in Combat Zones. Using Stingers, Mujahideen rebels reportedly scored 269 aircraft kills out of the 340 heat-seeking missiles fired against Soviets • No Documented Use in the US

  13. 2003 Baghdad, Iraq Airport Attack on DHL Cargo Airliner

  14. Possible Counter-Measuresfor MANPADS & Other Threats Reduce Attack Susceptibility • Pyrotechnic devices, Infrared (DIRCM) • Airport perimeter control, Security measures • “Controllable Enabling” of MANPADS weapons • Change in flight tactics (takeoff, landing) • Non-reflective/anti-infrared paints, gels • Designated “hardened” emergency airports Increasing Survivability: Attack and/or SafetyMalfunction

  15. Survivability Measures Can Provide Dual Benefits for Civil Aviation Threats Terror Attack and/or “Natural”SafetyMalfunctions • Strengthening Airframe (Explosive decompression) • Key System Redundancies, isolating flight control linkages (new) • Fire Reduction Systems (Flight 800-type disaster?) • Cockpit Armor (increase survival in crash?) • Pilot Emergency Flying Training

  16. Airline Industry Threat Susceptibility & Countermeasures Only Ground MANPADS Air Attack Air or Ground

  17. Airline Industry Threats Vs. SurvivabilityCountermeasures Only Ground MANPADS Air Attack Air or Ground

  18. Biological Security:Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Disease Threats

  19. Critical Threat Variables: Biological Weapons Attacks Agent Sidell at al., Janes Chem-Bio Handbook, 2nd ed. Keys toEffectiveBioweaponsAttack Environmental Conditions Dispersal Method Delivery System

  20. Critical Threat Variables: Naturally Occurring Disease Outbreaks Pathogen Keys toNaturally OccurringOutbreak Environmental Conditions Transmission Method Delivery Mechanism

  21. Psychological Variables Related to Public Risk Perception: Smallpox vs. Anthrax vs. HPAI/Flu

  22. Critical Decisions Must be Made Within Complex Threat Environments Draft Model

  23. Conclusions • Risk Analysis Modeling must simultaneously account for a plethora of possible threats • Benefit-Cost calculations will improve with multiple-purpose, dual-benefit countermeasures to reduce risk(s) • Threats Analysis in many scenarios will include Psychological variables and Public as well as Expert Risk Assessments • Terrorists and Nature both adapt to “the best laid plans,” and Risks thus are dynamic

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