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. Jesús Almansa and Marco Carbone. { jfa, carbonem} @brics.dk. 4th April 2002. Two-Party Communication. Bob. unsecured channel. Alice. secure channel. Adversary (Passive). Two-Party Communication. unsecured channel. Bob. Alice. secure channel. Adversary (Active).

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  1. ... Jesús Almansa and Marco Carbone { jfa, carbonem} @brics.dk 4th April 2002

  2. Two-Party Communication Bob unsecured channel Alice secure channel Adversary (Passive)

  3. Two-Party Communication unsecured channel Bob Alice secure channel Adversary (Active)

  4. Public-Key Cryptography unsecured channel Alice Bob Adversary (Active)

  5. Key Management A1 A2 A3 A4

  6. Key Management A1 A2 TTP A3 A4

  7. Public-Key Certificate Vouches for the authenticity of the public key bound to the subject entity • Usefulness: • To prove identity (authenticity of an entity) • To avoid denials Good: trust can be used transitively • Bad: • all trust placed with one single entity • if TTP is compromised, comm. is insecure

  8. associated (confidence) values Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificates Trust Relations Evidences Conclusions

  9. A (entity, key) B pkA signed by pkB Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) A widely used software package (Zimmerman) Stalling’s notation:

  10. certification path web of trust Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

  11. pkA is valid if either pkA pkA or Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Confidence Values = { unknown, no trust, marginally trusted, fully trusted }

  12. Is Bob’s key valid for Alice? Bob Bob Alice Alice Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) : Yes : No

  13. Confidence Valuation in a PKI based on Uncertain Evidence (R. Kohlas – U. Maurer) • Agenda: • Formalism • Basics & Graphical Notation • Principles • Modeling Public-Key Certification • Confidence Valuation in PGP • Conclusions

  14. Formalism: Basic Definitions • Hypothesis • A statement not generally known to be true. • Piece of Evidence (Assumption) • A statement we suppose is true.

  15. Formalism: Basic Definitions(2) • Belief • Composition of statements taken as a fact. • Argument for h Collection of assumptions from which (along with the belief) h can be derived.

  16. E h Formalism: Graphical Notation Hypothesis and Evidences:

  17. Σ Formalism: Graphical Notation(2) Belief:

  18. Formalism: Graphical Notation(3) Argument:

  19. Formalism: Graphical Notation(4) Validity and Arguments: Σ h

  20. Formalism: Basic Definitions(3) • Confidence Value • Degree of certainty for an assumption or • hypothesis to be true. • Confidence Assignment • Entity’s initial belief w.r.t. each assumption.

  21. Formalism: Basic Definitions(4) • Confidence Valuation • Function that takes a hypothesis h and a • confidence assignment and returns a • confidence value for h. Reduces a priori information to a single confidence value for the hypothesis

  22. Formalism: Graphical Notation(5) Confidence Values:

  23. Formalism: Graphical Notation(6) Confidence Assignment:

  24. Formalism: Graphical Notation(7) Confidence Valuation: ( )= , e h h

  25. Confidence Valuation in a PKI based on Uncertain Evidence (R. Kohlas – U. Maurer) • Agenda: • Formalism • Basics & Graphical Notation • Principles • Modeling Public-Key Certification • Confidence Valuation in PGP • Conclusions

  26. h Principles: P1 If   , ( )= e then h

  27. h Principles: P1 (2) If  , ( )= e then h

  28. If  Principles: P2 , , ( ) ( ) e e then h  h

  29. Principles: P3 If f  h2 h1

  30. Principles: P3 (2) ( ) and f = then ( , , ( ) ) e e h1 = h2

  31. Principles: P4 If h1 h2

  32. Principles: P4 (2) then , , ( ) ( )  e e h1 h2

  33. Confidence Valuation in a PKI based on Uncertain Evidence (R. Kohlas – U. Maurer) • Agenda: • Formalism • Basics & Graphical Notation • Principles • Modeling Public-Key Certification • Confidence Valuation in PGP • Conclusions

  34. Modeling PK Certification • To realize the abstract formalism in a concrete problem: • identify pieces of evidence • identify possible conclusions • define confidence values • In the particular case of PK Certification: • Pairs of entities and keys can be seen like statements • The confidence values must be assigned to entities

  35. Modeling PK Certification Bob Bob Carol, K1 Carol, K2 Carol, K1 Alice Alice

  36. Confidence Valuation in a PKI based on Uncertain Evidence (R. Kohlas – U. Maurer) • Agenda: • Formalism • Basics & Graphical Notation • Principles • Modeling Public-Key Certification • Confidence Valuation in PGP • Conclusions

  37. AutX,K TrustX,K CertK1,X,K2 Confidence Valuation in PGP Statements:

  38. AutY,K1 AutX,K TrustY,K1 Confidence Valuation in PGP CertK1,X,K

  39. h Confidence Valuation in PGP If   P1 holds , ( )= e then h

  40. If  , ( ) e h Confidence Valuation in PGP P2 holds , ( ) e then  h

  41. Confidence Valuation in PGP If f  h2 h1

  42. Confidence Valuation in PGP ( ) and f = then , , ( ) ( ) e e h1 = h2

  43. Is Bob’s key valid for Alice? Bob Bob Alice Alice Confidence Valuation in PGP P3 does not hold! : Yes : No

  44. Confidence Valuation in PGP If h1 h2

  45. Confidence Valuation in PGP P4 holds then , , ( ) ( )  e e h1 h2

  46. Confidence Valuation in a PKI based on Uncertain Evidence (R. Kohlas – U. Maurer) • Agenda: • Formalism • Basics & Graphical Notation • Principles • Modeling Public-Key Certification • Confidence Valuation in PGP • Conclusions

  47. Conclusions • Summary • Two parts: • Logic • Confidence Valuation Both efficient! • What are and how to assign confidence values. • In light of what was said, how adequate is it for trust management.

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