Project Update/Overview

1. Project Update/Overview Understanding 2011 Grampians Natural Disaster, addressing risk and resilience Research Team Federation University Australia22 January 2014

2. Project Progress: Data collection – completed (surveys; interviews) Data analysis; report writing Draft report + literature review chapters

3. Project Progress (continued): Honours project: - Overview of findings from James Cameron’s thesis “LANDSLIDE MAPPING & PROCESSES IN THE GRAMPIANS, VICTORIA”

10. 70% of landslides initiated in 4 rock units25% of landslides initiated in the Silverband Formation90% of landslides on eastern slopes >22°Majority > 33° (angle of repose?)

11. Serra Sandstone & Glen Hills Sandstone can fail at low rainfall • More rock units fail in rainfall >220mm • Even ‘strong’ rocks fail when rainfall >250mm

12. GNDR Website • Updates to the website: • Interactive landslide • maps; • Knowledge • management–resource • ‘centre’. • www.gndr.org.au

13. Project Website: www.gndr.org.au

14. Project Website: www.gndr.org.au

15. Project Website: www.gndr.org.au High High resolution image

16. GNDR Website updates • GNDR Document library • Access to publically available documents (reports; journal articles; policies. Also links to useful websites; YouTube clips); • Various resources: Local government, state & national papers and documents; • Search option; search by category for advanced use; • Additional resources can be continue to be added.

20. Overview of Findings • Interviews and Surveys: • Preparedness and the emergency Response: ‘this was an event like no other’; ‘we never thought about a landslide in Halls Gap’ • Flooding and landslides were wholly unexpected and • therefore difficult to prepare for and respond to.

21. * Estimate of preparedness prior to the Grampians Natural Disaster: resident, business, community Individual and resident (n = 20) Businesses/organisations (n = 17)

22. * Financial impact on businesses and community organisations (BCO) On BCO during the event (n = 17) On BCO during recovery (n = 17)

23. What worked well? • Catalysts for effective preparation and response: • Staff from emergency and recovery services organisations identified the following catalysts: • Past Experience and local knowledge • Communication and coordination • Valuable community contacts and community ‘Hubs’

24. Community perceptions: Preparation and response of emergency and recovery services: • Varied perceptions – largely positive; • Written comments provide more detail: particular services provided good information, coordinated support and overall assistance; • Some frustration about the length of time to rebuild infrastructure; warnings kept tourists away.

25. Challenges in preparing and responding to this event: • Perceptions from the emergency and recovery services organisations: • Some blurring of agency roles • Flood warning systems • Miscommunication/ Poor communication • Complexities of the community response: expectation versus reality • Workforce gaps

26. Social impacts: Emergency and recovery services organisations • Pressures of providing response and recovery for this disaster (going above and beyond the call of duty); • Fatigue; potential for worker ‘burn out’ (long work hours); • Dramatic shifts between roles for some workers in response to the emergency.

27. Economic impacts: Emergency and recovery services organisations • Concerns for short-term tourism reductions to businesses at the time when recovery programs were being conducted by various agencies • Very limited ability to recognise benefits that can be gained from the event via short-term recovery activity and longer-term building legacy opportunities

28. The main social and economic impacts of the Grampians natural disaster in 2011.

29. Social impacts - Community Reflections: Individuals/Residents: 50% = reported ‘little or no impact’ following natural disaster. 20% = reported ‘high or very high impact’ from the floods and/or landslides (Reason: property damage, including loss of land, fencing and outbuildings, along with ‘stored items’). Other impacts: Travel in region (routes, times, distance)

30. Social impacts on community continued… • Minimal injuries; no loss of life; • (Some) perceived threats: family and personal safety; other threats - damage to property and possessions; • Coping: Health and wellbeing indicators –largely ‘un-impacted’ BUT some reports of stress and anxiety. • Support during this event was received by family, friends, community: ‘…with the help of our friends in the community, we coped satisfactorily’; ‘We saw how communities rally round’.

31. Economic impacts Costs on emergency agencies • Total expenditure of approximately $140M • Plus operating budgets stretched to place more resources in the Grampians • Intangibles costs: • management stress due to ad hocgovernance, • staff ‘burn out’ from long hours work • agency officials dealing with legal obligations like insurance and safety.

32. Economic impacts (continued…) • Costs on individuals and residents • Minimal to moderate financial costs incurred • Indication that ‘employment opportunities were created’ during the recovery • Intangible cost that frustrated residents was insurance covering private property (to the extent that local councils assumed responsibility)

33. Economic impacts (continued…) • Costs on business and community organisations • majority of businesses and community organisations negative or very negative financially impacted: loss of income through reduced tourist activities • loss of earnings/no earnings, none or few ‘sales’, and loss of normal trading. • However, all businesses reported no negative income issues ‘now’, which indicate resilience in recovery to prior status

34. Economic impacts (continued…) • Costs on business and community organisations • Intangible costs were reported by businesses • Bureaucracy • Confined movement • Anxiety-related health issues Indication of some non-market resilience problems

35. Economic impacts (continued…) • Recovery phase outcomes • Approx$140M construction work produced jobs and skill enhancement not available prior to the event • Output benefits from this work were modelled to multiply out to $304M, far outweighing the tourism losses calculated by ten times, spread widely • Only a small amount of this assisted tourism sector • Only short-term jobs and output Enabled the region to have some output gains immediately after the event that added to resilience.

36. Economic impacts (continued…) • Recovery phase outcomes • Very little evidence of any legacy from this emergency being recognised, honoured and commemorated (see Parks Victoria website…as if it did not happen) • Particular type of tourism opportunity that has not been taken advantage: e.g. ANZAC commemorations • Shows lack of dynamic resilience

37. Environmental Impacts • Direct and indirect environmental impacts from the landslides to the natural environment; • Community passionate about their environment: Changes observed to the environment (altered physical terrain, changes to flora). ‘Stress’ caused by the damage to environment (and loss of income); • Positives: New Park infrastructure. • Pavement and culvert damage, SilverbandRd (source VicRoads)

38. Recommendations • Recommendations - based on the findings of this research; • Consolidate and build on the large amount of work (reports and planning documents) already undertaken since this event by key agencies and organisations; • Consideration of current and future capacity to further developing community resilience.

39. Recommendations • Agencies involved in areas of potential landslide need to be very aware, informative and inclusive in their dealings with the local community (both residents and business) - need for stronger public-private partnership between public agencies and private businesses and residents • build inclusiveness prior to any disaster by providing better information for more effective complexity modelling • allow community and businesses to be involved more in relief and recovery during the disaster and its aftermath

40. Recommendations • Strong post-emergency ‘legacy’ opportunity created through information on websites and other media outlets • recognise the strong relief efforts during the disaster • even more, recognise the vastly improved and more extensive infrastructure through the Park for residents, tourists and professionals who value ecological and economic resilience

41. Recommendations • Diversify from existing businesses and community activities by broadening what tourism represents in the region and to even bringing in different business activity such as knowledge-based industries that value the ecological environment (e.g. geospatial mapping).

42. Recommendations • Measure intangible costs and risk assessments in a coherent approach accepted by all stakeholders e.g. governmental arrangements and in insurance claims (financial stress stem from lack of appreciation of landslides as disasters that have cumulative effects) • Risk assessment and resilience building officer should be employed across the major stakeholders to co-ordinate such assessments and risk preparedness

43. The factors identified that increase preparedness and response to natural disaster by the community and emergency and recovery services.

44. Where to from here? • Draft Report: Late January 2014; • Feedback on draft report: mid February 2014 • Report finalisation: Late February 2014

45. More Information Dr Helen Thompson, Director, CeCCT: 03 5327 9418 E: h.thompson@ballarat.edu.au Alison Ollerenshaw T: 03 5327 6201 E: a.ollerenshaw@ballarat.edu.au Project website: www.gndr.org.au