Conceptual schemes

1. Conceptual schemes Michael Lacewing © Michael Lacewing

2. An anthropological idea • Different cultures and languages have different sets of concepts - different conceptual schemes • One suggestion: the senses let in information, which is then interpreted, using the conceptual scheme • We don’t form ideas directly from sense experience • Whorf: • We are inclined to think of language simply as a technique of expression, and not to realize that language first of all is a classification and arrangement of the stream of sensory experience which results in a certain world-order

3. Conceptual relativism • The claim that we cannot translate from one conceptual scheme to another, so that different schemes embed different representations of reality • Whorf: all observers are not led by the same physical evidence [i.e. stream of sensory experience] to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated. • However, if we can translate between schemes, there is no conceptual relativism.

4. Relativism and reality • Some people wrongly say that people with different conceptual schemes inhabit different realities. • This supposes that language creates reality - but the world would exist even if no one spoke language. • Relativism is defended by presupposing that something is the ‘same’, but interpreted differently. • Relativism rephrased: A proposition may be true in one conceptual scheme without being able to be expressed in another scheme. Therefore, no scheme can express all true propositions.

5. Discussion • Parts of another conceptual scheme may be untranslatable - but we can use the parts we can translate to understand these, and thereby expand our conceptual scheme • One conceptual scheme can express all truths, as long as it is expanded • Objection: can we always combine different conceptual schemes? • E.g. blue v. green v. blue-green

6. Discussion • If we can’t combine conceptual schemes, then different schemes can express different truths. • However, we cannot argue that what is true in one conceptual scheme is false in another. • Conclusion: in order to be able to state a truth, you must be able to state it!

7. Objection • Empirical: how far can we translate between conceptual schemes? • Philosophical: the relation between language and conceptual schemes that relativism presupposes is incoherent • If the conceptual scheme ‘organizes’ our experience, then ‘experience’ must be made up of ‘experiences’ • We can only identify our experiences the familiar way, using language (e.g. seeing a rose) • Any conceptual scheme that starts from these experiences will be similar to ours