Tactical PPV

1. Tactical PPV

2. Tactical PPV This powerpoint was created using information provided to us by Chief Bob Nicks of the Austin Fire Department and Professor O.A. Ezekoye of the University of Texas.

3. Objectives • The Firefighter should be able to: • Describe why coordinated ventilation provides the “context” for the development of fireground tactics • Describe how fan positioning, building size and configuration, wind, and vent size affect ventilation • Describe how under-ventilation or improper ventilation can create an unsafe interior • Perform PPV during Investigative Mode to assist in fire location

4. Objectives • The Firefighter should be able to: • Perform PPV during Offensive Mode fire attack, coordinating search, ventilation and fire attack. • Perform PPV outside the fire corridor to reduce hazards to Firefighters and decrease damage to structure and contents (adjacent structures and attics). • Perform PPV post-knockdown to assist in overhaul without increasing risk of rekindle.

5. Tactics and Fire Ventilation • Venting for fire situations is often misapplied and careful thought should be given to the objective at hand. The main objective must be to improve interior conditions for firefighters by reducing heat levels and improving visibility - Paul Grimwood, British Fire Service • An analysis of the last 8 years of NIOSH Firefighter fatality reports show that in every fatalitywhere fire behavior was a causal factor in the Firefighter death, ventilation was not performed or performed incorrectly. • Coordinated PPV will make the fireground safer; uncoordinated PPV or PPV employed by improperly training Firefighters can be dangerous!

6. Tactics and Fire Ventilation • Ventilation is the most complex tactic to perform correctly because proper ventilation requires: • Knowledge of proper ventilation • As an industry, information on the subject varies widely. • All companies working on scene must work together to coordinate their efforts • To coordinate on-scene efforts, all Firefighters must know their role and how their role affects others on the fireground.

7. Tactics and Fire Ventilation Tactics determine how the fire fighting operation is structured, put together, and creates an entirety of parts. If smoke is the primary hazard, the coordination of ventilation activities should become the context for all fireground tactical activities. Explained later in detail during the tactical portion

8. What is “Proper Ventilation”? • Coordinated Fire Attack • 360 • Locate Fire – Determine Risk of PPV • Determine Vent Opening Location • Determine when to make vent – Coordinate; Do not vent until attack crew is ready to move • Fire Attack • Employ PPV before entry, • Observe effects • Make Fire Attack • Other Tactical Functions • Must ensure “Vent for Life”, Laddering, and/or Additional Forcible Entry do not negatively affect ventilation • Backup Team stands down until entry of Fire Attack Team

9. AFD Close Calls • Between 1998 and 2003 the Austin Fire Department experienced FIVE near death fire related events at three incidents • 903 E. Riverside Drive (Two Firefighters) • 2213 S. Lakeshore Drive (Two Firefighters) • 837 E. Oltorf Street

10. Common Incident Factors • All Firefighters were hospitalized with thermal and/or smoke related injuries • All were minutes or possibly seconds from death • Proper ventilation could have prevented these injuries

11. Common Fire Characteristics • All fires were in a ventilation controlled state at the time of the event (A fire where the fire growth is determined by the amount of air available. A ventilation-controlled fire occurs when there is not enough air to burn all the materials being pyrolyzed) • All were located in residential structures • All fires were located on the second floor • All were either unventilated or ventilated improperly

12. 2213 S. Lakeshore Drive

14. INITIAL DISPATCH0426 HOURS ENGINE COMPANY 22 HEAVY BOX ALARM COMPLEMENT

15. UNIT ENGINE 22 ENGINE 1 ENGINE 50 ENGINE 6 TRUCK 1 TRUCK 35 RESCUE 14 BATTALION 6 BATTALION 4 PERSONNEL 3 4 3 4 4 3 2 1 1 RESPONDING UNITS

18. 1st floor door open

19. 2nd floor looking toward fire apartment

20. CRITICAL FACTORS • “FIRE KNOCKED DOWN” • VENTILATION-CONTROLLED FIRE • FUEL RICH • OXYGEN STARVED • RAPID FIRE PROGRESSION • HEAVY BLACK SMOKE TO THE FLOOR • NO DOOR CONTROL • ATTACK LINE IS SHORT • ENGINE 22 OFFICER AND TRUCK 35 OFFICER NEVER MEET • TRUCK 35 OFFICER CONDUCTING SEARCH

21. CRITICAL FACTORS • STILL VENTILATION CONTROLLED FIRE • FUEL RICH • OXYGEN STARVED • RAPID FIRE PROGRESSION • HEAVY SMOKE CONDITION PERSISTS • PERSONNEL IN THE INTERIOR OF THE STRUCTURE WITHOUT A CHARGED LINE • ENGINE 22 • TRUCK 35 • 2ND ALARM SOUNDED 0444 HOURS

22. HEAVY BLACK SMOKE SHOWING FROM THE EAVES OF THE ENTIRE BUILDING FIRE APARTMENT VENTS AT THE SLIDING GLASS DOOR

23. 2213 S. Lakeshore Drive

24. AFD Recommendations from 2213 S. Lakeshore • Formal Investigations indicated that AFD needed: • Change from a “policy” based system to a “guideline” based system • The need to develop and review new fireground tactics • Additional fire ground training with an emphasis on ventilation tacticsand procedures

25. 837 E. Oltorf Incident

26. Investigative Results from the 837 E. Oltorf Incident • On August 22, 2003 at 02:41 Engine 6 responded to a Heavy Box Alarm at 837 East Oltorf Street. Engine 6. • All occupants were out of the structure. • The second floor fire was in a ventilation-controlled state with no visibility and moderate to high heat (at least 500-600 F at waist level at the doorway of fire room).

27. Investigative Results from the Dan Dillon Incident • The fire attack team became separated for approximately 45 seconds, the Lieutenant advancing into the bedroom on the right and the Firefighter #1 proceeding down to the end of the hall. • During this time of separation, the Engine 6 Lieutenant experienced a sudden and complete loss of air. • The Engine 6 Lieutenant tried troubleshooting the air pack, unsuccessfully attempted to communicate a “Firefighter Down” and attempted to exit the building. The Lieutenant lost consciousness during the escape attempt and was unable to exit on his own. • The other fire attack team member (Engine 6 Firefighter #1) and Ladder 17 crew located and removed the Lieutenant from the structure.

28. 2nd floor 1 2 3 1- location of dropped axe. 2 -location of voice enunciator. 3- Lt. Dillon found. 4- Fire Origin 4

29. Stairway Engine 6 ascended to make fire attackOpen door where Engine 6 LT removed

30. Looking up attack stairwell.

31. Looking up attack stairwell.

32. Fire room, first door to the left (cannot see in this photo). Door at end of hall is where Engine 6 Firefighter advanced. Engine 6 LT advanced into room on the right.

33. Where Engine 6 LT ran into closet door. Engine 6 LT lost consciousness inside closet for 5 to 30 seconds, then regained consciousness and collapsed in hall at end of rug in doorway. Fire room directly across hall, stairway through the door just to the left.

34. 837 E. Oltorf

35. Point of Origin

36. Fire room. Window vented from the outside with pike pole

37. Investigative Results from the Oltorf Incident • The Engine 6 Lieutenant was transported to the hospital and treated for smoke inhalation. • Doctor providing treatment stated that the Lieutenant was within 30 seconds of the injuries being fatal. • The Engine 6 Lieutenant was treated and released the next day. Several days later the Engine 6 Lieutenant was readmitted to the hospital and treated for chemical burns to the lungs. • The Engine 6 Lieutenant was released back to active duty after three weeks and has made a full recovery.

38. Issues Relevant to this Incident • Engine 6 Lieutenant experienced a sudden and complete loss of air. • Ventilation was not coordinated with fire attack. Engine 6 fire attack team, along with all other crews operating on the interior, entered a fire building in a ventilation-controlled state before the structure was effectively ventilated. • The Engine 6 fire attack team became separated in an IDLH atmosphere while attempting to locate the fire. • Both hose team members tried to communicate via radio to announce a “Firefighter Down” and could not locate their radio collar mics.

40. Formal Investigations of the Dan Dillon incident indicated that the department needed: • Continue to seek information that would assist in determining why the Engine 6 Lieutenant experienced a lost of air. • Determine a better way of carrying the collar mics. • Improve interior fire fighting communications • Train Firefighters to solicit important information from occupants and witnesses. • Share important size-up information with the entire crew. • Conduct Department Wide Ventilation Training.

41. Why Ventilate? • Smoke is Fuel • Smoke is Fuel • Smoke is Fuel • Smoke is Fuel • Smoke is Fuel • Smoke is Fuel • Smoke is Fuel

42. Would you fight a fire in a house filled with Propane?

43. Propane vs. SmokeSmoke is Fuel Propane • Flammable Range 2.1-9.6% • Ignition Temperature 920-1120 °F Smoke / CO • Flammable Range 12.5-74% • Ignition Temperature 1128 °F

44. WARNING!!!When firefighters arrive, most fires will be in a ventilation-controlled state.

45. Ventilation Controlled FiresCreate Smoke that is Fuel! • Most fires are ventilation controlled on arrival. • Firefighter vent practices (or lack of) can change a ventilation controlled fire to a rapid fire progression (flashover,backdraft, etc.). • PPV can reduce the risks of ventilation controlled fires when properly performed.

46. Ventilation-ControlledWhat does this mean? • A fire where the fire growth is determined by the amount of air available. A ventilation-controlled fire occurs when there is not enough air to burn all the materials being pyrolyzed. • Less than 21% oxygen: oxygen deprived combustion process produces 2 to 5 times the amount of carbon monoxide than in a balanced reaction. • Less than 13% oxygen: under-ventilated fire conditions, flaming ceases, smoldering combustion occurs

47. Ventilation-Controlled Compartment Fires Facts • High production of flammable gases • Containment of heat • Containment of flammable gases • Only needs more air for the fire to rapidly progress into flashover conditions • Fire poised for a rapid change

48. Ventilation Controlled Case Studies This is an Emerging National Problem! • Washington DC under-ventilated fire flashover kills two firefighters • Ohio flashover kills a firefighter • Illinois backdraft kills two firefighters

49. UT/AFD Research Using PPV to mitigate ventilation controlled fire dangers in single family dwellings. 49

50. What Did We Know About PPV? PPV has been in existence for over 30 years. Marketed as a tool to increase FF/Victim Safety Large difference of opinions across the Fire Service as to its benefits Untested. Very few studies conducted on the cost/benefit of this tactic. It is claimed that PPV could help reduce the chance of “extreme fire behavior” caused by fires in a ventilation controlled state. If misunderstood and used improperly, PPV can be harmful. 50