Developing United Nations Peacekeeping

1. The Brahimi Report OCHA CIMIC Staff Course, Geneva 24/10/01 Developing United Nations Peacekeeping

3. A/55/305 report of panel on PKO (Brahimi) 21 Aug. 2000 Need for strategy and support Need for robust doctrine and realistic mandates HQs capacity for Inform. Mgmt and Strategic Analysis Improved mission guidance and leadership Rapid deployment standards and on-call expertise HQs capacity to plan an support peace operations Integrated Mission Task Forces Adapting to the information age Developing United Nations Peacekeeping

4. Issues Recommended Measures Global Logistics Support Strategy Mission Start-up Kit Maintain at least 5 mission start-up kits (13(b)) Procurement Policies & Procedures Amend Financial Rules & Regulations to facilitate rapid and full deployment within the proposed timelines (13(d)) Establish Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) (15) Issues & Brahimi Recommendations Rapid and effective mission deployment within the timelines of 30/90 days (13(a)) Integrated Mission Planning and Support

5. Global Logistics Support Strategy Providing the right support in the right quantity, in the right place, at the right time, at the lowest net cost . Our goal is to deploy a functioning mission HQ within 15 days and to achieve initial operational readiness of a mission within 30/90 days.

6. Pre-Brahimi Assumptions • Mission Headquarters Only • 100 Personnel • 90 Day Sustainment • Two Start-up Kits Approved • Approx $4.1 Million Each

7. Brahimi Assumptions Three Complex Missions Per Year • 3920 Total Mission Strength • 3 Std Inf Btn (850) (100% Self-sustaining) • Force HQ and 3 Sectors • 90-180 day sustainment • Modular approach • Approx. $160M start-up kit / mission

8. Current Assumptions One complex Peacekeeping Mission Per Year • Up to 10,000 Troops (25% Self-sustaining) • 300 Substantive Staff, 1,000 MilObs/CivPol • 1,000 Support (International/Local) Staff & Capacity for a second mission HQs unit

9. Complex UNMOs (100) UNMOs (100) Sector HQ Sector HQ Sector HQ FHQ Support Unit Mission HQ CIVPOL (100) Infantry Battalion De-mining Unit Infantry Battalion Infantry Battalion UNMOs (100) UNMOs (100) UNMOs (100) Military Police Unit 3 CIVPOL (100) CIVPOL (100) Military Police Unit 2 Military Police Unit CIVPOL (100) Multi-role Engineer Unit Level 3 Medical Unit Transit Camp Logistics Unit Multi-role Engineer Unit APOD Aviation Unit Level 2 Medical Unit SPOD Force Reserve Company Mission Composition

10. High Readiness Brigade Improved Strategic Deployment Stock Current status with COE and UNOE 30 / 90 day Deployment Deployment Cost and Timelines as a Function of Resources Cost Diversion of UN Resources Time (days) 30 60 90 150

11. Enhancing Global Logistics Support OBJECTIVES : • Optimize Planning and Organizational Design • Provide Adequate and Trained Staff • Strengthen Strategic Capability

12. Policy & Procedures • Development of Guidelines • Revision of Manuals • Mission Planning & Liquidation Templates

13. Management & Organizational Structure • Congruent Field & HQs Structures • Integrated Support Services Structure (ISS) • Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC) • Joint Movements Control Center (JMCC) • Joint Material Management Center (JMMC) • Two-Service FALD Structure • Current Logistics & Communications Service • New Administrative Service, Including Peacekeeping Procurement

14. Material Reserve • Surface Transport Assets • light, medium & heavy vehicles • Communication Equipment • Office Automation Equipment • Common Supplies • Spare Parts • Housing and Infrastructure

15. Service Support Contracts • Information Technologies • Communications • Common Staff Supporte.g. food, water, accommodations, fuel • Mission support • Transport, i.e. land, air, sea • Maintenance, i.e. vehicle, equipment, infrastructure • Warehousing • Port & Terminal operations

16. Human Resources • Management Training • Technical Training & Certification • Career Paths • Staff Mobility Authorized • Stand-by Staff Rosters • Stand-by Contractors / National Arrangements • Field-Personnel Management

18. Current Status • A/55/977 report of S-G (Omnibus), 1 June 2001 • A/55/1024 report of G-A Special Committee, 31 July 2001 • A/56/…., report of Advisory Committee (ACABQ), October 2001 • Support to Brahimi-report action, resourcing and staffing • Support to modular Strategic Deployment Stocks for Brindisi. • Five critical elements: • Enhanced advance planning • Expanded sources of recruitment • Streamlined recruitment procedures • Enhanced rapid deployment capabilities • Improved systems for career development and training (A/55/977 report of S-G (Omnibus), 1 June 2001 pp.2)

19. DPKO – OCHA: Brahimi Report - UNDP, OCHA, UNHCR, OHCHR, DPI and several other departments, agencies , funds and programmes have an increasingly important role to play in planning for any future operation, especially complex operation, and need to be formally included in the planning process. ( -> Integrated Mission Task Force concept)

20. DPKO – OCHA: Omnibus Report * The relationship between DPKO and OCHA is vital and must be improved - - * Peacekeeping Operations should be mandated, designed and resourced to support -- humanitarian action – * Close cooperation between DPKO and OCHA at all stages of mission design and planning * OCHA and DPKO mutually support each other - - established humanitarian agencies can be a source of information and support to new PK-missions - -

21. DPKO – OCHA: Omnibus Report (cont) * The nature and extent of cooperation - - in the field must depend upon the local context * There may be places where UN humanitarian actors are incorporated into a PK-mission - - * -- and others where a clear separation is vital – OCHAs role is to act as bridge – (A/55/977 1 June 2001, pp. 46 – 47)

22. Thank you ! Any questions…