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Macro-prudential Regulation: Cross-sectional and Time Dimension Approaches

This paper discusses the cross-sectional and time dimension approaches to macro-prudential regulation, emphasizing the importance of considering the endogenous nature of financial risk and the heterogeneous risk capacity of market participants. It suggests a better framework that exploits the natural diversity of risks and encourages risks to flow to where there is absorptive capacity. The paper also highlights the need to shift regulatory focus from risk sensitivity to risk capacity and differentiate institutions based on their risk capacity. Key suggestions for a better macro-prudential framework are provided.

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Macro-prudential Regulation: Cross-sectional and Time Dimension Approaches

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  1. BOK International Conference 2011 Comments on Macro-prudential Regulation: Where are we and Where do we need to go? 2011. 5. 26 Joon-Ho Hahm Yonsei University

  2. Macro-prudential Approaches • Cross-sectional dimension • - focus on the ‘system as a whole’ • - TBTF and interconnectedness among financial institutions • - SIFI regulations: capital / liquidity surcharge, resolution, bail-in, etc. • Time dimension • - focus on the interaction between financial sector and real economy • - procyclicality • - countercyclical capital buffer, through-the-cycle risk parameters, • dynamic provisions, etc.

  3. Major Points and Contributions (1) • This paper focuses on the cross-sectional dimension of macro-prudential • approach • - highlight endogenous, dynamic nature of financial risk • - Basel III approach (stronger Basel II + macro-prudential overlay) may • not be enough • - suggest a better framework: exploiting natural heterogeneity in risk • absorptive capacity of market participants • Micro-prudential approach leads to the fallacy of composition • making individuals safer may lead to a collectively riskier system • regulatory measures in micro-approach lead to endogenous risk • e.g.) risk measurement based on market prices creates procyclicality • as well as collective behaviour of financial institutions

  4. Major Points and Contributions (2) • Risk is not static and depends on who holds the instrument • natural diversity of risks and market participants is a key source of • systemic resilience • ignoring and standardizing the heterogeneous risk capacity of financial • institutions may aggravate endogeneity and system instability • e.g.) mark-to-market valuation is relevant for institutions with limited risk • capacity due to short-term funding, but imposing this across the board • leads to the situation where all sell the same asset at the same time • - e.g.) too heavy credit risk measures and too little liquidity risk measures • for commercial banks while their risk absorptive capacity is the opposite • Making the system safer needs more than counter-cyclical measures

  5. Major Points and Contributions (3) • Key suggestions for a better macro-prudential framework • - objective must be to minimize systemic risk subject to a given aggregate • level of individual risk-taking (required to promote economic growth) • - systemic risk can be reduced by reorganizing individual risks and • encouraging risks to flow to where there is absorptive capacity • - shift regulatory focus from risk sensitivity to risk capacity • - differentiate institutions in terms of risk capacity, and for this, need to • look more closely at the liability (funding) side • - encourage risk transfers by creating a system within which institutions • who can absorb risks have incentives to do so • e.g.) with mark-to-funding, firms with illiquid assets have incentives • to seek longer-term funding

  6. Issues and Questions (1) • Agree in principle, but challenge is in actual implementation • How can we identify differential risk capacity of financial institutions? • - agree with the idea that we have to look at the liability side, namely, • the sources of funds, but may need more than this • - funding structure itself is endogenous and changing due to financial • innovation, disintermediation, and conglomeration • e.g.) wholesale and market funding of commercial banks • - risk is not static in the type of instruments but depends on ‘who holds • the claim’ (core vs. non-core liabilities) • - Korea’s experience illustrates this point (Hahm, Mishkin, Shin and • Shin 2010)

  7. Bank Liabilities by Claim Holders households financial corporations non-financial corporations foreign sector Source : Joon-Ho Hahm, Frederic Mishkin, Hyun Song Shin and Kwanho Shin (2010.12) 7

  8. Bank Securities held by Claim Holders financial corporations foreign sector households non-financial sector Source : Joon-Ho Hahm, Frederic Mishkin, Hyun Song Shin and Kwanho Shin (2010.12) 8

  9. Issues and Questions (2) • Even more challenging task is, how can we incentivize financial firms • to better match risk-taking with their own risk absorptive capacity? • - partially reflected in Basel III global liquidity risk measures • - LCR is to promote the short-term resiliency of the liquidity risk profile of • institutions by ensuring that they have sufficient high quality liquid • resources to survive an acute stress scenario lasting for one month • - NSFR is to promote resiliency over longer-term time horizons by • creating additional incentives for banks to fund their activities with more • stable sources of funding on an ongoing structural basis • - These are liquidity risk measures, how about credit and market risks? • - macro-prudential levy or reserve requirement on non-core liabilities • can also help in this regard

  10. Suggested Parameters for Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)

  11. Suggested Parameters for Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)

  12. Issues and Questions (3) • What are the implications for central bank in emerging market countries? • Central bank monetary policy can influence not only procyclicality but • also interconnectedness of the financial system • - influence risk appetite and distribution of risk by impacting profit and • net worth of financial firms, collateral value, leverage, and expectation • of bail-out (risk-taking channel of monetary policy) • - e.g.) low interest rate > money move > market funding of banks > asset • price inflation > herd behavior and concentration risk • - need to consider its impact on endogenous risk distribution when • formulating monetary policies • Central bank monetary policy and macroprudential regulations are • complementary and hence better coordination is required • - regardless of its macro-prudential mandate, central bank can bring • expertise and information in calibrating macroprudential measures

  13. Issues and Questions (4) • Does emerging market country’ financial system has sufficient diversity • in risk absorptive capacity? • External liabilities of financial institutions are an important source of • interconnectedness and procyclicality in emerging market countries • raising systemic risk potential • - cause wide disparity between risk taking behavior and risk capacity • of emerging market financial institutions • - global liquidity flows also significantly undermine monetary policy • effectiveness of central bank in emerging market countries • - need a macro-prudential measure to mitigate its impact on systemic • risk • e.g.) Korea will introduce macroprudential bank levy on non-deposit • foreign currency debt of commercial banks from August 2011

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