The Rwandan Genocide

1. The Rwandan Genocide JI HYE PARK JINSUH CHOI JONATHAN CURRY

3. Historical Background Belgian Colonies in Rwanda Hutu Rebellion Hutu Rise to Power President Habyarimana

4. In 1994, Rwanda’s population of seven million was composed of three ethnic groups: • Hutu (approximately 85%) • Tutsi (14%) • and Twa (1%). -Tutsi considered political and economic elite -Traditional, no ethnic disputes

5. Belgian colonists designate Tutsi as superior, Hutu as inferior. -Altered perceptions of economic and political disparity -Hutu rebel in 1959, aim to overthrow Tutsi rule -Belgian forces withdraw in 1961

6. Following the UN supervised referendum in 1961, the Hutu rise to power. -Remained under UN trusteeship for until the nation became independent

7. President Habyarimana -Faced with heavy international pressure and violent civil war -Strong anti-Tutsi upbringing; instinctual support for Hutu superiority -Planned to share power with Tutsis/moderate Hutus to resolve issues

8. April 6th, 1994 President Habyarimana’s plane is shot down. Almost immediately, violence breaks out. The genocide goes into full swing.

9. International Response UNAMIR Arusha UNAMIR II

10. UN forces in Rwanda were insufficient -The UNAMIR was present, but ill equipped to handle a genocide -Security Council called for withdrawal

11. Arusha Peace Agreement -Signed August 4th, 1993 -Aimed towards the creation of a broad-based government and establishment of peace -Lacked capacity to address issues like genocide

12. UNAMIR II -Security Council calls for troop decrease to a force of about 270 A later revision of UNAMIR II led to the deployment of 5,000+ troops, but by the time they arrived hundreds of thousands of lives had already been lost. -Remaining troops were to be used for negotiations and relief efforts, not military operations

13. Tipping Points & Key Decisions Ethnic Elitism Acts of Extremism Arusha Implementation of UNAMIR I Implementation of UNAMIR II

14. Ethnic Elitism Post-WWII Belgian colonists designate Tutsi as “civilized” and Hutu as inferior. -Ethnic context altered perceptions -Was not a catalyst of genocide, though nevertheless crucial

15. Acts of Extremism The threat of losing power political and economic power via the Arusha Process led Hutu extremists to begin preparing their ‘final solution.’ -Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique -Radio Television Libre Mille Collines -Assassination (?) of the President

16. UNAMIR I & II I -Hesitancy of those who could provide the most support shows extremists that they can “act with impunity.” -DPKO refuses Dallaire’s request to disarm militia units that posed a threat to the UNAMIR presence. -Belgian government withdraws contingent after Prime Minister is killed. II -Resolution 912 led to the drastic reduction of UNAMIR forces. -Resolution 918’s planned course of action is delayed beyond the ideal date of deployment.

17. Failures of the International Community Before • The international communities should have considered ‘final solution’ as serious matter • Under Chapter VII, UN was able to use military force in order of peacekeeping and prevent civilian’s security

18. Failures of the International Community Before • Let Hutus extremists be involved in Arusha peace process • France should have took an action because it knew that there will be a genocide happening in Rwanda

19. Failures of the International Community After • Situations in Rwanda should have conveyed faster to non-permanent members of the UN • Resolution 912 was not supposed to be passed • Should have nominated the situation in Rwanda as ‘genocide’ and expose the condition to media • Security Council should have interpreted the massacre as a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39 of UN Charter, and shift the mandate of UNAMIR

20. Failures of the International Community After • Boutros Ghali should have expressed stronger with his opinion about sending additional military force and broadened understanding of Chapter VII. • Take control over radio station of Hutus, so that they could not give orders to kill people all over. • If The US should have supported with weapons immediately. Also, it was the president’s responsibility to move public's moral opinion to help Rwandans.

21. Failures of the International Community After • France could have saved more lives of Rwandan if they intervened with pure humanitarian motives • Rather than criticizing French intervention at the last minute, other countries should have helped France • Every country was only searching for its own benefit, being apathetic to loss of innocent lives. If they were more sympathetic, the genocide would not have happened.

22. Wheeler Assessment Supreme Humanitarian Emergency 5/5 Necessity 5/5 Last Resort 3/5 Proportionality 2/5 ----------------------------------------- Positive Humanitarian Outcome 1/5 Humanitarian Justifications 1/5 Legality 4/5 Selectivity 1.5/5

23. Rwanda, Post-Genocide International Response & Key Players in the Intervention Justice System

24. International Responseand Key Players -President Clinton and members of his Administration go on “pilgrimages of contrition” -Force Commander Dallaire: “I cannot find any solace in saying ‘I did my best’.”

25. Justice System -UN establishes the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) -Traditional gacaca courts are repurposed -Nearly 20 years after the end of the genocide, the courts are still active

26. Referenced Works • Global Bystander to Genocide: International Society and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. Wheeler, Nicholas. • Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Implications for International Criminal Law and Transitional Justice. Powers, Shannon E. • Ghosts of Rwanda. Frontline documentary.