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Explore the evolution of court administration in Canada, emphasizing the importance of court administrators in reinforcing judiciary independence, managing internal conflicts, and enhancing organizational models. Discover the role of court administrators in balancing the needs of various court stakeholders and fostering a positive relationship with the judiciary. Analyze the challenges and successes of integrating different court services and the impact of participatory democracy on public service administration. Learn about the functions, qualifications, and recommended organizational models for court administrators in both provincial and superior courts.
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Court Organization and ManagementMarch 8, 2012The Perspectives of Administrators Ian Greene
Millar & Baar, Judicial Administration in Canada (1981) • Chapter 5: The Function and Role of Court Administrator • When the book was written, the position of “court administrator” was relatively new • Perry Millar was an “administrative judge” in the BC Provincial Court • A number of different administrative functions in courts (eg. clerks, secretaries, counter staff, records management, case coordinators) were brought together and placed under the direction of the “court administrator” – a new position. Prior to that, they reported to the senior person in that field (eg. clerk) in the provincial capital. • Some observers: court administration is about 100 years behind other parts of the public service in adopting organizational change.
Professional Court Administration • We learn from our mistakes. Courts should be organized to ensure that administrative personnel feel able to inform senior administration (especially judges) of problems. • “A basic purpose of court administration is to reinforce the independence of the judiciary and the authority of the courts.” To accomplish this, judges must accept help of court administrators. • Chief court administrators come from a variety of backgrounds (lawyers, senior public servants, etc.) • Early years: only accountability to “inspectors of court services.” • These offices evolved into something more appropriate. • Canadian Association of Court Administrators: 1975 – perhaps court administrators could learn from other jurisdictions.
Internal Goal Conflict • Judges: fairness & expeditious justice • Defence council (crim): may benefit from delay • Prosecutors (crim): need to ensure witnesses are available & sufficient evidence collected • Conflicts between accused persons and their lawyers • Civil trials: delay may help richer clients likely to lose; smaller parties are often hurt by delay & forced to settle for less • Witnesses reluctant to appear because of adjournments and sharp cross-examinations, and fear of reprisal • Expert witnesses: professional integrity threatened • Police: trials often demoralizing • Probation officer: may question philosophical base of courts • Court reporters: harassed for complex transcripts for minimum pay • Court interpreters: worried about attacks on competence • Adversary system heightens conflict
Link Mechanism • See p. 119 of article: individual court • Trial court administrator’s job is to “draw together” conflicting parties by coordinating attendance. • Trial court administrator is accountable to the judiciary, but has a fair degree of independence in coordinating attendance • Mostly a communication function • But the local court administrator is also accountable to the provincial court administrator, leading to Figure 3 on p. 122 • Provincial Link Function: local court administrators report to the Provincial court administrator, who has a different set of “link” functions to deal with. Competent Provincial and Local administrators lead to success, if relationship with judiciary is positive.
Organizational Models • Traditionally, there have been separate administration services in the provinces for courts with provincially-appointed judges, and the supererior courts with Federally-appointed judges. Chief administrator of a superior court usually known as “registrar.” As of 1980s, political appointments. • Recommended – integration between the two court services both in terms of function and supervision. Weberian model of merit.
Provincial Court Administrator • What should duties be? (127-130) • What should qualifications be? (130-132)
Sossin, Democratic Administration • 1991 York conference (Greg Albo, David Langille & Leo Panitch) – A New Kind of State? Popular Power and Democratic Administration (1993) • “participatory democracy;” democratizing the public service & moving away from the military model • Graduate Diploma in Democratic Administration • Osborne & Gaebler (1993): Reinventing Government • Citizens Charter (1993) in UK: all public services had to publicize standards & establish complaints mechanism • 1990s: Democratic admnistration overtaken by “new public management”
Citizen Empowerment (1) • Critiques of conventional bureaucracy • Accountability (infuse democracy into administration) • Ministerial responsibility (difficult to make work effectively with a very large & complex bureaucracy) • Judicial review (can be effective for individual accountability but expensive) • Ombudsman? (**Ontomb inv courts?) • Police oversight bodies (internal accountability, Toronto Police Services Board, Special Investigations Unit, Civilian Commission on Police Services)
Citizen Empowerment (2) • Participation • What degree of participation is appropriate for different administrative settings? (Courts?) • Forms: • Town hall meetings • Surveys • Public hearings • Public interest group and/or stakeholder consultations • Referenda
Origins of Democratic Administration • Max Weber: for efficiency and effectiveness (“ideal type”) – impartiality, legal relations between employees & supervisors, neutrality, tenure so as to speak truth to power (Gary Webster from TTC fired?), merit, hierarchy, rule of law, separation between administration & politics. • Much better than other types tried (eg charismatic) – but Weber was aware of the downside: impersonalization: “iron cage constructed by specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart.” Domination through knowledge. • Politics-administration dichotomy – not realistic. Patronage generally overcome, but public servants have discretion – not recognized in the “ideal type” or . Necessitated by growth of welfare state. • “bottom up” approach in strategic planning recommended. Take governments away from the bureuacrats & return to the people.
State of democratic administration • Frequently appauded; rarely implemented. Why? • New Left: increased participation of users • Transition from old left • Feminist analysis • New Right: increased competition, choice, privatization • New public management • Departure from its origins • Experimentation and failure
Future of Democratic Administration • Citizens engagement model • Deliberative democracy • Facilitate public deliberation • Consult with citizens • Relationships of mutual trust • Accountability to citizens • Attachment rather than detachment • Impact of globalization • My view: integrity
Marian Tyson, Trial Court Restructuring: A Court Administrator’s Perspective • When reforms are introduced into courts, it is court staff who need to implement them; thus staff need to be involved in planning reforms • Reforms already taking place: family court reunifications; procedures to assist self-represented litigants • Trial court unification: no progress in 20-30 years (except for merger of country/district courts with superior courts) because there are so many divergent and strongly held views (Superior court judges, provincially-appointed judges, Canadian Bar Assoc, CJC, Canada Law Reform Commission) • Gov’ts postpone difficult decisions (such as trial court unification) • Hoping stakeholders will find a solution • Hoping the problem will go away
Trial court unification • Mid-1990s: every provincial AG supported it • 3 prov’s ready to start pilot projects & New Brunswick started; gave up when SCC ruled that the way NB tried it was unconsitutitional – s 101 issue. What would be required would be federal appointments for all trial court judges hearing cases falling within definition of “superior court” • Instead of trying this new approach all provinces just gave up; likely because of strong opposition of CJC, CBA & CJC • Purpose of reform: reduce delay & confusion & simplify process. Must determine whether the reform is likely to result in these improvements, or may make things worse • Nova Scotia: reforms have allowed senior court officials to take on some minor adjudicative duties. Small claims court given expanded jurisdiction & can sit evening with part-time judges
Other reforms • Superior courts: process-heavy, while small claims courts very informal and quick • Room for courts that expect preparation from lawyers but the process is streamlined • Nova Scotia moved to fewer JPs but ensured that they are properly trained • Uncertainty about reform leads to stress and is a cause of unnecessary delay • Reforms of administrative processes can take place without larger structural reforms and can reduce delays • Politics is the art of the possible • Creativity and realization of what is feasible (given appropriate interventions and their likely success)