Paralogisms of Pure Reason: Illusions and Transcendental Dialectic

1. Philosophy 190: Seminar on Kant Spring, 2015 Prof. Peter Hadreas Course website: http://oucampus.sjsu.edu/people/peter.hadreas/courses/Kant/index.html

2. The paralogisms of Pure Reason, pp. 409-415; 445-58

3. PREPARATION for the ‘Paralogisms of Pure Reason’, (pp. 409-415; 445-58) The ‘Paralogisms of Pure Reason are a ‘Chapter’ – a smaller section -- of the Second Part of the Critique of Pure Reason: The Transcendental Dialectic. See chart on following slide.

5. Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic CPR, pp. 384-393 “Above we have called dialectic in general a logic of illusion. [p. 199 A62/B86]That does not mean that it is a doctrine of probability; for that is truth, but cognized through insufficient grounds, so that the cognition of it is defective, but not therefore deceptive, and so it need not be separated from the analytical part of logic. Still less may we take appearance and illusion for one and the same. For truth and illusion are not in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it insofar as it is thought.

6. Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic CPR, pp. 384-393 “Our concern here is not to treat of empirical (e.g. optical) illusion, which occurs in the empirical use of otherwise correct rules of the understanding, and through which the faculty of judgment is misled through the influence of the imagination; rather, we have to do only with transcendental illusion, which influences principles whose use is not ever meant for experience, since in that case we would at least have a touchstone for their correctness, but which instead, contrary to all the warnings of criticism, carries us away beyond the empirical use of the categories, and holds out to us the semblance of extending the pure understanding.”

7. Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic CPR, pp. 384-393 “We will call the principles whose application stays wholly and completely within the limits of possible experience immanent, but those that would fly beyond these boundaries transcendent principles. But by the latter I do not understand the transcendental use or misuse of categories, which is a mere mistake of the faculty of judgment when it is not properly checked by criticism, and thus does not attend enough to the boundaries of the territory in which alone the pure understanding is allowed its play; rather, I mean principles that actually incite us to tear down all those boundary posts and to lay claim to a wholly new territory that recognizes no demarcations anywhere. Hence transcendental and transcendent are not the same.”

8. Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic: The Tenacity of Transcendental Illusion CPR, pp. 384-393 “Transcendental illusion, on the other hand, does not cease even though it is uncovered and its nullity is clearly seen into by transcendental criticism (e.g. the illusion in the proposition: "The world must have a beginning in time"). The cause of this is that in our reason (considered subjectively as a human faculty of cognition) there lie fundamental rules and maxims for its use, which look entirely like objective principles, and through them it comes about that the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our concepts on behalf of the understanding is taken for an objective necessity, the determination of things in themselves

9. Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic: The Tenacity of Transcendental Illusion CPR, pp. 384-393 “ [This is] an illusion that cannot be avoided at all, just as little as we can avoid it that the sea appears higher in the middle than at the shores, since we see the former through higher rays of light than the latter, or even better, just as little as the astronomer can prevent the rising moon from appearing larger to him, even when he is not deceived by this illusion. The transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with uncovering the illusion in transcendental judgments, while at the same time protecting us from being deceived by it; but it can never bring it about that transcendental illusion (like logical illusion) should even disappear and cease to be an illusion.

10. NOTE: The sea appearing higher “ in the middle than at the shores. . .” is not an illusion. The apparent larger size of moon on horizon is. “Because of the Coriolis Effect, we also need to keep in mind that the water will also be trying to deflect toward the right of the direction it is travelling. As you can see, that means the water will be moving toward the center of the ocean. This really occurs and the water forms a "hill" in the center of the ocean basins.” http://sparce.evac.ou.edu/q_and_a/ocean_circulations.htm

11. Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic: The Tenacity of Transcendental Illusion CPR, pp. 384-393 “For what we have to do with here is a natural and unavoidable illusion a which itself rests on subjective principles and passes them off as objective, whereas logical dialectic in its dissolution of fallacious inferences has to do only with an error in following principles or with an artificial illusion that imitates them. Hence there is a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason, not one in which a bungler might be entangled through lack of acquaintance, or one that some sophist has artfully invented in order to confuse rational people, but one that irremediably attaches to human reason, so that even after we have exposed the mirage it will still not cease to lead our reason on with false hopes, continually propelling it into momentary aberrations that always need to be removed.” (pp. 386-7)

12. Transcendental Dialectic, First Book: On the Concepts of Pure Reason CPR, pp. 394-408 [ NOTE: The section explains how the Transcendental Ideas are Generated] “The function of reason in its inferences consisted in the universality of cognition according to concepts, and the syllogism is itself a judgment determined a priori in the whole domain of its condition. I can draw the proposition "Caius is mortal" from experience merely through the understanding. But I seek a concept containing the condition under which the predicate (the assertion in general) of this judgment is given (i.e., here, the concept "human"), and after I have subsumed [the predicate] under this condition, taken in its whole domain ("all humans are mortal"), I determine the cognition of my object according to it ("Caius is mortal").”1 (pp. 399-400) 1. Assumes syllogisms in ‘Darii’ or perhaps ‘Ferio.’

13. Transcendental Dialectic, First Book: On the Concepts of Pure Reason, CPR, pp. 394-408 [ NOTE: The section explains how the Transcendental Ideas are Generated] “Accordingly, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a certain object, after we have thought it in the major premise in its whole domain under a certain condition. This complete magnitude of the domain, in relation to such a condition, is called universality (universalitas). In the synthesis of intuition this corresponds to allness (universitas), or the totality of conditions. So the transcendental concept of reason is none other than that of the totality of conditions to a given conditioned thing. Now since the unconditioned alone makes possible the totality of conditions, and conversely the totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned, a pure concept of reason in general can be explained through the concept of the unconditioned.” (pp. 399-400)

14. Transcendental Dialectic, First Book: On the Concepts of Pure Reason, CPR, pp. 394-408 [ NOTE: The section explains how the Transcendental Ideas are Generated] “There will be as many concepts of reason as there are species of relation represented by the understanding by means of the categories; and so we must seek an unconditioned, first, for the categorical synthesis in a subject, second for the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series, and third for the disjunctive synthesis of the parts in a system.   There are, therefore, just as many species of syllogism, and in each of them prosyllogisms proceed to the unconditioned: one, to a subject that is no longer a predicate, another to a presupposition that presupposes nothing further, and the third to an aggregate of members of a division such that nothing further is required for it to complete the division of a concept.” (p 400)

15. Transcendental Dialectic, First Book: On the Concepts of Pure Reason, CPR, pp. 394-408 [ NOTE: The section explains how the Transcendental Ideas are Generated] Previous slide further explained:   There are, therefore, just as many species of syllogism, and in each of them prosyllogisms proceed to the unconditioned: one, to a subject that is no longer a predicate, . . . . All S are M (Medieval mnemonic: ‘Darii’) This A is S Therefore, This A is M For the ‘prosyllogism’ S can never be a predicate and is allegedly true of any M. So, ‘I think’ applies to any ‘All S are M’ or indeed to any major premise of a syllogism. (p 400)

16. Transcendental Dialectic, First Book: On the Concepts of Pure Reason,CPR, pp. 394-408 [ NOTE: The section explains how the Transcendental Ideas are Generated] Previous slide further explained:   There are, therefore, just as many species of syllogism, and in each of them prosyllogisms . . . another to a presupposition that presupposes nothing further, . . .” (p 400) Hypothetical syllogism If A then B If B then C . . . . And indefinitely ‘if C then D, and if D then E . . . . etc. Therefore if A the E . . . etc. But if A is a condition of hypothetical syllogism it is the first term of a hypothetical prosyllogism andthereby a transcendental Idea originating the hypothetical syllogism.

17. Transcendental Dialectic, First Book: On the Concepts of Pure Reason, CPR, pp. 394-408 [ NOTE: The section explains how the Transcendental Ideas are Generated] Previous slide further explained:   There are, therefore, just as many species of syllogism, and in each of them prosyllogisms . . . , and the third to an aggregate of members of a division such that nothing further is required for it to complete the division of a concept . . .” (p 400) Disjunctive syllogism: Either A or B Not B Then A But what if the first premise contains all predicates as disjuncts, then that premise will contain and be a ground for the major premise of any disjunctive syllogism. As such it will be a disjunctive prosyllogism.

18. Transcendental Dialectic, First Book: On the Concepts of Pure Reason, CPR, pp. 394-408 [ NOTE: The section explains how the Transcendental Ideas are Generated] “By the idea of a necessary concept of reason, I understand one to which no congruent object can be given in the senses. Thus the pure concepts of reason we have just examined are transcendental ideas. They are concepts of pure reason; for they consider all experiential cognition as determined through an absolute totality of conditions. They are not arbitrarily invented, but given as problems by the nature of reason itself, and hence they relate necessarily to the entire use of the understanding. Finally, they are transcendent concepts, and exceed the bounds of all experience, in which no object adequate to the transcendental idea can ever occur.” (p. 402)

19. Transcendental Dialectic, First Book: On the Concepts of Pure Reason, CPR, pp. 394-408 [ NOTE: This passage specifies the three Transcendental Ideas] “Now all pure concepts have to do generally with the synthetic unity of representations, but concepts of pure reason (transcendental ideas) have to do with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions in general. Consequently, all transcendental ideas will be brought under three classes, of which the first contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance, the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general.” (pp. 405-6)

20. Transcendental Dialectic, First Book: On the Concepts of Pure Reason, CPR, pp. 394-408 [ NOTE: This passage specifies the three Transcendental Ideas] “The thinking subject is the object of psychology, the sum total of all appearances (the world) is the object of cosmology, and the thing that contains the supreme condition of the possibility of everything that can be thought (the being of all beings) is the object of theology. Thus pure reason provides the ideas for a transcendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia rationalis), a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis),b and finally also a transcendental cognition of God (theologia transcendentalis).” (p. 406)

21. The paralogisms of Pure Reason, pp. 409-415;

22. What are Paralogisms of Pure Reason? “A logical paralogism consists in the falsity of a syllogism due to its form, whatever its content may otherwise be. A transcendental paralogism, however, has a transcendental ground for inferring falsely due to its form. Thus a fallacy of this kind will have its ground in the nature of human reason, and will bring with it an unavoidable, although not insoluble, illusion. (p. 411)

23. Paralogisms are Logical Patterns Based on the Unconditioned Primacy of the ‘I think’ “Now we come to a concept that was not catalogued above in the general list of transcendental concepts, and nevertheless must be assigned to it, yet without altering that table in the least and declaring it defective. This is the concept -- or rather, if one prefers, the judgment – I think. But one will easily see that this concept is the vehicle of all concepts whatever, and hence also of transcendental concepts, and is thus always comprehended among them, and hence is likewise transcendental, but that it can have no special title, because it serves only to introduce all thinking as belonging to consciousness.

24. The ‘I think,’ if treated empirically, can justify an legitimate science “Now the rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of this kind; for if the least bit of anything empirical in my thinking, any particular perception of my inner state, were mixed among the grounds of cognition of this science, then it would no longer be a rational but rather an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus already before us a putative science, which is built on the single proposition I think; and we can, in accordance with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, quite appropriately investigate its ground or groundlessness. (p. 412)

25. But if the ‘I think’ is treated purely as the apperception, ‘I think,’ it generates Transcendental Ideas and Illusions in Keeping with the Structure of the Categories of Understanding “I think a is thus the sole text of rational psychology, from which it is to develop its entire wisdom. One easily sees that this thought, if it is to be related to an object (myself), can contain nothing other than its transcendental predicates; because the least empirical predicate would corrupt the rational purity and independence of the science from all experience.” (p. 413)

26. But if the ‘I think’ if treated purely as the apperception, ‘I think,’ it generates Transcendental Ideas and Illusions in Keeping with the Structure of the Categories of Understanding “Here, however, we have merely to follow the guide of the categories; only since here first a thing, I as a thinking being, is given, we will not, to be sure, alter the above order of the categories to one another as represented in their table, but we will begin here with the category of substance, and thus go backwards through the series. The topics of the rational doctrine of the soul, from which everything else that it may contain has to be derived, are therefore the following: ---” (p. 413)

27. Confounding of Table of Categories (p. 212) with Transcendental Idea derived from ‘I think’ p. 413

28. First Paralogism: ‘I think’ as Substance “That the representation of which is the absolute subject of our judgments, and hence cannot be used as the determination of another thing, is substance. I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of Myself cannot be used as the predicate of any other thing. Thus I, as thinking being (soul), am substance. (p. 415-6)

29. Second Paralogism: ‘I think’ as simple “That thing whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of many acting things, is simple. Now the soul, or the thinking I, is such a thing. (p. 417)

30. Second Paralogism: ‘I think’ as simple NOTE: As used to ‘prove’ immortality of soul’. “Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of unique value only insofar as through it I distinguish this subject from all matter, and consequently except it from the perishability to which matter is always subjected. It is really only to this use that the above proposition is applied, hence it is often expressed thus: the soul is not corporeal.” (p. 420)

31. Third Paralogism: ‘I think’ as personality insofar as it is conceived an numerical identical across time “What is conscious of the numerical identity of its Self in different times, is to that extent a person.  . . . Thus it is a person. (p. 422)

32. Third Paralogism: ‘I think’ as personality insofar as it is conceived an numerical identical across time “On this basis the personality of the soul must be regarded not as inferred but rather as a completely identical proposition of self-consciousness in time, and that is also the cause of its being valid a priori. For it really says no more than that in the whole time in which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of my Self, and it is all the same whether I say that this whole time is in Me, as an individual unity, or that I am to be found with numerical identity, in all of this time.” (p. 423)

33. Fourth Paralogism: “of the ideality of the (of the outer relation) NOTE: By this Kant implies that the Transcendental Idea ‘I think’ generates the metaphysical doctrine of idealism “That whose existence can be inferred only as a cause of given perceptions has only a doubtful existence: Now all outer appearances are of this kind: their existence cannot be immediately perceived, but can be inferred only as the cause of given perceptions: Thus the existence of all objects of outer sense is doubtful. This uncertainty I call the ideality of outer appearances, and the doctrine of this ideality is called idealism, in comparison with which the assertion of a possible certainty of objects of outer sense is called dualism.” (p. 425)

34. The paralogisms of Pure Reason, pp. 445-58

35. The Transcendnental Illusion arising from the ‘I think’ analyzed as a ‘paralogism.’ “The procedure of rational psychology is governed by a paralogism, which is exhibited through the following syllogism: What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance. Now a thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject. Therefore it also exists only as such a thing, i.e., as substance. (p. 447)

36. The Transcendental Illusion arising from the ‘I think’ analyzed as a ‘paralogism.’ “ The major premise talks about a being that can be thought of in every respect, and consequently even as it might be given in intuition. But the minor premise talks about this being only insofar as it is considered as subject, relative only to thinking and the unity of consciousness, but not at the same time in relation to the intuition through which it is given as an object for thinking. Thus the conclusion is drawn per Sophisma figurae dictionis, hence by means of a deceptive inference.” (p. 448-9)

37. Moses Mendelssohn (1729 –1786) German Jewish philosopher often thought to be a main source of the Jewish Enlightenment.

38. Application of Undoing of Transcendental Ideas: Refutation of Mendelssohn’s proof of the persistence of the soul “This acute philosopher soon noticed that the usual argument through which it is to be proved that the soul (if one grants that it is a simple being) cannot cease through disintegration, is insufficient for the aim of securing the soul's necessary continuing duration, since one could still assume cessation of its existence by vanishing. In his Phaedo, he sought to avoid this perishability, which would be a true annihilation, by attempting to prove that a simple being cannot cease to be at all because, since it cannot be diminished and thus lose more and more of its existence, and so be gradually transformed into nothing (since it has no parts and thus no plurality in itself), there would be no time at all between a moment in which it is and another moment in which it is not, which is impossible.

39. Application of Undoing of Transcendental Ideas: Refutation of Mendelssohn’s proof of the persistence of the soul “--Yet he did not consider that even if we allow the soul this simple nature, namely, that it contains no manifold [of parts] outside one another, and hence no extensive magnitude, one nevertheless cannot deny to it, any more than to any other existence, an intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree of reality in regard to all its faculties, indeed to everything in general that constitutes its existence, which might diminish through all the infinitely many smaller degrees; and thus the supposed substance (the thing whose persistence has not been otherwise established already) could be transformed into nothing, although not by disintegration, but by a gradual remission (remissio) of all its powers (hence, if I may be allowed to use this expression, through elanguescence).”

40. Application of Undoing of Transcendental Ideas: Refutation of Mendelssohn’s proof of the persistence of the soul “For even consciousness always has a degree, which can always be diminished; consequently, so does the faculty of being conscious of oneself, and likewise with all other faculties. -Thus the persistence of the soul, merely as an object of inner sense, remains unproved and even unprovable, although its persistence in life, where the thinking being (as a human being) is at the same time an object of outer sense, is clear of itself; but this is not at all sufficient for the rational psychologist, who undertakes to prove from mere concepts the absolute persistence of the soul even beyond life.” (p 449-4450)

41. Slides #1 to #22, Portrait of Immanuel Kant in mid-life: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/users/philosophy/courses/100/Kant003.jpg Slide #22 to end, Cameo of Kant in later mid-life: https://www.google.com/search?q=pictures+of+Kant&biw=1549&bih=900&tbm=isch&tbo= u&source=univ&sa=X&ei=MK0tVcuSFsP2oATQtYCoDw&ved=0CB0QsAQ#imgrc=3hJg7us4iNbcEM%253A%3BXsVsHzMy9Zn1cM%3Bhttp%253A%252F%