Electoral Competition and Accountability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of China’s Village Elections

1. Electoral Competition and Accountability:A Game-Theoretic Analysis of China’s Village Elections Hiroki Takeuchi Department of Political Science University of California, Los Angeles hirokit@ucla.edu Presentation prepared for the 2007 EITM Workshop University of California, Los Angeles, July 20, 2007

2. Electoral Competition and Accountability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of China’s Village Elections I. Motivation II. Null Hypothesis III. Premises IV. Conclusion

3. Motivation (1) • Field Research • 40 villages across seven provinces • Literature • Many cases, few theories

4. Motivation (2): Anecdotes • Vice Party Secretary of R Town in Hunan Province “Candidates in the village elections in our town never carry on a campaign. So we don’t have a problem of ‘buying votes’ (mai piao). No campaign, no corruption.” • Chief of D Village in Hebei Province “I did nothing during the last election. I felt that I did not have to be Village Chief as I had already been Village Party Secretary. But villagers nominated me for candidacy and I was elected.”

5. Motivations (3): Observations • Competitive elections are often corrupt. • Village cadres elected by competitive and corrupt elections often do not provide public goods. • Village cadres who provide public goods are often elected by non-competitive elections.

6. Null Hypothesis • Electoral competition holds candidates accountable to the electorate. • Competition brings uncertainty of an electoral result. • The uncertainty gives candidates an incentive to campaign. • Candidates are held accountable to the electorate.

7. The Institutional Setting Organic Law • Established in 1988 and revised in 1998 • Article 14: Each election must be contested. Village Governmental Organizations • Villagers’ Committee (VC) • Village Party Branch (VPB) • VPB > VC

8. Premises • Candidates seek to win the election. • Some elections are competitive and others are not. • A village is a small community (b < c). • Campaigning is not effective to win an election. • The number of votes needed to win is small.

9. Parameters w = a candidate’s benefit from winning an election c = a candidate’s cost of campaigning b = a candidate’s cost of buying votes p = the probability that candidate 1 will win when both candidates take the same strategy.

12. Conclusion of the Model • Electoral competition may raise the probability of a vote-buying candidate’s win. • The increase in b may lower the probability of a vote-buying candidate’s win.

13. The Future for Expanding Township Elections? (Increase in b) b > c • Voters do not know candidates personally. • Candidates have an incentive to campaign to sway voters. • Electoral competition will hold candidates accountable to their policy proposals through campaigning. • Elected cadres will be less accountable to higher authorities or the Party organization.

14. Conclusion: Limits of Election under an Authoritarian Regime • The Chinese Communist Party has encouraged elections at the village level but hesitated to introduce elections for higher levels. • It is because candidates and local cadres will be truly accountable to the electorate, not to the Party, once elections are introduced above the village level.