The U.S. Army MANPRINT Program

1. The U.S. Army MANPRINT Program Dr. Michael Drillings Acting Director, MANPRINT Directorate Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 Voice: 703-95-6761; Fax: 703-695-6997 michael.drillings@hqda.army.mil

2. MANPRINT UPDATE AGENDA The state of Army MANPRINT • Where we are • Where we are going

3. The Full Range of: Manpower Human Factors Engineering Personnel Capabilities Health Hazards Training Soldier Survivability System Safety What is MANPRINT? MANPRINT Integrates The Entire System’s Life Cycle: Research, Development, Acquisition, Training and Operations Throughout MANPRINT is the Army’s implementation of DoD Human Systems Integration (HSI) Program

4. Total Army Personnel Command Force Integration Division Human Research & Engineering Directorate Soldier Survivability Human Factors Engineering MANPRINT Practitioners(ACAT I Programs) MANPRINT Directorate (HQ DA, DCS G1) Army Safety Center System Safety Manpower Personnel Center for Health Promotion & Preventive Medicine Health Hazards Training Survivability/ Lethality Analysis Directorate

5. Why MANPRINT? MANPRINT results in systems that: • Perform better • Use less manpower • Use less expensive personnel • Consider training issues early • Are safer for the user • Have less life-cycle cost

6. Split-torque transmission reduces repair/replace times Easily removable main rotor blades Mission Equipment Package rack orientation and module location One piece engine cowl allows greater access to engine and auxiliaries o o o o o o o o o MANPRINT Design Influence on Comanche Dual point folding tail Tail rotor configuration eliminates personnel hazards Cockpit configuration Accessibility to LRUs Weapons loading/access Crew protection EOTADS promotes easy access to TGS and nose components Portable Maintenance Aid Initial Required Program Buy - Life Cycle Cost avoidance > $3.29B Source: MANPRINT/Human Systems Integration Influence on Comanche Design & Development Program, St. Louis, MO: The Analytic Sciences Corp., January 1995

7. Comanche Tool Kit • The tool box for the T-53 series helicopter turbine engine (Huey & Iroquois) had 134 different tools. • The tool KIT for the T-800 for the Comanche has SIX tools instead of 134 • Tools are inexpensive & commercially available • Results • Fewer tools • Less burden on the supply system • Less training and inventory time • Increased combat readiness

8. Where We Are • We work for the DCS, G-1 • We are in the MANPRINT Directorate • We have input, through the G-1, to materiel development meetings (ASARCs, AROCs; RRCs; ASRs; GOSCs) • We have input to the Requirement’s process • MANPRINT Assessment is an integral part of acquisition • We have a staff of 4 G G A G G A A

9. Where We Are (cont.) • Through the WIPTs, the domains are involved in solving problems • We rely on several other labs and agencies to help us • PMs do MANPRINT • Their primary job is to produce a system meeting KPPs for a specific price and on a specific schedule • MANPRINT is not a KPP (key performance parameter) G A A

10. Where We Are Going • Life under a new DoD 5000 • Continued improvement in tools • Through research • Better MANPRINT education and training for Acquisition Corps • New acquisition approaches • Spiral development • Incremental system improvement • Capability based acquisition • Use best available technology • Waived systems G A A A A

11. Where We Are Going (Cont.) • Robotic and semi-autonomous systems • Joint interest • Cognitive engineering • Example A A G

12. Cognitive Engineering Human Factors Engineering principles must be considered an integral part of the system engineering process. To achieve that, the physical, cognitive, and decision-making requirements needed by the crew and maintainers to perform required tasks must be determined.

13. Cognitive Engineering Human Factors Engineering principles must be considered an integral part of the system engineering process. To achieve that, the physical, cognitive, and decision-making requirements needed by the crew and maintainers to perform required tasks must be determined. This information will be the basis for determining relevant design characteristics, performance standards, performance and decision aids, task structure, potential workload, crew configuration, and training requirements.

14. Where We Are Going (Cont.) Better Business Processes • VISIONS database • More efficient transmission of information • More uniform requirements’ language Better Technical Substance • Better funding of R&D • Better prediction of human performance • Integration of MANPRINT domains Better communication • Joint training program • Community of practice web site • Beginnings of true joint cooperation to serve the common interest A A A

15. MANPRINT in the System Acquisition Process - AR 602-2 (1 June 2001) • Combat Developers • Include MANPRINT considerations in documents (MNS, AoA, ORD, CAPSTONE rqmts document, critical operational issues and criteria (COIC) • Ensure MANPRINT is represented on all Integrated Concept Teams (ICTs) • Program Executive Officers (PEOs) • Include responsibility for funding and executing MANPRINT program in PM charters • Rate assigned PM execution of MANPRINT responsibilities • Monitor PM and contractor execution of MANPRINT requirements • Program/Project/Product Managers (PMs) • Implement proactive MANPRINT program for all systems managed • Include MANPRINT considerations as explicit part of source selection • Incorporate MANPRINT provisions in system contracts and specs • Charter MANPRINT WIPT or include MANPRINT in appropriate IPT • Resolve MANPRINT issues before each milestone decision review • Crosswalk MANPRINT performance parameters from ORD to RFP to TEMP • Provide resources and funding for MANPRINT program implementation

16. The Bottom Line • SOLDIERS will be using the equipment developed to perform missions and to defend their lives. • Equipment designed with the soldier in mind is : • Easier to use, employ, and operate • Easier to maintain and sustain • More effective • Safer • More efficient • More cost effective • Less likely to require redesign We must equip the soldier, not man the equipment!

17. Summary • MANPRINT will continue to be required by regulation (although less emphatically) • MANPRINT is smart business • Improved design • Reduced life cycle costs • Reduced risk to soldiers • www.manprint.army.mil

18. How to have a Successful MANPRINT Program -- Combat Developers • Include MANPRINT representative(s) on Integrated Concept Team (ICT) • Establish MANPRINT plan of action • Identify and document MANPRINT issues/concerns • Include soldier & unit (MANPRINT) considerations in requirements documentation • MANPRINT/HSI specifically addressed in para 5e of ORD • Critical MANPRINT considerations meeting definition of Key Performance Parameters should be addressed in para 4 of ORD • Transfer documentation of MANPRINT issues to PM • Track as Common Data Elements (CDEs) • Ensure seamless MANPRINT consideration in system design efforts

19. How to have a Successful MANPRINT Program -- Materiel Developers • Include MANPRINT considerations in program planning & execution • Include MANPRINT considerations in acquisition strategy • Incorporate MANPRINT requirements in solicitation(s) and source selection(s) • In Comanche source selection, 17% of score centered on MANPRINT considerations • Provide resources for MANPRINT program implementation • Make MANPRINT part of your Integrated Product Team (IPT) • Where appropriate, charter a MANPRINT Working IPT • Establish MANPRINT plan of action and milestones • Track MANPRINT issues/concerns with domain SME’s • Require the Contractor to have a MANPRINT Program • Track and document MANPRINT issues via CDEs, SMMP, or similar mechanism • Include MANPRINT issues in test & evaluation planning • Crosswalk MANPRINT performance parameters, objectives and thresholds from the ORD to the RFP to the TEMP

20. How We Influence the Process • Combat developer states requirements • FCS example • Milestone Decisions • WIPTs • IPTs • MANPRINT Assessments • Test and Evaluation

21. Cognitive Engineering Human Factors Engineering principles must be considered an integral part of the system engineering process. To achieve that, the physical, cognitive, and decision-making requirements needed by the crew and maintainers to perform required tasks must be determined. This information will be the basis for determining relevant design characteristics, performance standards, performance and decision aids, task structure, potential workload, crew configuration, and training requirements. The system shall: • Conform to sound HFE design processes. • Minimize physical and cognitive workload and task complexity for the target audience. • Emphasize the use of automation to aid or replace the performance of complex tasks. • Optimize crew/team communication through integration of controls and displays. • Employ appropriate soldier-centered interfaces to enable effective supervision/control/teaming between manned and unmanned systems

22. Domain Definitions MANPOWER - number of military and civilian personnel required and potentially available to operate, maintain, sustain and provide training for systems PERSONAL CAPABILITIES - cognitive and physical capabilities required to train, operate, maintain and sustain material and information systems TRAINING - instruction, education, OJT, or unit training required to provide personnel and units with their essential job skills, knowledge, values and attitudes. HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING - integration of characteristics into system definition, design, development and evaluation to optimize human-machine performance SYSTEM SAFETY - design and operating characteristics of a system that minimize the human or machine errors or failures that cause accidents HEALTH HAZARDS - design and operating characteristics of a system that create significant risks of bodily injury or death; “threats” include: loud noise, chemical and biological substances, extreme temperatures, and radiation energy. SOLDIER SURVIVABILITY - characteristics of system that can reduce fratricide, detectability, and probability of attack, as well as minimizing system damage, personal injury, and cognitive and physical fatigue

23. Additional Examples Lightweight Towed Howitzer (XM777) Apache Longbow Joint PM estimates $6.2M cost avoidance due to MANPRINT efforts (Potential rework costs) Cost avoidance = $16.8M over life cycle of fleet Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle • Initial design reduced crew from 4 to 3 but performance was unacceptable • Simple design change resulted in predicted performance improvements(reduced workload, reduced soldier risk) • Re-designed system validated with minimum testing • Performance now acceptable • $2-4M saved in program costs • Saved $15M in MPT over 7 years (3 vs. 4 crew) • MANPRINT investment: $60K!

24. Some “Lessons Learned” Source: Reverse Engineering: Human Factors, Manpower, Personnel, and Training in the Weapon System Acquisition Process, ARI Tech Report 659, January 1995 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Stinger • Requirements and system assessments were addressed in terms of machine, not man-machine system performance • Complex engagement sequence created significant training and operational problems • Ground clearance rqmts to avoid back blast & debris resulted in serious limits on elevation or use by tallest soldiers (98th percentile) • Lower mental category soldiers could not meet required single engagement kill probability rqmts • Maintenance issues led to: • Creation of new MOS (27M) for direct support maintenance relatively late in system development • Increased manpower demands beyond initial planning • Need for a maintenance training device to be delivered two years after IOC UH-60A Blackhawk M1 Fault Detection & Isolation Subsystem • Assessments of RAM during testing permitted exclusion of soldier-produced failures, resulting in unrealistically high estimates of performance • MOS’s selected as organizational mechanics were lower in mental aptitude than either M1 tank crewmen or general population of soldiers • Failure to operationally define rqmts for missions (e.g., nap-of-the-earth & night flying) led to incomplete testing • MOS67T (Blackhawk repairer) manpower was underestimated by 21 to 600%, necessitating recruitment efforts to obtain required personnel and a significant training “surge” at Fort Eustis • M1 Simplified Test Equipment was so unwieldy, difficult to transport, and difficult to connect to the tank that it actually discouraged its use • As early as DT/OT II, maintainers showed limited understanding of system functions, inability to identify basic faults, and limited facility in using technical manuals