1 / 12

COM5336 Cryptography Lecture 14 XTR Cryptosystem

COM5336 Cryptography Lecture 14 XTR Cryptosystem. Scott CH Huang. COM 5336 Cryptography Lecture 10. XTR. XTR = ECSTR= E fficient C ompact S ubgroup T race R epresentation. Proposed by A Lenstra & E Verheul. XTR uses an efficient and compact method to represent subgroup elements

prisca
Download Presentation

COM5336 Cryptography Lecture 14 XTR Cryptosystem

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. COM5336 CryptographyLecture 14XTR Cryptosystem Scott CH Huang COM 5336 Cryptography Lecture 10

  2. XTR • XTR = ECSTR= Efficient Compact Subgroup Trace Representation. • Proposed by A Lenstra & E Verheul. • XTR uses an efficient and compact method to represent subgroup elements • XTR removes the distinction between conjugates • The security of XTR is based on the XTR-Discrete-Logarithm problem in the subgroup of GF(p6) of order dividing p2  p + 1. COM 5336

  3. Subgroups of GF(p6) • p6 1 = (p  1)(p + 1)(p2 + p + 1)(p2  p + 1) • Subgroup of order p  1 can be embedded in GF(p) • Subgroup of order p + 1 can be embedded in GF(p2) • Subgroup of order p2 + p + 1 can be embedded in GF(p3) • Subgroup of order 6(p) = p2  p + 1 cannot be embedded in GF(pt)for t = 1, 2, 3 • (Pohlig-Hellman)order p2  p + 1 subgroup is as hard as GF(p6), or if order p2  p + 1 subgroup is easier than GF(p6) then GF(p6) is at most as hard as GF(p3) (and that is unlikely) COM 5336

  4. Naïve XTR Basics • Let p,q be primes. • q | p2  p + 1 • Pick an element g of GF(p6) of order q. • Construct the cyclic subgroup <g>={1,g,g2,...gq-1}  GF(p6)* • Apply the GDLP to <g>. COM 5336

  5. XTR Subgroup Element Representation • If , then it can be proved that • For all and its conjugates can be represented by • XTR does not distinguish between and its conjugates. • We do not wish to work in . We wish to work in only. COM 5336

  6. XTR-Discrete-Logarithm Problem • XTR Setup • XTR-DLP: Given . Find • We do not need to find . We only need to find • We do not need to represent any elements in . We do not need to work in . We’ll only work in . • We are interested in the following Given . Compute . (Algorithm 2.37) COM 5336

  7. The XTR Paper Organization • Efficient algebraic computation in GF(p2) (§ 2.1) • Efficient computation of Tr(gn) given Tr(g) (§2.2-§2.3) • Algorithm 2.37 (main algorithm) • Efficient computation of Tr(ga.gbk) given Tr(g) and a,b with unknown k. (§2.4) • Algorithm 2.48 (main algorithm) COM 5336

  8. Advantages of XTR • The security of the subgroup <g> is believed to be as hard as GF(p6)*. • We normally need log p6 = 6 log p bits to represent GF(p6)*. • However, Tr(h) is in GF(p2)*, so we only need log p2 = 2 log p bits. • That's a 66% improvement compared to ordinary DLP-based schemes. COM 5336

  9. XTR vs RSA COM 5336

  10. XTR vs ECC over GF(p) COM 5336

  11. XTR Summary • XTR is secure, efficient, compact, easy to implement, with trivial parameter generation • Disadvantages: • Do we really trust GF(p6)? • Multiplication of Tr(gm) and Tr(gn) is non-trivial (but can usually be avoided) • p6 grows as fast as RSA moduli (i.e., fast) • q grows as fast as ECC subgroups (i.e., slow) • log2(q)  log2(p)  170 only for current security levels COM 5336

  12. Conclusion • ECC and XTR are both the most promising asymmetric cryptosystems nowadays. • Both cryptosystems are secure, efficient, and suitable for portable devices. • The lack of knowledge of their corresponding subgroups may contribute to their security. COM 5336

More Related