Philosophy 224

1. Philosophy 224 Wilson, from On Human Nature

2. E. O. Wilson • Edward O. Wilson is an Alabama-born entomologist currently teaching at Harvard. • He’s known outside of entomological circles for coining the term “sociobiology,” which he defines in the preface to On Human Natureas, “The extension of population biology and evolutionary theory to social organization” (x). • Essentially, sociobiology is the attempt to apply biological and evolutionary explanations to social scientific phenomenon.

3. A Naturalistic Starting Point • On Human Nature is devoted to the application of the sociobiological hypothesis to the problem of articulating an account of human nature. • This project is required, he insists, by the success of the theory of evolution, “If humankind evolved by Darwinian natural selection, genetic chance and environmental necessity, not God, made the species” (271). • If the evolutionary account of human development is correct, then we have to start there, with our being as a natural creature, if we are to understand what we are. • Further, it is only if we start there, that “Human nature can be laid open as an object of fully empirical research…” (ibid.).

4. Spiritual Dilemmas • If we adopt this naturalistic starting point, however, we are immediately confronted by two profound challenges to common aspects of our self understanding. • The first arises in the recognition that the evolutionary account of human beings rejects any notion of an external purpose or significance. • Implication: we are not here for any reason. Acknowledging this runs the risk of depriving us of our animating ideals. • The second of these challenges has the same root, but appears in the naturalization of our moral sensibility. • Implication: our sense of right and wrong is just an evolutionary by-product. Acknowledging this risks the promotion of a pernicious moral skepticism or relativism.

5. Evolution and Purpose • Taking evolution seriously requires us to acknowledge that the driving force of our development as a species is our genes. • Though we might be inclined to believe that there is a purpose or telos directing our behaviors or shaping our understanding, “…the brain [the intellect] exists because it promotes the survival and multiplication of the genes that direct its assembly” (272). • This is what evolution suggests about the reality behind all of our accomplishments. No matter how lofty and ennobling they may seem to us, in the end they are all just epiphenomenon of our genetic drive to survive and propagate. • Wilson believes that we’ve already recognized this at the cultural level, and that it explains the cultural malaise which so many commentators (of all ideological stripes) have decried.

6. No purpose, but a Task • The only task left open to us, on Wilson’s account, is to understand better how this all works. That is, we should seek to understand the evolutionary significance of our cultural products. • Doing this, however, brings us face to face with the second challenge, the challenge to our sense of morality. • The naturalistic perspective that Wilson is advocating highlights “innate censors and motivators” (274) which are the ultimate source and explanation of our moral convictions. • It’s not the rightness or wrongness of actions which accounts for our principles, but rather genetically determined traits/behaviors.

7. Another Task? • In this arena, too, we can seek to understand more clearly and completely how these censors and motivators work. • Once we do, we are faced with a decision: how to evaluate the various biochemical processes which underlie our moral perceptions. • We have to answer the question, “Which of the censors and motivators should be obeyed and which one might be better curtailed or sublimated” (275). • This is no trivial question. Becoming conscious of the evolutionary, biological underpinnings of our moral perceptions puts us in the position of consciously choosing the future evolution of our species (275). • Though this may seem like a task for philosophers (and it has certainly been assumed to be so), Wilson is convinced that only a sociobiologist is in a position to accomplish it.

8. Isn’t this Reductive? • A common charge against assertions like Wilson’s, that our behavior, choices, aims and morals are ultimately products of our genes, is that it is overly reductive. • It takes a very complex field and reduces it to one, relatively simple, thing. • As we know from many other instances, trying to explain complex phenomenon with simple causes is usually not very successful. Complex events have complex causes. • Wilson tries to anticipate this sort of objection, not by responding to it directly, but by insisting that reduction is a necessary and ineliminable feature of science. • The sort of reduction suggested is not of simple explanation but of covering laws (explanations that include reference to laws/generalities of nature).

9. Do We have the Tools? • Even if Wilson is right about his prescription, there are important questions to ask about his diagnosis: sociobiology. • In an elaboration of the basic definition highlighted above he emphasizes the hybrid character of sociobiology, encompassing ethology, psychology, ecology and genetics (277). • It’s important to recognize that, for Wilson, there is a hierarchy implicit in this group, “What is truly new about sociobiology is that it has extracted the most important facts about social organizations from their traditional matrix in ethology and psychology and reassembled them on a foundation of ecology and genetics” (Ibid.). • The only justification of this hierarchy that Wilson offers is that only recently have ecology and genetics become mature enough as disciplines to do the foundational work.

10. One Implication • An interesting implication of this hierarchy is that it suggests a distinctly non-anthropocentric treatment of human nature. “The [sociobiologists] attempt to place humankind in its proper place in a catalog of social species on earth” (277). • This place is as one, and perhaps not even the most interesting or distinctive, of many such species.

11. A More Important Implication • When we consider the full range of real and possible forms of social behavior across the whole range of social species, we cannot fail to recognize insists Wilson, than much of this behavior is genetically determined. • Genetically Determined Trait: “a trait that differs from other traits at least as part as a result of the presence of one or more distinctive genes” (279). • We can get a good sense of the range and extent of genetic determination of behavior be comparing and contrasting common aspects of human behavior with a range of other species. • Comparison: our social groupings, sexual practices, training of young, etc with other closely related primates. • Contrast: the same with a range of bird species. • Compare the lists on pp. 281-2. 1) is a list of common human social features; 2)is a list of possible social feature for an intelligent race of insects (!).

12. Hard-Wiring • Wilson goes so far as to entertain the thought experiment, advanced by a fellow proponent of sociobiology, that if it were possible for humans to be raised independently of any social context, the features common to all human social forms would develop spontaneously, the inevitable expression of the peculiarities of the human genetic code • Summary of the claim: 284.

13. Boiling it Down • The key claim: human nature was shaped by natural selection. • Wilson goes even farther and insists that if this is not true, evolutionary theory fails, or at least would have to be substantially altered (285). • If what Wilson is here theorizing is to be confirmed, this confirmation will take the form of the clear application of principles from ecology and genetics to human social forms. • “The theory must not only account for many of the known facts in a more convincing manner than traditional explanations, but must also identify the need for new kinds of information previously unimagined by the social sciences” (286).