'Payment function' presentation slideshows

A Sufficient Condition for Truthfulness with Single Parameter Agents

A Sufficient Condition for Truthfulness with Single Parameter Agents. Michael Zuckerman, Hebrew University 2006 Based on paper by Nir Andelman and Yishay Mansour (Tel Aviv University). Agenda. Introduction to Truthful Mechanisms Definitions and preliminaries

519 views • 43 slides

Truthful Mechanism Design for Multi-Dimensional Scheduling via Cycle Monotonicity

496 views • 35 slides

Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions

Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions. Paolo Penna and Carmine Ventre. Already on these screens. Concept of mechanisms with verification Construction of optimal mechanisms w/ verification

360 views • 23 slides

Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions

Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions. Carmine Ventre (University of Liverpool) Joint work with: Paolo Penna (University of Salerno). Routing in Networks. s. Change over time (link load). No Input Knowledge. 3. 10. 1. 1. 2. Selfishness.

304 views • 18 slides

Buying A Car

300 views • 18 slides

The Math Class

The Math Class. The Math Class includes method members that perform common math functions Abs( num ) returns the absolute value Sqrt ( num ) returns a Double value that is the square root of a number. Num must be positive - a negative # will cause a run-time error

260 views • 11 slides