'Safety property' presentation slideshows

ECE 720T5 Fall 2011 Cyber-Physical Systems

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Chapter 7

Chapter 7. Safety & Liveness Properties. safety & liveness properties. Concepts : properties : true for every possible execution safety : nothing bad happens liveness : something good eventually happens Models : safety : no reachable ERROR/STOP state

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Hyperproperties

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Hyperproperties

Hyperproperties. Michael Clarkson and Fred B. Schneider Cornell University Air Force Office of Scientific Research December 4, 2008. TexPoint fonts used in EMF. Read the TexPoint manual before you delete this box.: A A A A A A A A. Security Policies Today. Confidentiality Integrity

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Hyperproperties

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Experience in Formal Model Verification for Mission-Critical Domains

Experience in Formal Model Verification for Mission-Critical Domains. By Vladimir Okulevich Quantitative Aspects of Embedded Systems Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 0 5 .03.2007- 09 .03.2007. Content. Introduction Software Dependability Formal Model Verification Examples: A,B,C

675 views • 47 slides

Hyperproperties

Hyperproperties. Michael Clarkson and Fred B. Schneider Cornell University IEEE Symposium on Computer Security Foundations June 23, 2008. TexPoint fonts used in EMF. Read the TexPoint manual before you delete this box.: A A A A A A A A. Security Policies Today. Confidentiality Integrity

586 views • 46 slides

Comparing Semantic and Syntactic Methods in Mechanized Proof Frameworks

Comparing Semantic and Syntactic Methods in Mechanized Proof Frameworks. C.J. Bell, Robert Dockins , Aquinas Hobor , Andrew W. Appel , David Walker. In the last decade, dozens of researchers have been investigating proof-carrying code (PCC) These researchers have split into two camps:

556 views • 45 slides

Self-stabilizing Distributed Systems

Self-stabilizing Distributed Systems. Sukumar Ghosh Professor, Department of Computer Science University of Iowa. Introductio n. Failures and Perturbations. Fact 1. All modern distributed systems are dynamic. Fact 2. Failures and perturbations are a part of such distributed systems.

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Agenda for a Science of Security

Agenda for a Science of Security. Fred B. Schneider* Department of Computer Science Cornell University Ithaca, New York 14853 U.S.A. Maps = Features + Relations. Features Land mass Route Relationships Distance Direction. Map of Security (circa 2005). Features : Port Scan Bugburg

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Agenda for a Science of Security

Agenda for a Science of Security. Fred B. Schneider* Department of Computer Science Cornell University Ithaca, New York 14853 U.S.A. Maps = Features + Relations. Features Land mass Route Relationships Distance Direction. Map of Security (circa 2005). Features : Port Scan Bugburg

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Formal Methods for Software Engineering

Formal Methods for Software Engineering. Lecture 6, Part II: Deadlock & Safety Analysis. Contents. Deadlock analysis Distributed deadlocks Dining philosophers Searching by deadlock analysis Safety analysis Safety properties Single-lane bridge problem. Deadlock state. north. north.

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Computer Science 425 Distributed Systems

Computer Science 425 Distributed Systems. Lecture 20 Distributed Transactions Chapter 14. Distributed Transactions. A transaction (flat or nested) that invokes operations in several servers. T11. A. A. X. T1. H. T. T12. B. T. B. T21. C. Y. T2. K. D. C. T22. F. D. Z.

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The DHCP Failover Protocol A Formal Perspective

The DHCP Failover Protocol A Formal Perspective. Rui Fan MIT Ralph Droms Cisco Systems Nancy Griffeth CUNY Nancy Lynch MIT. Fault Tolerant DHCP. Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is a widely deployed protocol to assign IP addresses and other client parameters.

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Chapter 16 : KRONOS (Model Checking of Real-time Systems)

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CS 294-8 Consensus cs.berkeley/~yelick/294

CS 294-8 Consensus http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~yelick/294. Agenda. Overview and Administrivia Specifications and verification Consensus Practical Issues in Consensus Note: due in part to unreliable network and lack of reliability in ppt, most slides are stolen from Lamport. Administrivia.

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Safe Kernel Extensions Without Run-Time Checking

Using Build Integrated Checking to Preserve Correctness Invariants. Safe Kernel Extensions Without Run-Time Checking. George C. Necula & Peter Lee. Hao Chen & Jonathan S. Shapiro. Laura Hauser cs297 6/7/2005. Overview. Proof-Carrying Code Safety Policy MOPS EROS

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CSE 637 Program Semantics and Verification

CSE 637 Program Semantics and Verification. Reactive Systems. Examples: Operating Systems Embedded Systems (e.g. Heart Stimulator) Protocols Main Characteristics: Termination is rather an error than a desired outcome. Program. Environment. Properties of Reactive Systems.

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CSE 637 Program Semantics and Verification

CSE 637 Program Semantics and Verification. Reactive Systems. Examples: Operating Systems Embedded Systems (e.g. Heart Stimulator) Protocols Main Characteristics: Termination is rather an error than a desired outcome. Program. Environment. Properties of Reactive Systems.

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Applying Learning Technique to Formal Verification

Applying Learning Technique to Formal Verification. Wonhong Nam wnam@cis.upenn.edu. Recent work I. Assume-guarantee reasoning based compositional verification [CGP03, AMN05(CAV) ] To prove that a safety property ? holds for a module M = M 1 || M 2

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