Begging the Question: A Reason to Worry about Theory-Dependence

1. Begging the Question: A Reason to Worry about Theory-Dependence

2. Evidence ------------ Theory

3. Evidence ------------ Theory Premise ---------- Conclusion

4. Plan

5. Plan Begging the Question

6. Plan Begging the Question • Rejecting Robinson’s argument against the existence of the fallacy.

7. Plan Begging the Question • Rejecting Robinson’s argument against the existence of the fallacy. • Def:= in terms of epistemic dependence

8. Plan Begging the Question Theory-Dependence as Epistemic Circularity • Rejecting Robinson’s argument against the existence of the fallacy. • Def:= in terms of epistemic dependence

9. Plan Begging the Question Theory-Dependence as Epistemic Circularity Criticism of Kosso’s formal criteria of independence • Rejecting Robinson’s argument against the existence of the fallacy. • Def:= in terms of epistemic dependence

10. Plan Begging the Question Theory-Dependence as Epistemic Circularity Criticism of Kosso’s formal criteria of independence The problem theory-laden tests VS The problem of theory-laden justification • Rejecting Robinson’s argument against the existence of the fallacy. • Def:= in terms of epistemic dependence

11. Robinson’s Argument (R)

12. Robinson’s Argument (R) • The prohibition of begging the question is not the prohibition of unsound arguments.

13. Robinson’s Argument (R) • The prohibition of begging the question is not the prohibition of unsound arguments. • If the prohibition of begging the question is a law of logic or a maxim of a good scientific method, then the prohibition of begging the question is the prohibition of unsound arguments.

14. Robinson’s Argument (R) • The prohibition of begging the question is not the prohibition of unsound arguments. • If the prohibition of begging the question is a law of logic or a maxim of a good scientific method, then the prohibition of begging the question is the prohibition of unsound arguments. THERFORE • “The prohibition of begging the question is not a law of logic, not a maxim of good scientific method” (Robinson 1971, 116).

15. (A1) • Berlin is the capital of Germany. THEREFORE • Berlin is the capital of Germany.

16. Types of Dependence

17. Types of Dependence • Epistemic Dependence

18. Types of Dependence • Epistemic Dependence • Logical Dependence

19. Types of Dependence • Epistemic Dependence • Logical Dependence • Doxastic Dependence

20. Logical (Syntactic) Approach

21. Logical (Syntactic) Approach “Syntactic theorists say that whatever is bad about an argument is due to the form of the argument” (Sorensen 1991, 245).

22. Logical (Syntactic) Approach “Syntactic theorists say that whatever is bad about an argument is due to the form of the argument” (Sorensen 1991, 245). • Entailment

23. Logical (Syntactic) Approach “Syntactic theorists say that whatever is bad about an argument is due to the form of the argument” (Sorensen 1991, 245). • Entailment • Logical Equivalence

24. Logical (Syntactic) Approach “Syntactic theorists say that whatever is bad about an argument is due to the form of the argument” (Sorensen 1991, 245). • Entailment • Logical Equivalence • Identity

25. Entailment (A2) • All the members of the club attended the University of Texas. • Twardowski is a member of the club. THEREFORE • Twardowski attended the University of Texas.

26. Identity (A4) • MORE THAN ONE ARGUMENT IS WRITTEN IN CAPITAL LETTERS. THEREFORE • MORE THAN ONE ARGUMENT IS WRITTEN IN CAPITAL LETTERS.

27. Identity (A5) • THIS ARGUMENT CONFIRMS THE LAST ONE. THEREFORE • THIS ARGUMENT CONFIRMS THE LAST ONE.

28. Doxastic Approach

29. Doxastic Approach (A6) • Jack’s behaviour is suspicious. THEREFORE • He is the murderer.

30. Can a justification-affording argument be epistemically circular?

31. Can a justification-affording argument be epistemically circular? I am awakened one night by what seems to be a loud pop. I glance at my electrical clock, but it is off. The next morning I awaken to see that a crew from the power company is at work on an electrical transformer across the street. I reason that since I seemed to hear a pop, the transformer must have blown during the night and, therefore, that I did seem to hear a pop last night (Cling 2002, 252).

32. Can a justification-affording argument be epistemically circular? • Cling’s argument is not really circular.

33. Can a justification-affording argument be epistemically circular? • Cling’s argument is not really circular. • Justification-enhancing arguments

34. Can a justification-affording argument be epistemically circular? • Cling’s argument is not really circular. • Justification-enhancing arguments VS • Justification-creating arguments

35. What can we learn from this?

36. What can we learn from this? • Criticism of a certain type of formalism in philosophy of science. • A better understanding of the problem of the theory-ladenness of our evidence.

37. H

38. H O

39. H H O

40. The idea is that evidence supporting an hypothesis only comes from observational procedures that test that hypothesis, but one necessary condition for a legitimate test is that it be at least possible that the test yield a result that is unfavourable to that hypothesis. But, the argument goes, an observational procedure cannot possibly yield a result that is unfavourable to an hypothesis that is assumed in the design of that procedure and in the analysis of the resulting data (Brown 1994, 408)

41. Kosso’s formal criteria

42. Kosso’s formal criteria • {Ti} are the theories that can account for the good functioning of our scientific instruments.

43. Kosso’s formal criteria • {Ti} are the theories that can account for the good functioning of our scientific instruments. • Tx is the theory of the observable object x.

44. Kosso’s formal criteria • {Ti} are the theories that can account for the good functioning of our scientific instruments. • Tx is the theory of the observable object x. • Tx1 is the part of Tx that could be confirmed by the observation report ‘x is P’.

45. Kosso’s formal criteria • {Ti} are the theories that can account for the good functioning of our scientific instruments. • Tx is the theory of the observable object x. • Tx1 is the part of Tx that could be confirmed by the observation report ‘x is P’. • Tx2 is the part of Tx that is also a part of {Ti}.

46. DNA strand observed with an electron microscope

48. Suppose that we have some evidence for the existence of atoms, atomics laws and of everything that makes a good electron microscope. Then, after one of our experiments, we come to the conclusion that the best explanation for the images that we produced is that we observed atoms. Therefore, we conclude that there are atoms after all.

49. Brown’s Quasi-Popperian View of Emprical Testing

50. Brown’s Quasi-Popperian View of Emprical Testing • Test A: If we determine the recession speed of a quasar on the basis of its redshift, and that we calculate its redshift with a relativistic formula, then our observations will be biased.